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Introduction
When looking into the billions of glum and hungry faces in the world, one might raise
the question whether globalization is really a bowl of cherries (cf. Rodrik, 1999).
Thus, it is manifest that in recent years many leading economic scholars have focused
on the connection between globalization and economic integration on the one hand,
and the international distribution of welfare on the other hand (see Rodrik, 1997;
Stiglitz, 2002; Collier, 2007 for example; Milanovic, 2006 for a good overview). Grow-
ing global inequality comprises two tendencies: growing inequality between countries
and within countries (see Milanovic, 2002 and 2006: 21ff for a discussion) and an
interaction between them is likely (cf. Bourguingnon, 2002).
The question about whether our global economic system supports the convergence
of living standards has been of interest in economic theory; however, it empirically
could not been answered sufficiently (cf. Raffer/Singer, 2001: 16 - 31, esp. 21). For
certain industrialized countries the process of convergence is likely. Ben-David (1993),
for example, finds evidence for the contribution of trade to convergence in the EU.
Rassekh (1992) draws a similar conclusion for OECD countries. Furthermore, it is
questionable if convergence within the EU (which also forms an important part of
OECD countries) is due to market forces (and especially induced by trade) or rather
to redistributive EU policies and subsidies (Raffer/Singer, 2001: 21/22).
In addition, recent research has highlighted the role of institutions in distribu-
tion (Fortin/Lemieux, 1997; Rodrik, 1997; Stiglitz, 2001; Pontusson, 2005: esp. 59
- 63; Collier, 2007; Krugman, 2007; Beramendi/Anderson, 2008; Ersado/Milanovic,
2008 e.g.). While institutional and geographical aspects generally gained importance
in economic theory throughout the last years, barely any institution questioned the
policy orientation towards economic openness and free trade. It is interesting that
economic research focused on the role of free trade when trying to explain the grow-
ing income inequality of the - sparsely world market integrated1 - US economy after
1980 (see section 1.2), while research about the influence of trade on income and
their distribution stayed rather low (cf. section 3.5). In the case of CEECs where a
major trade liberalization of the last century has taken place: the transition of Cen-
tral and Eastern European CPEs to market economies and the associated integration
of them into the world economy as well as the accession of 12 of them to the EU.
These countries are very interesting for the world income distribution since they had
a tremendous influence on it during the 1990s (Milanovic, 2002).
Furthermore, the lack of research in this area is interesting because the (neo-
)classical theory of international trade would imply convergence (for CEECs) in both
senses mentioned above: The Factor Price Equalization Theorem suggests that free
1Of course, world market integration rose in the US throughout the 1980s but remained rather
low compared to other countries as a percentage of GDP.
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trade leads to equalization of factor prices, thus wages2; the Stolper-Samuelson Theo-
rem comprises the assumption that abundant unskilled labor in CEECs takes advan-
tage of internationalization, leading to a wage increase relative to the better payed
high-skilled workers.
I take these predictions as a motive to empirically investigate the influence of
trade with the EU-15 on wages in four NMS of the EU: the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland, and Slovakia. Thereby I focus on the two aspects mentioned above:
factor price equalization between EU and NMS and distributional effects among the
working population in CEECs.
The outline of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 places the research into a the-
oretical context and therefore reviews theoretical contributions to the question of
income distribution in trade theory, mainly the Stolper-Samuelson and the Factor
Price Equalization Theorem. Chapter 2 surveys empirical investigations on the issue
outside CEECs and is concerned with the question of the possibilities and shortcom-
ings of empirical investigations led by economic theory. Since economics has recently
discovered that institutional (or, to put it even more provocatively: historical) context
does matter3; chapter 3 outlines the economics of transition and trade liberalization
in CEECs and also sums up the few empirical investigations of trade and wage devel-
opment in CEECs. Summing up these theoretical considerations, chapter 4 roughly
specifies the model structure to be estimated in chapter 6, whereas chapter 5 sum-
marizes the used data and gives a first overview of its descriptive statistics and a
preliminary analysis. Chapter 6 then provides the main contribution, i.e. the econo-
metric analysis of the impact of exports (towards the EU-15) on wages in CEECs.
My hypothesis is that trade with the EU-15 generally had a positive
impact on wages in the CEEC-4 leading to a convergence in wages between
the EU-15 and CEECs. Furthermore, I expect that this positive impact
was more emphasized in low-skilled (and thus lower income) industries
leading to a compression (or: weakening the growing divergence) in in-
come distribution. The empirical results of this investigation contradict
this hypothesis. The obtained results rather do not allow to make a clear
statement about the impact of exports towards the EU-15 on wages in the
CEEC-4. While negative short-run effects are possible, a positive long-run
relationship for Hungary and Poland is likely. These results are discussed more
precisely in chapter 7, which also draws some policy conclusions.
It seems straightforward that the question investigated in this thesis has policy
relevance (provided that inequality is a matter of interest, see Milanovic, 2006: 25ff
for an overview), especially for the lobbies and associations of workers, above all trade
unions. The results indicate that free trade market forces are not sufficient for an
equal distribution of welfare across and within countries. It should be highlighted
2It should be noted that the micro convergence of factor prizes does not necessarily imply that
GDP per capita will converge. See Rassekh/Thompson (1998) for a discussion.
3In fact, economic pioneer Adam Smith was well aware of the self-evident truth that his “invisible
hand” ([1776] 1984: 194) can only work with a minimum rule of law (see his “three duties of the
sovereign”, 300 and Book Five, 301ff.). Ricardo already restrained the importance of the state to
fiscal questions only. Smith ([1776] 1984) also argues that principles of economics such as the division
of labor are determined historically (Book I, ch. II; 6) and shows (in Book I, ch. III) that this division
is limited by the extent of the market. The latter is also not an everlasting principle of mankind but
rather emerging historically - an insight that has painfully been recognized in the context of Central
and Eastern European transition (cf. section 3.1). For Smith, contrary to many later economists,
time and space are main determinants of economic development.
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in this context that these findings are not a statement against trade liberalization
as such, but indicate that workers’ representations should be concerned about the
context of these liberalizations and should claim for accompanying policy measures.
This also might be for the benefit of public order. Bhagwati (2004) argues that there
is no global government and thus nobody could be made responsible for claims. More-
over, globalization does not only consist of flows of goods and factors but also ideas
and a cross-linked civil society. Historically, there was neither a Grande Nation nor
a Citoyen Francaise before social inequality pushed the Tiers Etat to uprise during
the French Revolution. Will growing global inequality lead to a similar uprise of the
Tiers Monde4 making our planet One World? Or will undemocratic, nationalistic,
or fundamentalistic movements gain importance? Beramendi and Anderson (2008:
4-5) highlight that inequality is not only political in its origins but also in its conse-
quences; other research suggested that excessive inequalities attack the foundations
of democratic political regimes (Boix, 2003: see esp. 10, ch. 1, and 235/6).
Accordingly, global action against inequality is necessary and since trade is prob-
ably among the central transition mechanisms for convergence, it is manifest to focus
on its distributional implications. This is especially true for the European Union, not
only because legal forms of civil participation indeed exist here. The high expecta-
tions of the CEECs’ population in the 1990s not only relied on catching up to Western
European standards in an institutional, but also in a social sense; this long-cherished
wish could not have been fulfilled by the socialist system (cf. Segert, 2002: 29-69 and
154-158). Therefore, it is important to know if and to what extent these expectations
have been fulfilled and which role trade played in this context.
Boix (2003: 235-240) argues that if trade entails wage compression between the
wealthy and the poor, the former have few incentives “to restrict the franchise to
avoid the redistributive consequences of a fully democratic system” (p. 236)5, espe-
cially when capital mobility is high. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that
not (only) absolute divergences in income matter, but (also) relative ones. The Eu-
ropean Commission (2008: 149) itself refers to the economics of happiness literature
and the relative income theory of consumption; the ranking effect seems important for
job and overall worker’s satisfaction: all the rest being equal, workers are ’unhappy’
when paid less than their colleagues. Therefore, the relative position in the income
distribution plays a key role in subjective employment quality and individuals are
concerned more about their relative than their absolute consumption level.
This again has implications on economic growth since, for example, the desire to
’Keeping up with the Joneses’ suggests that the share of income consumed depending
on the individual’s position in the income distribution of the population which has
consequences on the saving rate and therefore on economic growth (cf. also Caleiro,
2007 for the relations of consumer confidence, spending and economic growth in the
context of unemployment).
Finally, one topic touched in this thesis is also of recent importance for domestic
policy in Austria and other EU-15 countries: If trade in goods serves as a partial
(Ohlin, [1933] 1967: 26f) or even total (Samuelson, 1948, 1949) substitute for free
factor mobility leading to FPE, working populations in the NMS will have no economic
4The expression Tiers Monde, poorly translated into other languages, traces back to Alfred Sauvy
and his article “Trois mondes, une plane`te” in L’Observateur, August 14, 1952.
5Milanovic/Ersado (2008: 13) refer to other studies that suggest democracy being anti-inequality
even though these results are not very robust and find themselves (20/25) a robust pro-equality effect
of democracy.
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incentive to emigrate to other countries, as labor markets open entirely in the EU-27.
It seems like this expectation has not become fulfilled.
Chapter 1
Economic Theory of Trade and
Factor Prices
1.1 Mercantilists and Physiocrats
From the very beginning of reasoning about international trade, distributional ques-
tions have always played a certain role. For mercantilist economists this question
was an issue rivaling between countries about the highest trade surplus. This trade
surplus was considered as necessary condition to redistribute the existing global sup-
plies of bullion which were exchanged for goods (cf. Go¨mmel/Klupp, 1994: 91) and
were considered as means of welfare accumulation and constituting power differences
of states (cf. Go¨mmel/Klupp, 1994: 25f, 88f). This view entailed import substitu-
tion (cf. Go¨mmel/Klupp, 1994: 93) and protectionist measures (cf. Go¨mmel/Klupp,
1994: 79f, 94, 142) to reduce the drain of bullion.
The physiocratic laissez-faire et laissez passer1 principle in foreign trade theory2
also was mainly led by national self-interest, namely the intention to sell agricultural
excess-supply abroad to prevent a domestic price deterioration while the mercantilist
concern about international distribution of bullion was not of interest for the phys-
iocrats (cf. Go¨mmel/Klupp, 1994: 132, 142).
Generally it should be noted that abstract considerations about national welfare
were the key concern of these early economist branches whereas distributional effects
in the narrower sense or factor prices did not play a decisive role.
1.2 Adam Smith: Absolute Advantages
This view does not conceptually change with Adam Smith, often referred to as the first
to develop an approach to an international division of labor that allows both countries
engaged to profit. Combating the protectionist ideas of mercantilists, Smith argues
for free trade.3 Generally, for Smith, the division of labor was the main source for
1The quote is accredited to Vincent de Gournay (cf. Go¨mmel/Klupp, 1994: 71).
2“Qu’on maintienne l’entie`re liberte´ de commerce; car la police du commerce inte´rieure et
exte´rieure la plus sure, la plus exacte, la plus profitable a` la Nation et l’e´tat, consiste dans la pleine
liberte´ de la concurrence” (Quesnay, ([1775], 1969: 336).
3Smith’s ([1776], 1984) idea that restraints upon the importation from foreign countries would give
“great encouragement” to the respective industry (192) that would therefore employ a greater share
of labor and stock than otherwise would have gone to it (192/3) already came close to modern trade
theory. He sees only two cases where burdens on imports are advantageous for the encouragement
of domestic industry: if the industry is of necessity for the country’s defense or if a tax is imposed
on the production of a domestic industry, making it reasonable to impose an equal tax upon imports
1
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social welfare (cf. Book One, ch. I-III) involving the international division of labor,
and thus trade.4 If one country has advantages over another in producing particular
commodities, “it will always be more advantageous for the latter rather to buy of the
former than to make” (Smith, [1776] 1984: 195). For Smith, who argues based on
the value theory of labor5, this advantage is regarded as absolute, i.e. the “natural
price” of the commodity is lower in the country that has an absolute advantage in
producing it. This concept is therefore considered as absolute advantage6 and was
later transcended by David Ricardo.
1.3 David Ricardo: Comparative Advantages
Ricardo’s theoretical insight forms the base of today’s economic theory of foreign
trade. Going beyond Smith, Ricardo ([1817], 1996: 94f) points out that under re-
stricted movement of production factors in a two country, two commodity framework
it may be advantageous for a country to import one good, even though it has an
absolute advantage in producing both goods, if the advantage in the production of
the imported good is relatively lower compared to the advantage in the production
of the other good that is thus exported to finance imports. This consideration of in-
ternational differences in relative opportunity costs (Dixit/Norman, 1980: 1) became
famous as the theory of comparative advantage.7 Even though this theory undergoes
strong limitations8 and is “of limited use in employing data to analyze the overall
structure of foreign trade” (Helpman, 1999: 123) at least in its simplest formula-
tion, its main consideration became the core of trade theory. It is considered as
“the first, oldest, and most basic proposition in the theory of international trade”
(Dixit/Norman, 1980: 2).
It should also be noted that in contrast to the statement of Deardorff (1994, cf.
Cline, 1997: 37), Ricardo was the first to systematically consider and investigate
(197f).
4“It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family never to attempt to make at home what it
will cost him more to make than to buy. ... All ... [professions] find it for their interest to employ their
whole industry in a way in which they have some advantage over their neighbors, and to purchase
with a part of its produce ... whatever else they have occasion for. What is prudence in the conduct
of every private family can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom.” (Smith, [1776], 1984: 194)
5“The real price of everything, what everything really costs to the man who wants to acquire it,
is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What everything is really worth to the man who has acquired
it, and who wants to dispose of it or exchange it for something else, is the toil and trouble which it
can save to himself, and which it can impose upon other people. What is bought with money or with
goods is purchased by labour as much as what we acquire by the toil of our own body. That money
or those goods indeed save us this toil. They contain the value of a certain quantity of labour which
we exchange for what is supposed at the time to contain the value of an equal quantity. It was not
by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased; and its
value, to those who possess it, and who want to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely
equal to the quantity of labour which it can enable them to purchase or command” (Smith, [1776],
1984: 13). “The natural price ... is ... the central price, to which the prices of all commodities are
continually gravitating” (l.c., p. 24) If the commodity is sold for its natural price, it “is then sold for
what it is worth, or what it really costs the person who brings it to market” (l.c., p. 23).
6Smith ([1776], 1984: 257) himself does not use this term in the cited context but distinguishes
absolute from relative advantage in another sense.
7Ricardo himself does not use this term in his chapter “On Foreign Trade” but only once in
another context (cf. Ricardo, [1817], 1996: 183).
8For the case of decreasing returns see Raffer (1994) for a comprehensive overview. Samuelson
(1949: 183) mentions that constant returns to scale are a very serious limitation on the production
functions. Further on, the framework does not allow for intra-industrial trade and assumes full em-
ployment. As Daly (1999) points out, if the assumption of restrictions of factor movement is violated,
international trade (governed by comparative advantages) becomes interregional trade, governed by
absolute advantages.
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distributional effects of foreign trade on different groups of society, depicting for
example that a decrease in food or basic necessity prices due to foreign trade will
lead to a rise in profits (Ricardo, [1817], 1996: 92); and this indicates that trade
liberalization will lead to a downturn in English agriculture, which was in the interest
of English industrial capitalists at that time.
1.4 The Heckscher-Ohlin Model
About a century after the publication of Ricardo’s magnum opus “Principles of Polit-
ical Economy and Taxation”, the Swedish economists Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin
expanded the considerations of Ricardo in various ways:
1. Like Smith, Ricardo ([1817], 1996: 17/18) found the value of a commodity
possessing utility to depend on the relative quantity of labor which is necessary
for its production and on its scarcity - a classical view which was considered
antiquated by neoclassical mainstream economics of the 20th century. Ohlin
(1931: 161) definitely moved away from this view, providing a neoclassical
foundation for the theory of international trade based on the relative scarcity
of factors of production.
2. In this context they extended the theory of comparative advantage to the case
of two countries with different endowments of two production factors. They
argue that these differences in factor endowments, together with specialization,
are the reasons for international trade (Ohlin, 1931: 162f). Accordingly, a
country has an advantage in producing those goods which production is using
the abundant factor of this country relatively intensive (Ohlin, 1931: 163).
3. While classical theory has mainly considered factors as rigid, Heckscher and
Ohlin paid much attention to the movements of these factors in relation with
international trade.
4. Therefore the question of returns to these factors, i.e. the distributional effects
of trade, gained a new dimension in the theory of international trade.
The idea that the relatively abundant factor of a country makes it cheaper to
produce the good intensively using this factor “has proved the most enlightening ex-
planation of comparative advantage, in that it yields the greatest variety of testable
propositions” (Dixit/Norman, 1980: 4). This advantage simultaneously turned out
as the theory’s weak point in the sense that empirical investigations have mainly
conflicted with the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model9. Heckscher and Ohlin
themselves advised against overstretching their explanations.10 Nevertheless, the HO
model became the major framework for models in trade theory in the 20th century.
Also the two central theorems presented in this thesis, the SST and the FPE theorem
are based on the HO framework.
9Probably the best known example is the Leontief (1953) paradox. Cf. also Trefer (1993). Wood
and Mayer (2001), however, find that HO theory has been successfully used to explain at least the
broad composition of exports in some cases.
10see Raffer/Singer (2001: 49); cf. also Samuelson (1948: 181 and 182/3).
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1.5 Factor Price Equalization and the Stolper-Samuelson
Theorem
In textbooks on international trade these theorems are generally presented apart from
each other, beginning with the SST which corresponds to the historical order of inven-
tion. In this subsections I break this mold because I would suggest interpreting the
FPE as the more advanced theorem in the sense that it nests the SST in some way.
This is not true in the strict sense11 but FPE generally follows the same rationale as
the SST and the underlying forces at work are considered to be the same.
Based on the work of Ohlin ([1933], 1967) showing that “the mobility of goods
to some extent compensates for the lack of interregional mobility of the factors”
(Ohlin, [1933], 1967: 29) and will lead to a partial equalization of relative (and abso-
lute) factor prices, it was believed for a long time that while free factor movements
fully equalize factor prices, free commodity movements equalize them only partially
(Samuelson, 1948: 163). Even Samuelson (cf. 1948: 164, 169) shared this belief until
the late 1940’s. In 1941 Stolper and Samuelson still stated that as a result of the
reallocation of production factors after trade liberalization “there will be a tendency
- necessarily incomplete - towards an equalisation of factor prices between the two or
more trading countries. It is clear that the equalisation is only partial because other-
wise we would be involved in the contradiction that differences in comparative cost
would disappear, and there would be no trade” (Stolper/Samuelson, 1941: 59, italics
mine). Years later, feeling uncomfortable about the lack of proof for this proposition
in the literature (Samuelson, 1948: 169), Samuelson tried to provide this proof - and
discovered that the proposition was false. He argues that “so long as there is partial
specialization, with each country producing something of both goods, factor prices
will be equalized, absolutely and relatively, by free international trade” in goods even
without trade in factors of production (Samuelson, 1948: 169).
Before turning to the question of partial or total equalization it seems helpful
to understand the assumptions and underlying processes that cause factor prices to
equalize. Therefore suppose two countries I and II both producing two goods A and
B with the production factors L and H that are considered to be fixed in quantities
and totally mobile across industries. The availability of factor L relative to factor H
is assumed to be higher in country I than in country II:
LI
HI
>
LII
HII
.
Furthermore, the production of good A is assumed to require relatively more input
of factor H than production of good B:
HA
LA
>
HB
LB
,
and production functions, i.e. technologies of production, are considered to be the
same in both countries. For simplicity only consider the situation in country I, which
is relatively abundant in factor L (thus having a comparative advantage in the pro-
duction of good B) when the country moves from autarky to trade with county II
11For example, the FPE theorem requires more restrictive assumptions than the SST. Further-
more, SST predicts not only a relative decrease of income of the scarce factor as a result of trade
liberalization but an absolute one (in real terms). However, it is possible that under certain as-
sumptions (especially increasing returns to scale) FPE occurs, while both factors gain from trade (cf.
Helpman/Krugman, 1985: 190).
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(which can be assumed to be the rest of the world). In autarky, the price of good B
(relative to the price of good A) will be lower in country I than in country II since
H is the relatively scarce factor in country I. Under autarky, H will therefore earn
a relatively high income (as compared to country II and also to the free trade equi-
librium). Now consider the countries opening up for trade. This entails for country
I that its autarky prices will no longer hold and the price of good B will rise (to
the level of country II or any price in between). Accordingly, production factors will
move away from the production of good A to the production of good B, exporting the
excess demand of B to obtain A from country II in exchange. Note that this reaction
corresponds to the predictions of HO theory about specialization patterns and clearly
follows from the perfect competition (i.e. zero-profit) assumption and occurs until the
point is reached, where the marginal productivities of the two factors are the same in
every industry A, B:
∂A(LA,HA)
∂LA
∂A(LA,HA)
∂HA
=
∂B(LB ,HB)
∂LB
∂B(LB ,HB)
∂HB
. (1.1)
Moving production factors away from sector A indicates that a relatively higher
proportion of factor H gets freed up and clearly cannot be redeployed one-to-one
in sector B since otherwise the above mentioned equality of marginal productivities
would be violated. The excess supply of H is distributed across the sectors in a way
that equality 1.1 holds and this leads the paradox situation that even though the
proportion of total production factors remains the same in the society, nevertheless
the opening up to trade lowers the proportion of L relative to H in each sector (cf.
Stolper/Samuelson, 1941: 68). Diminishing the scarcity of factor H, this clearly en-
tails a relative loss of income of factor H. Stolper and Samuelson showed for the first
time that this loss will not only be relative (to the other factor of production) but
will unequivocally be absolute in real terms (cf. Stolper/Samuelson, 1941: 69; the
interested reader is referred to the original work for the proof of this statement).
Of course these findings were only obtained under rather restrictive assumptions
and it should be illustrated which assumptions they are: First of all, full employment
of production factors has to be given. Factor mobility among sectors was already
mentioned above. Production functions homogeneous of degree one, i.e. constant
returns to scale are assumed and productivity has to be marginally diminishing.
Stolper/Samuelson do neither explicitly mention the latter assumption nor perfect
competition, i.e. zero-profits which is clearly implied. They do mention the fact
though, that trade liberalization has to lead to a contraction instead of a destruction
of the formerly protected industry and that the small country assumption must hold,
i.e. country I does not affect the international terms of trade. The implications of
strong theoretical assumptions and the possible divorce from reality is discussed in
chapter 2 of this thesis, however, it is important to stress that under these special
assumptions Stolper and Samuelson could contribute undoubtful theoretical progress
providing a definite statement “concerning the effects of international trade upon
the relative remunerations of productive agencies, and more important, upon their
absolute real incomes” which was quite surprising since the literature of that time
only derived “statements of possibilities and presumptions rather than of necessities”
(Stolper/Samuelson, 1941: 58).
What does factor prices prevent from fully equalizing in this framework? In the
quote cited above, Stolper and Samuelson could not imagine occuring equalization in
comparative costs in a free trade equilibrium. It is surprising that even these out-
standing economists fall for such fatuous mistakes. Of course, as long as the marginal
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Figure 1.1: Samuelson’s FPE graph
production costs of one good relative to the other (i.e. the slope of the production
possibility curve) are different between both countries they will have an incentive to
further specialize until their equalization occurs. What Stolper and Samuelson con-
sidered as impossible in 1941 is no less than the main point of free trade equilibrium.
Equalization of the marginal production costs entails equalization of commodity prices
between both countries. This requires the further assumption of no transportation
costs (and generally no tariffs or NTBs). If identical technological production func-
tions and qualitatively identical inputs in both countries are assumed supplementary,
as long as no factor intensity reversals occur and no full specialization takes place, we
obtain a unique (Samuelson, 1949: 192) equilibrium where “real factor prices must
be exactly the same in both countries” (182, italics not in original).
Figure 1.1 (following Samuelson, 1948: 173, 1949: 188) illustrates the dynamics.
On the right hand side the horizontal axis measures the ratio of L to H. On the
vertical axis the ratio of (real) income of L relative to the (real) income of H is mea-
sured.12 Due to the different marginal rates of substitution for each good, we obtain
two different curves, one for A and one for B. Suppose, in country I the L-to-H ratio
is given by point M. We can be sure about one thing: a greater L/H ratio will be
employed in B than in A. Since the ratio of income of L to the income of H has to
be uniform in the country, say F13, it is straightforward to see that every sector will
employ a different L/H ratio.14
The left hand side shows the one-directional relation between commodity prices
12This ratio is equal to the ratio of the marginal physical productivity of L to the marginal physical
productivity of H.
13We can assume that F lies within F’ and F” since it is assumed that a positive quantity of every
good is produced.
14Thus, M can be interpreted as a weighted average which falls between the L/H ratios in each
industry, where the proportion of employed H in each sector relative to the total H are the exact
weights for every sector. To intuitively understand the dynamics, suppose the income ratio moves
from F” to F’. This will increase production of B to the point F’ where only B is produced, i.e. all
resources are devoted to B, i.e. the weight of H employed in A is 0 and the weight of H employed in
B is 1.
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and factor prices.15 Under the cited assumptions, there is a unique mapping from
the equilibrium factor-price ratio to a corresponding product-price ratio. For exam-
ple, a rise of the L/H income share (and thus a movement upwards of the horizontal
line in both diagrams) would only be consistent with a lower price ratio of A to B
(P(A)/P(B)) measured leftwards on the horizontal axis on the left hand side. The
essential “crux” in the FPE theorem and the associated Stolper-Samuelson effect, of-
ten ignored in empirical applications, is “the unique correspondence between product
price and factor price” (Cline, 1997: 42): It follows, that when we specify a common
price ratio, say D, we can move backwards unambiguously (from E to F) to a factor-
price ratio (Samuelson, 1949: 189). Since the left chart applies to both countries
as do the curves for both goods on the right hand side (due to the technologies of
production being equal in both countries)16, this backward move will be common
for both countries. This leads to a common factor-price ratio and a common factor
proportion set-up in the two countries (Samuelson, 1949: 189; italics ont in original).
Originally, Samuelson (1948) explained his FPE theorem more intuitively (cf. esp.
p. 175) setting USA as country II (Europe being country I), L as labor, H as land
(with wages and rents respectively), A as food and B as clothes but also giving an
arithmetic illustration (175-178).17 In 1949 (189-191) he presented a more elaborated
mathematical proof of his theorem.
1.5.1 Generalizations
Generally, the FPE theorem also holds for more than two goods or, more generally,
as long as the number of goods exceeds the number of factors (Samuelson, 1949:
192). However, for three productive factors with two goods the FPE theorem does
not hold (Samuelson, 1949: 193). Stolper and Samuelson (1941: 69f) already mention
that their theorem also holds for three or more goods but admit “that three or more
factors of production within a single country do seriously modify the inevitability” of
their conclusions (p. 72).
Based on the work of Samuelson from the 1950s, Hukukane Nikaido (1972) has
generalized the SST for all numbers of goods equals the number of factors. In this
framework for any change in the price of each good there will exist some factor that
gains in real terms and another one that loses and FPE is obtained (“Samuelson-
Nikaido Lemma”, cf. Feenstra, 2004: 68f). Jones and Scheinkman (1977) proved
thereafter that for each factor, there must be a good so that an increase in the price
of that good will lower the return to the factor, which is referred to as “natural
enemy”. However, not every factor must have a “natural friend” (cf. Feenstra, 2004:
70). But if the number of factors exceeds the number of goods (Ricardo-Viner model),
the generalized version of the SST holds but the Jones-Scheinkman theorem does not
(cf. Feenstra, 2004: 71f).
As far as market structure is concerned, Helpman and Krugman (1985) investigate
how different assumptions affect FPE and generally show that some of the restrictive
assumptions concerning the market structure even might be violated. If, for example,
increasing returns to scale arise solely from external economies (pp. 59-63), FPE
may hold if “each industry that is subject to external economies ... [is] located in
a single country” and therefore the FPE set may be very small (60). Furthermore,
under the assumption of differentiated products where imperfectly competitive firms
15The exact shape of this curve is determined by the two curves on the right hand side; this
quantitative detail is disregarded here.
16Note, that it is not necessary that L/H is equal in both countries.
17The outline in the Stolper/Samuelson (1941) paper is somewhat different: countries I, II remained
unspecified (but reversed in factor abundance relative to the presentation here), A was considered to
be wheat, B was considered to be watches. L was labor, H was capital.
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are able to differentiate their products and their outputs therefore become imperfect
substitutes, increasing returns may reverse some standard results about trade and
distribution. More precisely, FPE holds under certain assumptions if differentiated
products are the reason for increasing returns while contrary to the SST scarce, as
well as abundant factors, may gain from trade if countries are sufficiently similar in
factor abundance and economies of scale are sufficiently large (pp. 190-195).
Chapter 2
Theory and Empiricism
The debate about theory and empiricism in philosophy, social, and natural science
has been a very vivid one in the twentieth century.1 Interestingly, the question was
hardly posed in econometrics (cf. Spanos, [1986], 1993: 659) even though the lat-
ter was emerged directly at the borderline between economic theory and empiricism.
However, one should not forget that approaching the latter is mainly not only moti-
vated by an economic model but also implies a statistical model, i.e. a probabilistic
formulation purporting to adequately analyze and estimate the matter under inves-
tigation (cf. Spanos, [1986], 1993: 19-21). Thus, one has to investigate whether the
available data supports the statistical model2 well before one can decide which con-
clusions can be drawn from empirical data for the economic model. The latter issue is
especially challenging in the present context of trade theory since we are here dealing
with theorems within a general equilibrium model which dynamics operate through
very specific and theoretically determined channels.
2.1 On Theorems
First of all, one should not forget that the SST and the FPE theorems are theorems
- logically proven statements based on previously accepted or established statements;
in the SST and FPE case the HO framework and some further assumptions. Insofar,
there is no need to empirically “test” for these theorems to be true.3 This would be
just as much nonsense as testing for the assumption of Pierre de Fermat that no three
positive integers a, b, and c can satisfy the equation an + bn = cn for any integer
value of n > 2. Even though confirmed up to n = 4, 000, 000 in 1993, this assumption
finally has not become a theorem through empirical affirmation of course, but due to
the theoretical proof of Wiles (1995). To give a last example, probably no one would
1To consider only the German-speaking part, one may think of the issues of the Wiener Kreis
(Vienna Circle), Popper ([1990], 2002: 26ff e.g.), the related Positivismusstreit (Positivism Dispute),
or the discussions in subatomic physics as illustrated by Heisenberg (1969: 79-87) e.g.
2This issue will be addressed in chapters 4 and 6 and neither corresponds to the philosophical
questions or quantum-physical problems (where in fact observation destroys interference, a problem
that barely arises in economics due to its mainly non-experimental character) mentioned in the
footnote before.
3Generally one should be cautious in the empirical affirmation of assumptions. For example, what
do we learn about the distribution of prime numbers or the Gaussian assumption that his formula
N/log(N) always overestimates the sum of prime numbers in the series of natural numbers up to N if
empirically affirmed up to N = 1074? Actually not very much since John E. Littlewood and Stanley
Skewes showed theoretically in the 1930s that this proposition does not hold for numbers higher than
the Skewes number being around 1078 and have therefore given caution about being convinced by a
overwhelming number of data. Another case, of course, is the refutation of theoretical assumptions
(not theorems). For example, the fact that 2, 682, 4404 + 15, 365, 6394 + 18, 7967604 = 21, 615, 6734
clearly disproves Euler’s assumption that no a, b, c, d ∈ Z ¬ 0 satisfies a4 + b4 + c4 = d4.
9
10 CHAPTER 2. THEORY AND EMPIRICISM
come up with the ludicrous idea to empirically prove the Gauss-Markov theorem (see
Appendix A).4
Even though some studies claim to “test” for the SST or FPE theorem, the above
explanations should illustrate why it makes no sense to empirically “test” for the SST
or FPE theorem in the strict sense. Besides being an absolute no-idea theoretically,
the assumptions of these theorems are too strong to be given in practice. Moreover,
if the assumptions are violated in the strict sense the whole theorem becomes obsolete.
Samuelson (1949: 182f) was well aware of this point, seeing his contribution as
“a purely logical one”: “Is ’If H, then inevitably C’ a correct statement? The issue
is not whether C (factor-price equalisation) will actually hold; nor even whether H
(the hypothesis) is a valid empirical generalisation. It is whether C can fail to be
true when H is assumed true. Being a logical question, it admits of only one answer:
either the theorem is true or it is false.”
Nevertheless, another - more empirical - approach could address the issue in how
far the underlying assumptions are appropriate, or - to what extent the theorems’ cen-
tral conclusions still apply under the violation of its assumptions. Samuelson himself
was well aware that his theorems stand on shaky ground, namely that the HO frame-
work is quite inadequate (cf. Samuelson, 1948: 181), and even warned that it was
“dangerous to draw sweeping practical conclusions concerning factor-price equaliza-
tion” (Samuelson, 1949: 195). He called this model (1964: 152) “unrealistic” which is
also indicated by the fact that the original Stolper-Samuelson article was even rejected
for publication in the American Economic Review. Their editors thought that despite
being a brilliant theorem, it had nothing to say about real world implications of trade
theory (cf. Cline, 1997: 43). Even for confirmed trade economists like Deardorff and
Hakura (1994: 17) the high reliance of the SST and the FPE theorems “on the strong
implications of the two sector, H-O model” appears “somewhat uncomfortable”.
2.2 Tests for FPE
Due to this pessimism of leading trade theorists about its empirical relevance, it is
not particularly surprising that FPE did not receive much empirical attention in the
very beginning (cf. Rassekh/Thompson: 11f, cf. also Berger/Westermann (2001)),
even though the FPE theorem is a necessary outcome of the HO model which gained
empirical attention at least with Leontief’s (1953) paradox shortly after Samuelson’s
papers were published. This skepticism somewhat declined in the 1970s5 after Krueger
(1968) had attributed more than half of the per capita income differences between
the USA and many developing countries to differences in human capital endowment
indicating differences in income to be correlated with factor endowment. On the the-
oretical front, Samuelson’s (1971) contribution directed attention from FPE to the
4In applied research another problem aggravates the problem, namely that due to the non-
experimental character of most branches of economics, our “test arrangements” barely satisfy the
common theoretical assumptions. Referring to the above examples, verification efforts for Fermat’s
theorem become severely delicate if one only has a set of observations L = {a, b, c} : L ⊂ Q ¬ Z.
Also, in the Gauss-Markov theorem one might face the problem that it is rarely the case in practice
that one knows the true model Yn×1 = Xn×kβk×1 + un×1 and has all sets of k variables available. If
one has instead observed only k − p variables ∀ p : 1 ≤ p < k, rank(X) = k does no longer hold and
the OLS estimator will be inconsistent (and probably biased).
5See Rassekh/Thompson (1993: 13ff) for an excellent overview of the developments.
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more realistic issue of factor price convergence caused by trade expansion.6 Kotlikoff,
Leamer and Sachs (1981) showed that manufacturing wages and capital-to-labor ra-
tios converged in the 1960s and 70s, arguing that the latter only partially explains
the former. Dollar, Wolff, and Baumoll (1988) refer to the statement cited above
that FPE implies that relatively capital abundant countries must be producing rela-
tively more capital intensive goods instead of using more capital per worker in each
industry. Calculating the correlation in the capital-to-labor ratio in total manufac-
turing and every single of 28 industries (for 13 industrial countries in 1980), they
obtain statistically significant correlation mostly exceeding 0.5 and thus reject this
FPE implication. Mokhtari and Rassekh (1989) argue that between 1961 and 1984
the increase in trade and the convergence of the capital-to-labor ratios contributed
to explain convergence of manufacturing wages in 16 OECD countries. Focusing on
the period 1870-1913, O’Rourke and Williamson (1992) directly refer to commodity
price changes in explaining changes of the wage-rental ratio between the UK and the
US and attribute about half of the convergence in the latter to the convergence of
the former. Rassekh (1993) finds that FPE is capable of explaining cross-country
variation in industry-level wages for a sample of 11 industries in 14 OECD countries
over the period 1970-1985.
More recent empirical studies include Davis et al. (1997), Debaere/Demiroglu
(1997), Cunat (2001), and Hanson/Slaughter (2002). Contrary to these studies,
Bernard et al. (2002) correct for some variation in factor quality and technology
differences.7 Using a methodological framework that is robust to unobserved dif-
ferences in factor quality, production technology, and unobserved local variation in
consumer price indices, they found evidence against wage equality across geographic
areas of the United Kingdom; despite the UK is a relatively small, densely-populated
country with highly integrated goods markets and the potential for factor mobility.
The authors hold multiple HO cones of diversification and spatial variation in work-
ers’ relative cost of living (causing variations in the skill premia) responsible for these
findings (cf. section 2.4).
Berger/Westermann (2001) use cointegration techniques to estimate the long-run rela-
tionships between factor prices in six major industrialized countries. Rightly chastis-
ing other investigations for using nominal instead of real data, the authors stress that
results for real labor unit costs are less favorable for FPE to hold than nominal data
and find “very little evidence of significant co-movements in real labor costs across
the countries in their sample”, with real unit labor cost equalization found between
the US and Canada and between the US and France only.
2.3 Trade, US Income Distribution and the Equilibrium
Unlike the FPE theorem, the SST was subject of a vivid controversy among economists
in the US in the 1990s. This predominant empirical debate emerged because of the in-
crease of wage inequality during the 1980s in the United States and mainly discusses
the reasons for this surge in inequality.8 After some labor economists like Mincer
(1991), Bound and Johnson (1992), Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) suggested
skill-biased technological change as a possible explanation, another group of labor
6Rassekh and Thompson (1993: 1-7) discuss near FPE and factor price convergence as different
modifications of the FPE theorem.
7These corrections seem pretty important due to more recent developments in trade theory, cf.
section 2.4.
8An excellent overview of the empirical background to this debate and the debate itself is given
in Cline (1997).
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economists placed more emphasis on the role of trade and immigration. Katz and
Murphy (1992) e.g. examinined US wage data in the period 1963-91 using cointegra-
tion techniques and found that the durable-goods trade deficit as a percentage of GDP
is the only variable considered sharing the same long-run trend with wage-inequality.
Borjas (1994) theoretically emphasizes the far-reaching and long-lasting impact of
immigration on employment opportunities of natives. Using plant level data in US
manufacturing in the 1980s, Bernard and Jensen (1994) found that exporters account
almost exclusively for increase in the wage gap between high- and low-skilled work-
ers; they show that demand changes associated with increased exports are strongly
associated with wage gap increases. From these findings it might seem relevant to
refer to the FPE and SST: Suppose the USA was country II, L was low-skilled, H was
high-skilled labor, A was a skill-intensive and B a low-tech good (in the framework
presented in section 1.5). The FPE and SSTs then predict that under the relevant
assumptions an increase in trade with less skill abundant countries will lead to a price
increase in high-tech goods and a labor reallocation towards those more skill-intensive
occupations, increasing the wage gap between low- and high-skilled workers. Other
studies in this context include Murphy and Welch (1991), Borjas, Freeman, and Katz
(1992, 1997), and Borjas and Ramey (1994).
Trade economists like Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), and Bhagwati and Dehejia
(1994) mounted a critical attack on these studies pointing out that labor economists
ignored central assumptions and mechanisms of the SST. Among them is the fact
that the very concepts of trade theory call for a consistent use of general, rather than
partial equilibrium analysis which is often forgotten when only parts of the whole
equilibrium, namely comparative statics, are being studied (see Dixit/Norman, 1980:
v, 1 or Krugman, 1995). Suppose that we would observe that ceterus paribus growing
trade as a result of a trade liberalization has had a significantly larger positive impact
on wages in low income industries than in high income industries. Can we therefore
conclude that trade liberalization was the right policy choice to reduce income in-
equality? Besides from the fact that trade is never a first-best nor second-best mean
of achieving domestic distribution goals (Dixit/Norman, 1980: 25), it is also hard to
say what would have happened without trade liberalization. Maybe then the com-
pression would have been even greater. Thus, a general equilibrium appoach is the
appropriate way to address the question. In this respect Balcerowicz (1994: 19/20)
might be right, stating that a common fallacy in the debate about the transition to
a market economy was to evaluate any policy based on the comparison of a present
situation with the past.
It is questionable, however, how reliable a computable general equilibrium model
would be for as volatile developments as those in the Central and Eastern European
transition economies with only short time series to estimate elasticities (cf. Braber et
al., 1993), and thus disagreement among modelers about adequate model structures
prevail and would be a thesis topic in itself (cf. Bayar/Mohora, 2007 for a survey on
CGE models for CEECs). To sum up, it should be noted that any empirical results
of the subsequent analysis should be treated with caution - however, this would also
have been the case if more sophisticated and laborious CGE models would have been
applied.
An essential point of the HO-Samuelson framework in the transition from the
autarky to the free trade equilibrium is that trade’s impact on factor prices operates
through changes in product prices. As already stressed above, Deardorff (1993: 6)
emphasized that it is the “increase in the relative price of a good [that] increases the
real wage of the factor used intensively in producing that good, and lowers the real
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wage of the other factor” in the Stolper-Samuelson/FPE framework. While the strong
assumptions of this framework led other trade economists to apply more pragmatic
approaches to the question of the impact of trade on income distribution (see Feen-
stra and Hanson 1995, and Johnson and Stafford 1993 for example), Krugman (1995a)
brought the debate back to a general equilibrium framework. Setting out a stylized,
minimalist CGE model of world trade, wages and employment and suggesting some
approximations for the parameters of that model, Krugman examines the impact of
low-wage exports from the newly industrialized economies to the OECD (instead of
the US) and asks to what extent changes in relative wages and prices in the OECD
were explained by these imports. The answer turns out to be surprisingly small as
long as wages are flexible: Assuming wages of skilled workers rise by 3 % relative
to unskilled workers in the OECD due to liberalizing OECD-NIE trade, this would
imply imports from newly industrialized economies equal to 2.2 percent of OECD
gross output - which is more than the actual level - and would be associated with a
rise of only 1 % in the relative price of skill-intensive goods.9 Krugman (1995a: 359)
therefore concludes that studies that try to explain the impact of trade on income
distribution in industrialized countries by looking at price levels “have failed to find
any clear-cut effects” since “the change in relative prices associated with the growth
of NIE trade should be well within measurement error”.10
Cline (1997) allows for some modifications of the Krugman model and changes the pa-
rameters used by Krugman and therefore comes to a somewhat other finding, namely
“that trade and immigration (especially unskilled) have had a significant impact over
the past decade in the observed rise of skilled wages relative to unskilled wages” (238).
2.4 Theory Revisited
Even though Spanos ([1986], 1993: 660), disputing on the logical positivist branch
of econometrics, states that “no economic theory was ever abandoned because it was
rejected by some empirical econometric tests”, it should be noted that the generally
somewhat “bleak” gap between theoretical predictions on trade flows and the em-
pirical data (Helpman, 1999: 133) left trade economists not unaffected. Helpman
(1999: 133) e.g. suggested “to model more carefully the cross-country differences in
techniques of production”, since “allowing for differences in techniques of production
can dramatically improve the fit of factor content equations”. In fact, referring to
this idea, Davis and Weinstein (2001) introduced technical differences in a HO-Vanek
model11 and obtain results more corresponding to reality but under the assumption
of differences in production techniques, the classical FPE breaks down. Generally,
major advances in recent trade theory such as economies of scale (Helpman, 1984
gives a review), or differentiated products and monopolistic competition (cf. e.g.
Dixit/Norman, 1980: ch. 9; Krugman, 1995b reviews the literature) are not compat-
ible with the classical assumptions of the SST and FPE theorem and only lead to
similar results under supplementary assumptions (cf. subsection 1.5.1 of this thesis).
9Krugman also estimates the effect of OECD imports from newly industrialized counties on em-
ployment and concludes that under the relatively strong assumption of rigidly fixed relative wages
(“European assumption”) these imports led to a fall in employment of 1.43 %.
10This conclusion, however, must not leave us unpromising for the question under consideration
in this thesis since NIE trade only accounts for a small proportion of US or OECD GDP whereas
EU-15 trade amounts to a considerable fraction of CEEC-4 trade (cf. subsection 5.2.1 of this thesis).
11The HO-Vanek model generalizes the HO model to N goods and M factors and originally assumed
identical technologies and thus FPE to hold. Its general goal is to relate the factor content of trade
to the countries’ factor endowment. The HO-Vanek theorem then states that the factor content of
a country’s trade (i.e. its net exports) is equal to its factor content minus the factor content of the
rest of the world weighted by the considered country’s share of world production.
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2.4.1 Shortcomings and Alternative Approaches
The theoretical shortcomings of the FPE and SSTs and its lack of empirical support
have also shifted more attention towards the limitations of the model:
Even though transportation costs might have drastically decreased in the last
decades, it should still be noted that their existence prevents commodity prices and
thus factor prices from full equalization (cf. Samuelson 1948: 175, 178; 1949: 195)
even though freeing trade will reduce the gap.
Samuelson (1948: 175, 178-180) himself also mentions that complete specialization
truncates the convergence of factor prices before equalization is obtained. This might
occur if both trading partners are extremely different in factor endowments, or both
commodities use factors of production in almost the same proportions. Also Krugman
(1995a: 359f) refers to full specialization as “an important limitation to the factor
price equalization theorem”. However, his findings suggest that the wage gap between
high- and low-skilled workers must grow dramatically in OECD countries to make
them specialize in the high-skill production exclusively and this increase would be
interconnected with a dramatic increase of NIE imports far beyond any realistic level.
Generally, since the 1980s, economies of scale have become an important topic in
the theory of international trade. However, “where scale is important it is obviously
possible for real wages to differ greatly between large free-trade areas and small ones,
even with the same relative endowments of productive factors” (Samuelson, 1949:
196; cf. also subsection 1.5.1 of this thesis).
Connected to the implications of imperfect competition under economies of scale,
heterogeneous products might break down FPE: If a country systematically produces
goods which are intensive in skilled labor in every industry then wages will be higher
(cf. Bernard et al, 2002: 23). This problem in empirical application aggravates with
the aggregation level of industry data (cf. chapter 5 of this thesis).
These shortcomings generally raise concerns about the appropriateness or possible
inadequacies and limitations of the HO framework (cf. Samuelson, 1948: 181).
The violation of another assumption of the HO model has been stressed in the
context of empirical studies finding no evidence for FPE (cf. e.g. Bernard et al,
2002: 11, 20f), namely the mobility of all factors of production across industries. If
at least one factor is immobile, factor prices are prevented from converging towards
a common value. This problem is referred to as the concept of multiple HO cones
and can be described as follows (cf. figure 2.1 [taken from Bernard et al (2002)]):
The immobility of at least one factor prevents factor prices from converging towards
a common international value. Skilled (N) and unskilled (P) labor are available in
proportions EA and EB in countries A and B respectively. Three goods are produced:
computers (skilled labor intensive), textiles (unskilled labor intensive), and machin-
ery (intermediate skill intensity). For simplicity, Leontieff unit value isoquants are
assumed. Even with same commodity prices and identical technologies, sufficiently
large endowment differences will induce countries to specialize in different mixes of
goods with different equilibrium relative factor prices.
Related to the problem of factor immobility, relative factor prices will neither
equalize if technology is not common across countries, and workers cannot re-locate to
arbitrage away wage differences. Recent empirical studies such as Davis and Weinstein
(2001) show that the assumption of technical differences is adequate to describe the
actual pattern of world trade in a HO-Vanek model. It is questionable in how far
FDIs and activities of multinationals lead to a convergence in technologies, especially
in higher skilled industries.
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Figure 2.1: Multiple HO Cones
Another problem might be systematically different amenities: Under equal real
wages, the (non-observable or non-quantifiable) living conditions or the supply of
public goods might still differ. This effect might compensate for differences in real
wages leading to the observation of unequal factor prices even though living (or re-
alization) conditions for production factors are equalized. E.g. clean environment
or freely accessible beaches might compensate local workers for a lower wage, lower
profit or income taxes might compensate capital owners.12
Also, some authors have taken the rigidities of the FPE/SST and its somewhat
disappointing empirical substantiation as a justification for bringing back other frame-
works into the debate. Trade economists such as Deardorff and Leamer emphasize
the need to consider other theoretical frameworks such as the Ricardo-Viner sector
specific model (Cline, 1997: 44, 118). Furthermore, Sachs and Shatz (1996: 234/5)
e.g. mention three examples for possible linkages between trade and relative wages
that fall outside of the traditional HO-Samuelson framework. In all these examples
increased trade reduces the relative wage of low-skilled labor even without reducing
the relative price of low-skill intensive output in the US market:13
• Consider a low-skill intensive product produced with physical capital that is
internationally mobile. If a NIE liberalizes trade and investment regulations,
US firms will move production towards this lower-wage NIE. Therefore the
unskilled-intensive sector in the US shrinks, unemployment for low-skilled work-
ers rises and finally pushes down their wages while the relative prices of the
goods need not change since their total supply remains unchanged due to the
substitution by foreign-based production. This approach follows the rationale
of outsourcing models.
12This problem is related to the spatial variation in nominal but not real wages within one country
or a common currency union observed by Bernard et al (2002: 23).
13Examples for and references to other models of distributional effects of outsourcing are given in
Egger/Stehrer (2003: 61f).
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• If a monopolistic producer in the low-skilled sector in the US faces foreign com-
petition he might optimally cut down production one-for-one with the increased
imports, again increasing unemployment of the low skilled leading to the same
outcome as above.
• Globalization may create incentives for skill-biased technological change taking
advantage of economies of scale and requiring a fixed investment of high-skilled
workers (like engineers) rather than a fixed combination of high-skilled and
low-skilled workers.
A very different and less formalized approach concerning equalization of wages
has recently emerged out of very different intellectual influences such as dependency
theory, development economics, trade theory, literature on multinational corporations
and industrial organization. Trying to reflect the changes in the organizational and
government structure of the world economy in the past several decades, this Commod-
ity Chain Approach14 highlights the role of transnational corporations and production
networks in the global economy and tries to stem an observed immiserizing growth15
by improving (especially developing countries’) firms positions in global commodity
chains, i.e. by upgrading (cf. Bair, 2005: 164ff). Even though this approach con-
siderably differs from traditional approaches in trade theory, it should be noted that
the latter began to investigate similar issues especially since the publication of the
Helpman/Krugman handbook (1985: part IV; see also the Navaretti/Venables (2005)
handbook e.g.) and also empirical results such as Dulleck et al. (2005), Egger/Stehrer
(2003), and Esposito (2007) highlight the role of upgrading and outsourcing for wel-
fare distribution (in CEECs).
Due to the disagreement on the accuracy of the theoretical HO-Samuelson as-
sumptions, empirical economic research might shed light on the question which forces
are essential in influencing factor prices and income distribution in the context of
trade liberalization, which might challenge theoretical economists to model these un-
derlying factors adequately. The present thesis should be seen in the context of this
“continuing debate” (Cline, 1997: 46).
Finally it should be stressed that the FPE and SST and their general equilibrium
nature only consider (the increase in) trade to account ceterus paribus for changes
in factor prices. However, in reality this assumption will not be met, especially if
we consider the volatile nature of the transition economies with many different and
interacting forces at work. The subsequent chapter therefore discusses this context
before chapter four outlines theoretical considerations on an estimable model.16
14For a general introduction see Gereffi (2005). For an overview over the different camps in com-
modity chain research see Bair (2005).
15The term, originally referring to Bhagwati’s correspondent 1958 Review of Economic Studies
article, claims to depict an increase in economic activity in terms of output and employment that
happens simultaneously with falling economic return. Cf. Gereffi (2005: 164).
16Spanos ([1986], 1993: 21) distinguishes an estimable model as a particular form of the theoretical
model which is potentially estimable in view of the actual data generating process and the observed
data chosen explicitly from the theoretical model, the statistical model, and the empirical econometric
model.
Chapter 3
The Context of Transition
3.1 Economic Transition in CEEC: An Overview
Considerations of CEECs, in public opinion as well as in academics, generally have and
have had a tendency to treat these countries as a rather monolithic block. In accor-
dance with prominent traditions of Western studies on Eastern and Central Europe,1
this approach might have some value in economic analysis since it is mainly concerned
about common (market) forces at work and prescinds from differing historical and
institutional contexts - a lesson grievously taught by the transition experience. How-
ever, certain similarities of the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe
cannot be neglected since they were all CPEs from World War II until the breakdown
of state socialism in 19902, they all suffered from the immediate removal of formal
economic institutions leading to an institutional collapse and severe macroeconomic
imbalances.
3.1.1 Macroeconomic Imbalances
In the latter context the dramatic fall in economic output might not be ignored. Ta-
ble 3.1 presents some overview about the development of GDP p.c. in the CEEC-4
and selected other CEECs.3 It can be seen, that Poland is the first country that
has reached its 1990 level of p.c. GDP, namely in 1992,4 followed by Bosnia and
Herzegovina (1995) and Slovenia (1996). Hungary did not reach its 1990 level of per
capita GDP until 1998, the Czech Republic not until 2000. Slovakia archived its 1990
level in 2001, as did Estonia. Russia was severely hit and did not reach its 1990 level
1Longworth (1992) e.g. constitutes the demarcation between Eastern and Western Europe his-
torically reciprocal as a process of over 1,600 years that has developed a specific form of political
culture which is different to the West. Segert (1993) criticizes this view as being too deterministic
and presenting the present as the product of a deadlocked path with no alternatives. A´gh (1998)
differentiates Eastern Europe in Central Europe (including the Visegra´d Group [CZ, H, PL, SK] and
the Baltic states), South-Eastern Europe (the Balkans), and the ’proper’ Eastern Europe. Segert
(2002: ch. 1) stresses that the debate about Central Europe to some extent reflects the wishes in
these countries to separate themselves from Eastern Europe. Consistently, 1989 was seen as a re-
turn to Europe. Other authors have highlighted the Eastern European experience as an attempt of
catching-up development (cf. Segert, 2002: 29-68 and 154-158).
An overview of the debate on where the field is going after the breakdown of state socialism can be
found in Creuzberger (2000).
2Although the proportion between central and regional planning and the relevance of market
forces varied over countries and periods.
3A more detailed table about the development of GDP p.c. can be found in the Annex B.
4It should be noted though that Poland’s per capita GDP in 1990 (as well as in the end of the
1980s generally) was pretty low; it was barely above Romanian GDP and about half of the GDP in
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia.
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of GDP until 2005. It is controversial in economic literature, what has caused this
downturn in production.5
GDP p.c. GDP p.c. ∆ 1995 2000 1990 level
1990 2003 p.a. index index achieved
CZ 13,498 14,642 0.6 % 93 101 2000
H 10,087 13,016 2.0 % 95 113 1998
PL 5,897 9,217 3.5 % 115 146 1992
SK 9,903 10,943 0.8 % 83 98 2001
Bosnia & H. 1,640 3,492 6.0 % 101 185 1995
Croatia 10,722 9,778 -0.7 % 69 84 2004
Estonia 11,389 12,791 0.9 % 76 97 2001
Macedonia 5,522 5,253 -0.4 % 85 95 2005
Romania 5,637 5,211 0.6 % 93 92 2002
Russia 12,315 9,263 -0.3 % 69 75 2005
Serbia & M. 4,419 2,987 -3.0 % 48 48 201?
Slovenia 15,271 19,757 2.0 % 98 119 1996
Source: own calculations based on Heston/Summers/Aten (2006) and national sources.
GDP in US-$ and 2000 constant prices calculated using Laspeyres Price Indices
Column 3 shows real GDP p.c. growth between 1990 and 2003 p.a.,
Columns 4 and 5 show the index of real p.c. GDP, where 1990 = 100.
Column 6 expresses when the 1990 level of real p.c. GDP was achieved.
Table 3.1: Macroeconomic Overview
Another aspect of the macroeconomic imbalances was the size of government.
Using measures of openness, demography, and political and institutional variables to
estimate an optimal size of government among OECD countries, Begg and Wyplosz
(1999) show, that the size of government in transition countries was significantly
above this optimal level in 1997 despite a decline throughout the 1990s.
The Labor Market
Of course, the mentioned output fall had effects on the labor market. It should be
mentioned that in this domain of the economy, markets existed already under the
CPEs since labor supply decisions were mainly voluntary and economically driven;
labor markets were very distorted and little was known about the adjustment process
in transition (OECD, 1992: 239). Accordingly, CEECs inherited relatively large em-
ployment shares of heavy and energy-intensive industries and agriculture; Hungary
had the most similar employment structure to Western OECD countries. Generally,
the industries mentioned suffered most from economic recession. Even though there
5Two of the most important models trying to explain the output fall were the Blanchard/Kremer
(1997) and the Roland/Verdier (1999) models emphasizing the disorganization effect of liberalization
on existing production and allocation links. Another explanation (c.f. Li, 1999 or Blanchard, 1997)
holds the monopoly behavior of enterprises after liberalization responsible for the output fall: central
planers had behaved like a single vertically integrated monopoly, whereas liberalization led to multiple
monopolies charging monopoly prices to downstream monopolies. Markets emerged quickly after
liberalization and there was a supply response through entry of small private businesses. Moreover,
the disruption effects of liberalization on existing production links (inefficiencies in bargaining where
deficient legal systems exist or a combination of search frictions and relation-specificity in enterprise
investment are present, see Roland, 2000: 193) were largely underestimated. Roland (2000: 169/170)
emphasizes that most models give an answer to the initial output fall but cannot explain the long-term
difference between, for example, Poland and Russia.
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was a small shift towards promoting light industry, the production of consumer goods
and the expansion of services even before the start of reforms, large employment falls
in industry and agriculture could not be absorbed by these branches (OECD, 1992:
243, Nesporova, 1999: 5-7, 11f). Trade liberalization combined with sluggish domes-
tic demand due to faltering or even decreasing real wages might have undermined
the performance capability of these sectors. In Hungary and Poland, employment fell
rapidly in light industry and food-processing; two sectors considered to have much
developmental potential due to comparative advantage (OECD, 1992: 245). Gener-
ally, output fell faster than employment - aggravated by persistence of extensive labor
hoarding in many enterprises -, thus labor productivity declined substantially, even
though new labor-saving technologies were introduced (OECD, 1992: 241, Nesporova,
1999: 7).
Open Unemployed Employment
1990 1991 1992 1989-93 1993-97 1989-97
Czechoslovakia n.a. 119 523 - 10.3 % + 3.0 % - 7.6 %
Hungary 23 101 442 - 24.4 % - 4.0 % - 27.4 %
Poland 56 1,196 2,230 - 15.7 % + 4.7 % - 11.7 %
Sources: OECD, 1992: Table 6.6, page 249; Nesporova, 1999: Table 1.1, page 8
all numbers registered unemployed total increase or decline over the period
in thousands as of January Hungary ranges only up to 1996
Table 3.2: Unemployment in Early Transition
Women, young people, and those having only a basic or vocational level of edu-
cation faced the highest risk of unemployment (OECD, 1992: 251ff).
The most important sectors absorbing parts of the unemployed were not in manu-
facturing, but mainly private, rather small enterprises, especially in the service sector
(OECD, 1992: 245ff, Nesporova, 1999: 12f).
Another legacy of the communist past was the “strong geographical concentration
of those industries that are bound to experience the most severe job losses” during
the transition process, leading to “sizeable regional differences in the distribution of
unemployment and vacancies” (OECD, 1992: 256). The unemployment rate tended
to be lowest in centers of agglomeration (cf. Bru¨lhart and Koenig’s (2006) Come-
con hypothesis), regions with a more diversified industrial economy6, areas bordering
on more developed countries, and regions offering good opportunities for tourism
and leisure (Nesporova, 1999: 19f). Insufficient labor mobility, handicapped also by
housing prices in developing areas (Nesporova, 1999: 51) and missing regional de-
velopment policies (infrastructure, education) led to a continuation of the problem.
Mainly regional EU assistance can be seen as a factor foiling this development.
The unpromising situation on the labor market led to lower labor market par-
ticipation rates (Nesporova, 1999: 10), endeavors to obtain further income sources,7
increased self-employment in the very first years (Nesporova, 1999: 15f), and more
flexible forms of employment deteriorating the conditions for the latter (Nesporova,
1999: 13f) and thus to a general weakened position of workers. After some years, the
acceleration of unemployment halted and remained at a level around 10 %; this was
6Actually this is an interesting finding in view of predictions concerning comparative advantage
and specialization patterns from trade theory.
7Nesporova (1999: 24) mentions, that between 1989 and 1995 the proportion of wages in total
income fell from 46.7 % to 30.3 % in Poland and from 66.5 % to 46.1 % in the Czech Republic.
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not due to a recovered labor demand but rather to more restrictive unemployment
compensations resulting from the fact that persistent unemployment under restraints
in public budged had depleted labor market fonds (cf. Nesporova, 1999: 17 and 51).
Decreased unemployment benefits and low unemployment turnover (so that the long-
term unemplovment was high, cf. Nesporova, 1999: 20) increased poverty, which was
a problem especially in Poland (cf. Nesporova, 1999: 25ff) and labor weakness, both of
course mutually effecting each other. Government policies aggrevated the situation by
only partial indexation of minimum wages to prices and a punitive labor tax on wage
increases above a special level (Nesporova, 1999: 22). Furthermore, restrictions to
wage increases in profitable enterprises were implemented, whereas badly performing
enterprises could rise wages (Nesporova, 1999: 23). This restriction hindered income
driven labor allocations towards expanding industries, which was severely transition-
impeding due to widespread skill mismatches, meaning that newly required skills were
often undersupplied in expanding industries (cf. Nesporova, 1999: 20). By 1997 real
wages reached their 1989 level only in Czech Republic (103.2), whereas they were
significantly below that level in Poland (83.2) and Hungary (77.9; Nesporova, 1999:
23). Finally, also the restrictive monetary and fiscal policies damped the demand for
labor since they restrained the access of developing enterprises to credit (Nesporova,
1999: 24).
To sum up, unemployment increased dramatically in the first stage of transition
and remained at a high level in the 1990s. Implemented labor market policies could
not sufficiently tackle the problem and did not only create harsh bargaining conditions
for labor and unions, a factor already “created as a weak actor” in the transition
context (Ost/Crowley, 2001: 228), but also partially prevented labor from reallocation
towards expanding sectors.
3.1.2 The Quest for Economic Stability
Approaches to macroeconomic stabilization, which were more concerned with hyper-
inflation than recession (not to mention employment; cf. Nesporova, 1999: 49) in the
very beginning, were mainly “derived from basic textbook economics” and highlighted
the importance of price liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization (fiscal and mon-
etary policy), and privatization (Roland, 2000: xviii). To make matters no better,
John Williamson had just finished his list of ten policy prescriptions which is usually
referred to as the Washington Consensus and that can be summed up by two aspects
(cf. Raffer/Singer, 2001 : 51f for a full list): Fiscal discipline should be guaranteed
by setting public expenditure priorities and by privatization and liberalization should
take place in financial markets, where foreign investment should be enabled to ob-
tain the same rights as domestic firms, as well as in goods markets where especially
NTBs should be abandoned and unified and competitive exchange rates should be
introduced. The only institutional aspect of the agenda was to guarantee property
rights. It is thus barely exaggerated to speak of a radical market orientation without
markets that was to a large extent enforced by the allegedly good advice of Western
policy advocates and pressure from international organizations such as the World
Bank and the IMF.8 The experience of this vision of transition “has revealed impor-
tant shortcomings ... . Liberalization mostly did not yield a positive supply response;
8However, one should also not forget, that the slogan “There is no alternative” (TINA) had some
eligibility. Admittedly this was hardly the case because of profound argumentation of the neoliberal
agenda but rather due to the fact that just a couple of years before heterodox, i.e. non liberal,
stabilization plans failed in Argentina, Brazil and Peru (cf. McKinnon, 1993: 3). Socialist ideas were
declassed after the collapse of CPEs, while structuralist and dependenc´ıa approaches still suffered
from the physical and ideological wipe-out by the military juntas in Latin America.
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it led to a major unpredicted fall in output” (Roland, 2000: xix). If anything, experi-
ence of transition shows that policies of liberalization, stabilization, and privatization
that are not grounded in adequate institutions may not deliver successful outcomes
(Roland, 2000: xix). In the mid-1990s, however, more institutional approaches to the
transition problem gained importance (“New Institutional Economics”).9
3.1.3 Different Legacies From the Past?
Neglecting the differences between CEECs certainly has its weaknesses. Leaving be-
sides the special path that Yugoslavia has taken (especially after 1965, cf. Lampe,
2000), one should not forget about market oriented reforms taking place in Hungary
in 1968 already and in Poland 1980, followed by the Soviet Union, while the Czech
Republic clinged to a more plan oriented development until the bitter end (see Ko-
rnai, 1992, for the different intensities of economic reform in CPEs). Roland (2000:
11) points out that these differences are also connected to differences in the transition
strategy adopted (cf. also Ekiert, 1996, Smith/Swain, 1998: 27, and Segert, 2002:
191-213): countries with a history of reform prior to transition tended to start tran-
sition with serious macro imbalances, requiring tough stabilization packages, while
countries not having this reform history (GDR, CZ, Romania) didn’t have such a
stabilization problem. Nevertheless, after Poland, the Czech Republic is considered
to be the next-best example of a big bang policy, characterized by liberalization, sta-
bilization and privatization all occurring between 1991 and 1992. After the split of
the country, Slovakia switched to a more gradualist approach, especially regarding
privatization policies (Roland, 2000: 16). Hungary (as well as Slovenia and also
China) is an example of a generally more gradualist strategy, that is characterized by
implementing stabilization policies in the middle of the transition process rather than
in the beginning (Roland, 2000: 14ff).
Economists such as Dehejia (1995) and Fernandez/Rodrik (1991) have used new
political economy approaches to address the question of whether a gradual or a big
bang strategy is chosen to reform might sustainably influence the possible outcome.
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) model the trade liberalization process and show that
there would be no democratic majority if the liberalization is enforced in two parts
(gradualist approach) while the median voter might well vote for the reform if it is
enforced at once (big bang). Based on Mussa (1978), Dehejia (1995) on the other
hand, shows in a general equilibrium model of trade liberalization, that the latter
suffers the political constraint that the discounted lifetime value of workers in the
import competing sector after reform has to exceed that under the status quo (i.e.
the existing tariff and/or NTBs) at any point in time, which due to smoothing ad-
justment costs for workers makes gradualism politically feasible when the big bang
is not. In reality, the ability to enforce political reform of course hinges on the social
balance of power, that can vary widely between CEECs (cf. Becker, 2006).
9Cf. Coase (1992: 714): “The value of including ... institutional factors in the corpus of main-
stream economics is made clear by recent events in Eastern Europe. These ex-communist countries
are advised to move to a market economy, and their leaders wish to do so, but without the appropri-
ate institutions no market economy of any significance is possible”, or Roland (2000): The events of
transition “have further contributed to a change in focus in thinking about economics and have very
much reinforced the institutionalist perspective, emphasizing the importance of the various institu-
tions underpinning a successful capitalist economy. ... Thus, there is a shift of emphasis from markets
and price theory to contracting and the legal, social, and political environment of contracting”. See
also Rodrik, 2006.
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Authors more oriented towards the regulation school and political science such
as King and Szele´nyi (1995), Bohle and Greskovits (2007), and Becker (2007, 2008)
have thus stressed differences between types of post-socialist development in CEECs,
mainly shaped by the constellation of protagonists from the old elites during the crisis
of the socialist system, paths of emergence of private property and markets, and the
influence of international investors. Similarly, authors referring to the “Varieties of
Capitalism” approach (such as Bandelj, 2003, Kova´cs, 2006, 2008) ask, inhowfar
different forms of market organization can be distinguished in Central and Eastern
Europe.
3.2 Transition and Trade
Considering the great importance that foreign trade and trade liberalization have
played in the transition process,10 it is surprising how little economic theory on the
role of trade liberalization in the context of transition and/or economic stabilization
exists. An exception worth emphasizing is the contribution of McKinnon (1993),
even though it deals with stabilization in general and not transition especially (and it
makes in fact a difference if markets are distorted or non existent). Trying to derive an
optimal order of liberalization and stressing that this may vary by country, he points
out that the liberalization of foreign exchange should take place after the stabilization
of central governments finances, privatization, the development of a regularized tax
system, the opening of domestic capital markets, and the liberalization of domestic
trade and finance have successfully taken place (4-7, italics not in original).
Winiecki (2002), another contribution worth mentioning, agrees that “surprisingly
few [works] have been devoted to surveying the foreign trade issues emerging during
the transition process” (p. 1) but is generally not able to fill this gap even though
alluding to some interesting and central points.
In the transition context, policy recommendations were limited to basic textbook
statements like that price liberalization should be complemented by liberalization of
foreign trade (Balcerowicz, 1994: 28, 40 for example). While the theory of inter-
national trade, as outlined in chapter 1 of this thesis, was always concerned about
welfare and how it could be raised by freeing trade,11 one could get the impression
that economic policy advice, seeing liberalization as a policy aim rather than its mean,
was more concerned with dogma than welfare and has priggishly taken some particu-
lar theorems of trade theory for always granted while proponents of this theory have
warned to do so.
3.3 Accession and Admission to the EU
Even though endeavors to acces the EU were made by the CEECs right after the
breakdown of CPEs, the European Union was occupied with other concerns than
spending too much effort on the possible accession of the CEECs at that time: The
internal struggles about the balance of power (cf. Wielgoss, 1997: 9-13) as well as the
Treaty of Maastricht bound resources, especially after the corresponding referendum
in Denmark failed. In addition the former GDR had to be incorporated into the FRG
and the fourth enlargement (Austria, Finland, Sweden) also had to be realized (cf.
10This includes the importance in arguments about stabilization as well as the orientation of CEECs
towards foreign markets in practice.
11Stolper and Samuelson (1941) are no exception to this tradition, stating that “it is always possible
to bribe the suffering factor by subsidy or other redistributive devices so as to leave all factors better
off as a result of trade” (73).
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Merli/Huster, 2008: 27f).
3.3.1 PHARE
First hesitant steps of approximation were made with the PHARE Program (see
Wielgoss, 1997: 14-16) which consisted of non repayable financial aid and was ini-
tially enacted for Poland and Hungary in 1989 but extended to nine further recipient
countries until 1993. While also other assistances such as loans from the European
Investment Bank or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development were
granted and important for the restructuring process, PHARE was the “most impor-
tant instrument” of cooperation (Cameron, 1995: 426). In the very beginning the
program focused on macroeconomic stabilization (intended by liberalization of prices
and foreign trade, constituting an institutional framework and a restrictive financial
and monetary policy) rather than on restructuring the economy as originally intended
by the program (and reflected by its name). The latter, however, got more and more
important as economic conditions normalized (cf. Wielgoss, 1997: 15). Furthermore,
a shift is identifiable as far as the importance of the program is considered: Be-
ing a self-contained central program in the beginning, it became more and more an
accompanying measure.
3.3.2 Europe Agreements
After being signed in 1991,12 the Europe Agreements became the major tool of EU-
CEECs cooperation. Replacing less extensive agreements on trade and cooperation
(cf. Merli/Huster, 2009: 37), the Europe Agreements were focused on economic
matters: they envisioned the abolition of tariffs and quotas, the construction of a
free-trade area, and financial liberalization (Merli/Huster, 2008: 37; cf. also Nagel,
2003: 317). More precisely, they consisted of an asymmetric liberalization in goods
trade (but not in services or personal mobility), where the EU abolished NTB to
trade immediately and tariffs within five years while the CEECs had more time to
fulfill these tasks. Therefore, the Europe Agreements should in the present context be
seen as probably the most important agreements on free trade between the CEEC-4
and the EU-12 (by then) until the Accession Treaties came into force, even though
goods considered “sensitive”, such as textiles, coal, and steel, as well as agricultural
goods obtained special treatment,13 and furthermore some of the protection clauses
were operated rather pedantic sometimes, and some agreements suffered lacks of re-
alization (cf. Brasche, 2008: 284f, Merli/Huster, 2009: 37f). Finally, anti-dumping
clauses prevented EU markets from too harsh competition (see Ehrenhaft et al. 1997:
esp. ch. 3 on the issue).
The Europe Agreements also covered issues of political dialogue and other aspects
of cooperation (European Communities, 2009) and consistently belong to the category
of association agreements (under article 238 TOR) rather than the inferior sole trade
12The Europe Agreements were signed with Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania on
12/16/1991. An agreement was signed by then also with the Czechoslovak Republic but had to
be formally renewed with its successor states, Czech Republic and Slovakia on 10/6/1993 after the
separation of the country on January 1, 1993.
13Some authors emphasize that these were especially the sectors where CEECs had comparative
advantages and economic development was therefore undermined. In fact, goods considered “sen-
sitive” amounted to about one third in CEEC-4 exports towards the EU-15 in 1991 (cf. Wielgoss,
1997: 85). However, in all these sectors economies of scale are unlikely and even decreasing returns
are possible so that these “barriers” might even have fostered a sustainable long term development,
cf. Raffer (1994).
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agreements (subject to article 113 TOR) and were therefore considered as the “basic
legal instruments defining relations between the Union and the candidate countries”
(European Communities, 2009). However, they did not explicitly admit the claim of
CEECs access the European Union and contained only a “vague membership-formula”
(Lippert/Schneider, 1995: 27).
3.3.3 The Accession Process
The shift in the skeptical French position towards enlargement (Wielgoss, 1997: 23)
enabled the Union to open its doors to the CEECs: In June 1993 the European
Council of Copenhagen “agreed that the associated countries in Central and East-
ern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union” (European
Council, 1993: 7.A.iii). Of course, the vision of admission to the EU was bound to
certain conditions, made conditional in the so-called Copenhagen Criteria requiring a
stable democracy with a working and competitive market economy and the adoption
of the common rules, standards and policies of the body of the EU laws (European
Communities, 2009; Merli/Huster, 2008: 29). Deriving the necessity of a working
and competitive market economy directly from the TOR (article 3.f for example), the
Copenhagen Criteria went well beyond economic aspects that formed the body of the
Union but also included an institutional perspective.
Formal applications for the accession to the EU were filed in 1994 by Hungary
and Poland (3/31 and 4/5 respectively), by Slovakia on 6/27/1995, and by the Czech
Republic on 1/17/1996. These applications officially opened the procedure for acces-
sion (pursuant to Article 49 of the consolidated version of the Treaty on European
Union) whose stages have been concretized at the European Council of Essen in De-
cember 1994: The initiated White Paper on “Preparing the associated countries of
Central and Eastern Europe for integration into the internal market of the Union”
defined central criteria for the CEECs to transform their economy and institutions in
consideration of a possible accession to the European Union. Intra-European trade
played a key role in this process: “On accession, the acceding countries will become
part of the Internal Market. Therefore preparation for the Internal Market must
be at the heart of pre-accession strategy” (European Council, 1994: Annex IV:3).
Yearly Progress Reports monitoring the progress made became further parts of the
pre-accession strategy.
The role of trade for the CEEC-4 was also boosted by their accession to the newly
founded World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995: the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Slovakia joined in the very beginning (1/1), Poland half a year thereafter (7/1).
The Council of Madrid in December 1995 tied in with the Essen outcomes and
took them a step further since for the very first time the EU aimed for a time frame
that was substantiated and confirmed half a year thereafter at the Council of Florence.
Also, in Madrid a first interim report on the impact of the accession of the CEECs
to the EU on the policies of the latter was presented, as has been requested at the
Essen Council. The analysis of these impacts was deepened until 1997 and peaked in
the Agenda 2000, published by the European Commission on July 16, 1997.
The decision to begin negotiations was made at the summit of the European
Council in Luxembourg in December 1997 for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
and three other countries (“Luxembourg Group”) and at the summit in Helsinki in
December 1999 for Slovakia and five other countries (“Helsinki Group”). Negotia-
tions started on 3/31/1998 and 2/15/2000 respectively (Merli/Huster, 2008: 32). In
the course of these negotiations the Commission discussed the relevant acquis com-
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munitaire,14 ordered in 31 chapters, together with the accession candidates point by
point.
PHARE became the main financial instrument of accession strategy, especially af-
ter the Agenda 2000 was launched. It was then complemented by the Instrument for
Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) and the Special Assistance Programme
for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD). These funds were in effect from
2000 to 2006 with a budget of 10 billion Euro for this period.15 Its main priorities
were institutional and capacity-building and investment financing.
Despite these efforts, the second cohesion progress report of the European Com-
mission (2003) highlighted the widening of economic disparities within an enlarged
European Union. While advice for future cohesion policy mentions the contribution
of strengthening economic integration, more priority is given to political aspects of
redistribution (ch. III). Although the need for “development of ... infrastructure
networks, [and] improved access for remote regions” is emphasized (ch. III), the role
of trade and trade capacity building in this context remains surprisingly insignificant.
The report further highlights the significance of objective 1 assistance16 to real con-
vergence (ch. 1.4).
The European Council meeting in Copenhagen in December 2002 found the
CEEC-4 together with six other candidate countries ready to join the EU. After
signing their Accession Treaties on April 16, 2003 in Athens, the CEEC-4 and four
other CEECs officially accessed the EU on May 1, 2004 together with Cyprus and
Malta,17 to be followed by Bulgaria and Romania on January 1, 2007.
To sum up, after an unassertive beginning, the 1990s were finally marked by a
vast trade liberalization for some CEECs, especially (but not exclusive) the CEEC-4
under consideration and this liberalization was especially significant for trade with
the European Union after the signing of the Europe Agreements and ultimately their
admission to the EU in 2004.
3.4 Expected Patterns of Foreign Trade
This trade liberalization could not remain without an effect on resource allocation in
the CEECs. One might argue that this effect is overlapped by a strong noise due to
the volatile influences of the transition process. However, in the middle of the 1990s
the CEEC-4 were back on a relatively stable track of macroeconomic development.
Being highly dependent on foreign markets (cf. subsection 5.2.1 of this thesis), it is
14The acquis communitaire “is the body of common rights and obligations which bind all the
Member States together within the European Union” (European Communities, 2009).
15This corresponds to roughly 6 % of the Slovak GDP throughout the same period. About one
third of the money was devoted to ISPA and two thirds to SAPARD.
16The aim of Objective 1 Assistance is “to promote the development and structural adjustment
of regions whose development is lagging behind” (EU website). 75 % of all allocated EU funds on
regional policy are devoted to Objective 1 Assistance. From the CEEC-4 only the regions Praha and
Bratislava don’t fall under the criteria for Objective 1 Assistance.
17Before, plebiscites had to confirm the ratification of the Accession Treaties. In Hungary only 45.6
% of citizens eligible to vote participated in the plebiscite on April 12, 2003 but 83.8 % of them voted
in favor of the Accession Treaty (Merli/Huster, 2008: 650). On May 16-17, 2003 52 % of eligible
Slovak voters went to pools, voting 92.5 % in favor of the Treaty (Merli/Huster, 2008: 628). On
Jule 7-8, 2003 almost 59 % of Poles entitled to vote confirmed the Treaty by 77,5 % (Merli/Huster,
2008: 614f). Also in June, 58 % of eligible Czech voters went to pols for their very first nationwide
referendum to vote for the Treaty by 77 % (Merli/Huster, 2008: 645f).
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Figure 3.1: Short-Term Interest Rates
thus likely that foreign trade significantly influenced national development.
What were the expectations of traditional HO theory? CEECs are generally
considered as being relatively labor abundant countries suffering from shortages in
capital. Therefore we set CEECs in the framework presented in section 1.5 equal to
I, the EU equal to II. Let B be the labor intensive, and A the capital intensive prod-
uct, and L be labor and H capital. Accordingly, until trade has equalized marginal
productivities and thus factor prices, we would expect capital to be more expensive,
labor being less expensive in CEECs than in the EU-15. The latter is confirmed by
figures 5.1 and 5.2 on p. 40f. If the short term p.a. interest rate is used to measure
the price of capital, the former is also confirmed in figure 3.1 and shows a clear ten-
dency of convergence.
From the framework presented in section 1.5 we would expect trade with the EU-
15 to lower the cost of capital and increase wages in CEECs. Furthermore, if only
labor is considered and separated into low-skilled (L) and high-skilled (H) labor, it is
assumed that CEECs are relatively low-skill intensive compared to the EU-15,18 thus
trade between these two regions would lead to an increase in the wage of low-skilled
workers relative to the high-skilled workers in the CEECs by a surge in demand for
low-skilled goods from foreign markets and the according change in relative prices.
Therefore, we would expect trade to reduce wage inequality in CEECs.19
18This assumption is mostly taken as granted. However, one should not forget that CEECs gener-
ally have good human capital stocks (cf. Gutman, 2000: 26). If this human capital can be realized
in the context of Western modes of production is another issue.
19Obviously, the contrary is predicted for the EU-15. However, as Krugman (1995a) pointed out,
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3.5 Empirical Investigations
The small interest in the question of transition and trade, and especially its welfare
dimension is reflected in the small number of empirical contributions in the field.
While very real and serious negative social phenomena (cf. Kornai, 2006: 21ff)20
led to a considerable amount of studies about welfare and income distribution (see
e.g. Commander (1997), Coricelli (1997), Fo¨rster/To´th (1997), Milanovic (1998),
Aghion/Commander (1999), Ferreira (1999), Micklewright (1999), Milanovic (1999)
and the associated note by Eastwood (2000), Gru¨n/Klasen (2001), Milanovic/Ersado
(2008) for general and Rutowski (1996), Garner/Terrell (1998), Castronova (2006),
Newell/Socha (2007) for more specific studies). However, these investigations were
barely linked with openness and trade, even though the latter played a significant
role in the transition process but found relatively low empirical attention on their
part. One branch in literature (such as CEPR, 1990: 2 - 7, Winiecki, 2002: ch. 2,
and Zarek, 2006 for example) tried to derive expected trade patterns merely from
the classical HO model disregarding any later advances in trade theory as well as
considerable influences of transition. A more promising approach was led mainly by
facts and investigated actual trade patterns of CEECs empirically (Rodrik (1994),
Dulleck et al. (2005), Zaghini (2005), Benedictis/Tajoli (2008) for example). Finally,
while literature of the first branch did barely link the traditional HO model with real
world data, a relatively extensive literature empirically investigating the adequacy of
intra-industry trade models (mainly based on Dixit/Norman (1980: ch. 9)) emerged
in the late 1990s (e.g. Fidrmuc et al., 1997, 1998, 1999; Hoekman/Djankov, 1997;
Atrupane et al., 1999; and Fidrmuc, 1999.
Existing empirical studies about the influence of EU-CEECs trade on wages have
usually addressed the issue from the viewpoint of the EU-15 countries (Kunze, 2000;
Belke/Hebler, 2002: ch. 4; Breuss, 2006; Zuckersta¨tter (2004) e.g.). The remainder
of this section discusses the to my knowledge only studies focusing on the influence
of trade on wages from the CEECs’ perspective.
Onaran and Stockhammer (2006) use data on 14 sectors for five CEECs
(CEEC-4 plus Slovenia) for the time period 2000 - 2004 from the Vienna Institute for
International Economic Studies (WIIW) to estimate the effects of FDI and EU-trade
on real wages in the pooled sample of these countries. FDI and trade variables are
lagged to capture time lags in the wage response and to avoid endogeneity problems
(p. 9). They explicitly ignore unit root problems for real wages, arguing that the
problem is less severe in a panel setting and the work with the logarithmic level might
mitigate the problem (2006: 12).21 For the unemployment rate, exports, imports, and
FDI they argue that these variables tend to be stationary, which again is a strong
assumption for a transition economy. Period-specific fixed effects are used to reflect
a time trend. The results are reproduced in table 3.3 and clearly show that FDI has
a positive albeit economically small effect on wages (p. 13). Exports to and imports
from the EU (measured relative to the output of the sector) are far from being sta-
tistically significant.
the effect of CEEC trade for Western OECD countries is very small and thus the effect rather low
(even though some sectors such as textiles and transport equipment could indeed be affected, cf.
Forslid et al. (2002)), whereas EU-15 trade accounts for a large share of CEECs’ GDP.
20Interestingly, Kornai (2006) attributes a significant part of these phenomena to “cognitive prob-
lems” (26ff) of the CEECs’ population while relatively few attention is devoted to system-specific
(32f) and transition (31f) problems.
21As can be seen from the results in chapter 6 this is a rather hazardous statement. Also the
reference of Onaran/Stockhammer (2006) to Wooldridge (2002) is not traceable.
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Dependent Variable: Log Real Wage
specification 3 4
observations 350 325
Constant 6.501*** 6.470***
Productivity 0.119*** 0.119***
Unemployment -1.141** -0.958***
FDI inward stock/output (1 lag) - 0.124**
Exports to EU/output (1 lag) 0.006 -0.001
Imports from EU/output (1 lag) -0.020 -0.034
adjusted R-squared 0.994 0.994
prob(F-stat) 0.0 0.0
Source: Onaran/Stockhammer, 2006: Table 3 (Annex)
Table 3.3: Onaran/Stockhammer short term results
Finally, they also estimate a cross-section model they refer to as a “long term
estimation” taking five-year averages (2000-2004) of all variables for all sectors in the
countries (see table 3.4). The openness variables (imports, exports, FDI) are taken
for the period 1999-2003 to reflect the lag structure. Long-term effects of trade with
the EU-15 start to play a role in this specification, however, the influence of exports
is negative and the influence of imports is positive. They classify this result as being
the “opposite to what the traditional trade theory would expect” and conclude from
the negative net effect of exports and imports,22 “that increased exposure to foreign
markets have raised the competitive pressure on labor in the bargaining process over
the longer term” (p. 16). However, it is not the case that this specification measures
any rise or fall since for every sector simply the long-run average (and not the av-
erage change of the variable) is used. Accordingly there is no long-run effect that is
estimated. Besides from possible omitted variable problems using pooled OLS, the
outcome might have a very simple explanation: It might merely reflect the fact that
CEECs’ exports are more concentrated in low skill products which realize a lower
price and where wages are lower while sectors where CEECs have a high import pen-
etration are expected by the HO model to be more skill intensive and thus wages
are generally higher within these sectors. The Onaran/Stockhammer estimate simply
says that sectors with higher export shares have on average lower wages and sectors
with higher import penetration have on average higher wages. It is also obvious in
this specification that FDI stocks are negatively correlated with wages since it can
be assumed that FDIs flow into low skill, low wage sectors which obtains empirical
support by Egger/Stehrer (2003: 68).
Breuss (2007) uses panel data on 14 EU countries and 10 CEECs23 between
1992/95 and 2005 to estimate the influence of openness on the labor-income share
using fixed country effects. The results are reproduced in table 3.5 and show, that as
expected from theory the labor-income share in the EU decreases as a consequence
of globalization in general. Contrary, in the CEEC the increase in global net trade
had a positive influence on the labor income share but trade with the EU dampened
the income share of labor.24
22The difference is borderline significant.
23Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia
24Note, that again the specification is likely to suffer from spurious regression and endogeneity
problems and only estimates the effect in the short run. Furthermore, the dependent variable is the
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Dependent Variable: Log Average Real Wage
observations 65
Productivity, log average 0.342***
Unemployment -3.7***
FDI inward stock/output (1 lag) -0.967***
Exports to EU/output (1 lag) -0.510***
Imports from EU/output (1 lag) 0.351**
adjusted R-squared 0.608
prob(F-stat) 0.0
Source: Onaran/Stockhammer, 2006: Table 5 (Annex)
Table 3.4: Onaran/Stockhammer “long term” results
Dependent Variable: Labor income share
EU CEEC
constant 64.00*** 68.86***
net trade -0.28*** 0.27***
trade with CEEC -0.14*** -
trade with EU - -0.46***
FDI net -0.08*** 0.12**
observations 224 110
Source: Breuss, 2007: 18 (Table 2); net trade is total
commodity export minus total imports in % of GDP
FDI net means FDI outflow minus inflow;
for CEEC only inflow
Table 3.5: Breuss’ Estimation for determinants of the labor income share
Egger and Stehrer (2003) use data for 14 industries in the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland between 1993 and 1999 and find a positive effect of intermediate
goods exports and intermediate goods imports (with the EU) affecting the skilled-
to-unskilled wage bill in favor of unskilled workers in the CEECs. Therefore, they
conclude that intermediate goods trade with the EU as a measure of outsourcing of
vertically integrated multinational corporations accounts for a considerable reduction
in the predicted growth of the skilled-to-unskilled workers wage bill ratio in these
countries.25
In a similar manner, Esposito (2007) finds a significantly negative impact of in-
termediate goods exports on the ratio of non-manual to manual workers for the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland by updating the analysis of Egger and Stehrer (2003)
until 2005 and excluding the early 1990s. He further finds that trade integration and
outsourcing shaped the evolution of production and trade structures. While medium
and high-skill intensive industries generally grew stronger, especially in Hungary, he
also finds evidence that these countries specialized in the export of unskilled intensive
intermediate goods driven by the export of parts and components.
labor income share, thus trade with the EU might have had positive influence on wages but even
higher influence on capital income.
25A growth of the skilled-to-unskilled wage bill ratio was expected as a result of transition since
CEECs inherited rather low wage differentials especially as regards skill requirements (Nesporova,
1999: 22; for the effects of changing skill demand see Rutowski (1996) and Commander/Kollo (2008)
e.g.).
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A study by Newell and Socha (1998), mainly investigating the effects of priva-
tization on wages, finds suggestive circumstantial evidence that the increase in trade
with Western Europe, especially Germany, raised wages and employment in Polish
manufacturing industries between 1992 and 1996 through a relative shift in labor
demand.
The study of Milanovic and Ersado (2008) is a certain ray of hope in the
field: For the fist time using panel data from household surveys they try to investi-
gate reasons for the rapidly increased inequality in 26 CEECs and find that foreign
trade liberalization appears to have an entirely neutral effect on income distribution.
However, for the question examined in this thesis their findings should not be over-
rated since they did not use effective trade integration but rather policy variables as
explanatory variable (p. 8).
Chapter 4
Considerations on the Model
Structure
Chapter 1 has introduced the economic theory relating a change in a country’s trade
equilibrium to a change in factor prices, i.e. wages. In chapter 3 we have seen,
that for the CEEC-4 under consideration there might have been many other forces
at work influencing wages. The intention of this chapter is to discuss in which form
theses influences might be reflected in an estimable model and to illustrate possible
specification errors of the statistical model. Therefore, the first section discusses how
the adjustment process between two equilibria might be shaped whereas the second
section introduces thoughts on other variables than trade influencing wages (the cor-
responding observed data will be presented in section 5.3) and reviews the problem
of spurious regressions, often ignored in empirical panel data investigations.
4.1 The Adjustment Process
Let yt be either a measure for the wage level in the CEEC-4 or a measure for the
equality of wage levels between CEEC-4 and the EU-15 (constructed in a way so that
y = 0 indicates equality of wages and y < 0 if wages in the EU-15 are above CEEC-4
level) in time period t, let x1,t be a measure for the volume of trade at time period t,
and let e be the unit vector.
From the economic theory presented in chapter 1 we would thus expect β1 > 0 in
the equation
yt = β0e+ β1x1,t + t, t ∼ NID(0, σ2 ), (4.1)
indicating either a positive correlation between the level of trade and wages in CEEC-
4, or an equalizing effect of trade on wages in CEEC-4 and the EU-15. Considering
trade to be the only variable influencing wages, two problems concerning the dynamics
of the model arise: The speed and acceleration of adjustment.
Firstly, certain assumptions have to be made on the lag structure, i.e. the question
how much time wages need to react to a change in foreign trade. It is obvious that
in reality production factors are not perfectly mobile across industries in the short
run and therefore an appropriate lag structure would give them time to adjust. How
much time this takes is a rather empirical question (for the econometric theory see
Johnston, 1984: 343ff).1
Secondly, certain questions about the acceleration of the process arise. Assume
that the level of trade increases from the autarky equilibrium to the free trade equilib-
rium in a linear fashion. Will the equalization process of factor prices then also take
1Lagging the trade variable also takes care of possible endogeneity problems.
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place linearly? If not, t will not be independently distributed across time periods in
equation 4.1 and thus a central assumption of the OLS model will be violated.
It is also possible that the adjustment process runs in logarithmic form, i.e. the
faster the bigger the difference in wages is (and thus the further the trade level is away
from equilibrium). This is mainly due to the fact that as trade is liberalized the price
differences of the goods traded between both countries are higher in the first years
after liberalization and are diminishing thereafter. On the other hand, if increasing
returns to scale are assumed, the change in the marginal productivity of the process
of labor reallocation towards the sectors with comparative advantages will be lower
in the first years.
There are several approaches to modeling these propositions. One would be to use
fixed time effects, i.e. setting a time dummy variable for each year similar to the sec-
tor specific dummies in the LSDV estimator (and to possibly interact them with the
export share). This would allow at least for different intercepts in different years but
will result in a decrease in d.o.f. and it is questionable whether it is the appropriate
approach. Another possibility would be including a time trend, which could also be
multiplied with the trade variable. Finally, a possibility would be to use the existing
difference in wages as an explanatory variable and to possibly interact this variable
with exports.2
If the free trade equilibrium and FPE is obtained and yt is a measure for the
equality of wage levels between CEEC-4 and the EU-15 constructed as above, yt ≈
0 = β0 + β1x1,t + t must hold and thus
β0 = β1x1,t.
If the model was correctly specified,  ∼ NID(0, σ2 ) and OLS would be BLUE (cf.
Appendix A).3
However, as discussed before, it is very likely that relevant variables are missing in
this specification. If this was the case, the obtained OLS coefficients would be biased
(referred to as “omitted variable bias”), OLS will no longer be BLUE and inference
is undermined (cf. Johnston, 1984:260-261).
4.2 Misspecifications
4.2.1 Omitted Variables
Outside of the restrictive HO framework there might exist other variables influencing
wages. Even if the problem is less severe in a panel data context (cf. Hsiao, 1990: 3f),
2Greene (2000: 326) gives a very intuitive example of such a specification modeling braking
distance D with speed S and road wetness W by
D = β1 + β2S + β3W + β4SW + .
Since
δE(D)
δS
= β2 + β4W and
δE(D)
δW
= β3 + β4S,
the marginal effect of higher speed on braking distance is increased when the road is wetter (if
β4 > 0).
3The error  might then be interpreted as a certain error in data measurement, as a certain degree
of randomness or simply existing because we were unable to obtain and include all variables relevant
to the determination of wages. The differences in interpretation may be of interest for philosophy,
however, note that from the econometric point of view all these three interpretations are equal (cf.
Johnston, 1984: 14f).
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if they were omitted, the parameter OLS estimate for the influence of trade would be
biased and conventional inference procedures would be incorrect (cf. Johnston, 1984:
260f or Wooldridge, 2003: 87-92).
One important example is unemployment which is assumed to be non-existent
in the HO framework. In reality, however, unemployment might have an important
influence on wage levels by affecting the bargaining power of unions as well as indi-
vidual workers.
In microeconomic theory also productivity changes would lead to changes in
wages. In the strict HO framework productivity changes occur only due to realloca-
tions of production factors due to trade liberalization, so that all productivity changes
are captured in the trade variable. However, in reality it is likely that there are other
sources of productivity change.
A further relevant variable to consider is competition with imports. In the
classical HO framework each country will export only a certain class of goods accord-
ing to their comparative advantages and thus intra-industrial trade does not occur.
However, modern theory of international trade allows for this possibility of intra-
industry trade due to product diversification and imperfect competition.
FDI would be another variable worth considering in this context, since it might
likely affect the factor proportions and therefore wages. Samuelson (1948, 1949) ex-
plicitly excluded the possibility of factor movement since his question of interest was
whether FPE would also occur in the absence of factor movement. Factor mobility
has received little attention in trade literature (Wong, 1995: 3). Rybczynski (1955),
however, showed that an increase in one factor of production “must lead to an abso-
lute expansion in production of the commodity using relatively much of that factor”
(p. 337) and to a “worsening in ... the relative price of the commodity using relatively
much of that factor” (p. 340) and thus finally also influence real wages. Empirically,
Wo¨rz and Stehrer (2009: 108f) for example find evidence for a relative downward
pressure of FDIs on wages for seven sectors in OECD and selected non-OECD coun-
tries, thereof four supplementary CEECs, between 1981 and 2000. On the other hand,
Bedi and Cies´lik (2002) find evidence that Polish workers in sectors with higher FDIs
enjoy higher wages and higher wage increases.
Finally, the profits of the enterprises might be important. Again, the strict HO
framework does not allow for profits since the zero-profit condition has to hold to de-
termine equilibrium wages. In reality, however, there might be profits and they might
influence wages in two ways: If a surplus is obtained, workers might appropriate part
of it in the next year(s) through higher claims in the wage bargaining process. On the
other hand, operating surplus can be seen as a proxy for market power of enterprises
and if this is rising, it will be more difficult for workers to enforce wage claims.
4.2.2 Spurious Regressions
Another problem that is likely to arise if the examined data has a time series com-
ponent is the spurious regression problem which is well known from the time series
context through Granger and Newbold (1974).4. They simulated 100 different and
4A nutshell discussion is given in Granger, 1990.
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unrelated non-drifting random walks5 with a length of 50 time periods and showed
that 78 % of the variation in any series can be explained by any two other series even
though they are not at all related. In a panel setting, spurious regression problems
are “usually ignored in applied economics” (Entorf, 1997: 291) but have “interesting
properties” (Banerjee, 1999: 609): The LSDV estimator βˆ is consistent for its true
value (Kao, 1999: 5, Theorem 1; cf. Phillips, 1987 for the pure time series context),
but its t-statistic, tβ, “diverges so that inferences about the regression coefficient,
β, are wrong with the probability that goes to one asymptotically” (Kao, 199: 6)
and the asymptotics of βˆ are different from those of the spurious regression in pure
time-series data (Kao, 1999: 2). Increasing N does not help the t-statistic to con-
verge to a meaningful distribution and when T increases the rate of wrong rejection
of H0 : β = 0 increases significantly (cf. Kao, 1999: 14). Entorf (1997) finds that for
T →∞ (but possibly even for small T) and finite N the spurious regression problem
holds for FE panel models and t-statistics can be highly missleading. Contrary to pure
time-series models, the R2 remains low in a spurious panel setting (Kao, 1999: 14/15).
One modus operandi to avoid these nonsense regressions is using series that are
stationary. Most economic series (besides from financial market data) can be made
stationary by taking the first or second differences ∆xt = xt − xt−1, or ∆2xt =
∆xt − ∆xt−1 respectively. Such series are said to be difference stationary or inte-
grated of order 1, or 2 respectively, denoted I(1) or I(2). A random walk (see footnote
5) is an example of a difference stationary series.
Another example of non-stationary series that can be made stationary by transfor-
mation are trend stationary series, generated by xt = φ1 + φ2xt−1 + φ3t + t, where
φ2 < 1. Then the detrended series zt = xt − φ3t is stationary.
The distinction between difference and trend stationary series is essential for the
econometric analysis of the series (see below; for a discussion of the relevance of the
two aspects of non-stationarity in applied economics see e.g. Nelson/Plosser, 1982
and Stock/Watson, 1988). Different unit root tests applied in section 5.5 allow to
distinguish whether the series under consideration is a random walk with or without
drift or a trend stationary process.
5A random walk is an example of a stochastic trend, i.e. the trend of the series is random.
It is generated by the process Xt = Xt−1 + t. Hence X1 = X0 + 1, X2 = X1 + 2 = X2 =
X0 + 1 + 2 and further Xt = X0 + 1 + 2 + ... + t. Since t ∼ i.i.d.(0, σ2) it follows that
E(Xt) = E(X0 + 1 + 2 + ... + t) = E(X0), thus the proces has constant mean. However, since
V ar(Xt) = V ar(X0) + V ar(1) + ... + V ar(t) = 0 + σ
2 + ... + σ2 = tσ2 the variance is increasing
with time and therefore the series is not stationary.
Chapter 5
Data Description and Statistics
For the econometric analysis examining the impact of trade with the EU-15 on the
wages in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia I use OECD data for
13 manufacturing industries over the period 1997-20051. Despite being a relatively
short period, it covers an interesting range of time that coincides with major trade
liberalizations between the EU-15 and the CEEC-4, and where CEECs have become
relatively stabilized after the transition shock (cf. ch. 3).
Data like these, which have a cross-sectional as well as a time series dimension are
called panel (or longitudinal) data (cf. Wooldridge, 2003: 426 e.g.). In the present
case the panel has N = 13 cross-sectional components (denoted i = 1, 2, ..., N) and
T = 9 (denoted t = 1, 2, ..., T) time dimensions.
The fact that panel data has two dimensions usually leads to a larger number of
data points. Thus, while a shortage of d.o.f. is often a problem in analyzing time
series data, this problem is less severe in a panel setting since the two dimensions
offer more information and degrees of freedom which helps to reduce the gap between
the information requirements of the researcher and information provided by the data
(Hsiao, 1990: 218). The many advantages2 of panel data have encouraged a fruitful
theoretic as well as applied literature in panel data econometrics (Baltagi, 2004, and
2006 give an overview of the theoretical contributions and empirical applications in
the field).
The main data I am using throughout the subsequent econometric analysis comes
from the OECD, mainly from the STAN database for Industrial Analysis which “in-
cludes annual measures of output, labor input, investment and international trade
that allow to construct a wide range of indicators to focus on areas such as produc-
tivity growth, competitiveness and general structural change” (OECD, 2005: 1). It is
based on the International Standard Industrial Classification, Revision 3 (ISIC Rev.3)
and covers all activities (including services). For my purpose, however, internation-
ally tradable goods, especially manufacturing goods, are of interest, because they are
most likely to be affected by the integration to the EU (cf. Onaran/Stockhammer,
2006: 8). These 13 manufacturing industries are listed in table 5.1. The branches
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing (ISIC Rev. 3: 01-05), Mining and Quar-
rying (10-14), and Electricity, gas and water supply (40-41) could have been included
in the analysis too since they are tradable goods. However, these branches are subject
1In the case of the Czech Republic and Hungary the data is available from 1995 onwards, for
Poland starting in 1996. However, to make the results comparable, the main focus is on the period
1997 to 2005.
2For a more detailed discussion, see Hsiao, 1990: 1-5.
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to special considerations (material deposits, strategic political interests, protection in
agricultural sector for example)3 and have therefore not been considered. The same
is true for sector 7 since its activity depends on natural resources and wages in these
sectors are considered to be influenced by very specific factors. Therefore the sector
is excluded from most parts of the analysis.
Industry ISIC Code skill
Rev. 3
Food Products, Beverages & Tobacco 15-16 3 L
Textiles, Textile products, leather & footwear 17-19 4 L
Wood and products of wood & cork 20 5 L
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing & publishing 21-22 6 L
(Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 23 7 ML)
Chemicals & chemical products 24 8 MH
Rubber & plastics products 25 9 ML
Other non-metallic mineral products 26 10 ML
Basic metals & fabricated metal products 27-28 11 ML
Machinery & equipment, n.e.c. 29 12 MH
Electrical & optical equipment 30-33 13 H
Transport equipment 34-35 14 H
Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 36-37 15 L
Note: The classification of the skill intensity in the very right column follows OECD (2007: 220):
L = low technology; ML = medium-low technology; MH = medium-high technology;
H = high technology. Industries 13 and 14 have been assigned to high technology
industry according to the subsections included in them.
Table 5.1: List and classification of industries
Bernard et al (2002: 13) argue that “in general, tests of relative factor price
equality should employ the most disaggregate industry data available”. It is gener-
ally expected that the true economic relationship is micro and therefore the most
disaggregate data is the most desirable. However, if econometrics is understood as
“systematic study of economic phenomena using observed data”, as Spanos ([1986],
1993: 3) puts it, the word “observed” already implies that we sometimes don’t have
the data of our desired level of disaggregation. Since this is a frequent problem in
econometric analysis4 it is not surprising that a discussion of data aggregation (cf.
Fisher, 1990 for a survey) emerged not more than a dozen of years after the foun-
dation of the Econometric Society. In this regard econometrics can also be seen as
“an attempt to compensate for the glaring weakness of the data base available” as
Leontief (1971: 2) calls it and this weakness is especially obvious when dealing with
CEECs. It should be noted, however, that examples exist, where the errors in econo-
metric models were less after data aggregation and it is assumed that this is the case
quite frequently in economics since micro data have undergone various transformation
processes (Fisher, 1990: 37f).
3Furthermore another problem exists as far as availability of data is concerned, since employees’
income is not available for Mining and Quarrying in France and Portugal.
4Cf. Spanos ([1986], 1993: 663): “The main problem in econometric modelling, however, is that
what a theory suggests as important features to be observed and the available observed data can
differ substantially.”
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5.1 Wages
Obviously the most essential variable in the data are wages. STAN offers an ag-
gregation of labor compensation of employees at current prices in national currency
(LABR) for each industry.5 I divided those by the number of employees (EMPE) in
every industry6 to obtain the nominal average yearly sector-specific gross wages per
worker:
nominalwage = w =
LABR
EMPE
. (5.1)
It was not possible to calculate these for Ireland since it does not report appro-
priate EMPE data until 1998 and the sector Coke, refined petroleum products and
nuclear fuel is neither reported in EMPN nor in EMPE (even after 1998). The prob-
lem, however, is negligible as will be clear after it is explained how EU-15 wages are
calculated since the exports of all four CEECs to Ireland are marginal.
With those limitations in mind, wages were available for the period 1995 onwards,
except for Poland (1996), and up to 2006/7 except for Denmark (EMPE until 2005),
Sweden (EMPN until 2005), Poland, and Hungary (2005).
5.1.1 EU-15 Wages
At a first thought it might seem reasonable to sum up all LABR in EU countries
and divide it by the sum of EMPE for every i and t to obtain the EU-15 wage. This
would give the arithmetic (or population) mean of EU wages weighted by the number
of employees. However, this does not necessarily make sense in the present context.
To understand why, assume a CEEC with wage wNMS and two (groups of) EU-15
countries with wages wL and wH , where wL < wNMS < wH . Assume that workers
in most EU-15 countries earn wH so that average EU wage is higher than wNMS but
that the CEEC almost exclusively establishes trade relations to countries with wL.
Thus, if FPE holds, we would be mistaken assuming the CEEC wage to raise and
converge to the population mean of the EU wage since it is more likely to fall close
to the level of wL.
Accordingly I calculated an average EU-15 wage specific to each of the four
CEECs, which is weighted by the export share of the CEEC to the EU-15 mem-
ber states (which is called EU reference wage in the further analysis) and which is
given for each CEEC by
5Furthermore, STAN also offers the sum of wages and salaries (WAGE) for some countries. Sup-
plementary to WAGE, LABR also includes supplements such as contributions to social security,
private pensions, health insurance, life insurance etc. Since they can be regarded as part of the wage
which is directly spent for financial security it is the more appropriate measure.
6This might lead to minor inadequacies since EMPE is not calculated in full-time equivalents.
Full-time equivalents are only available for a couple of countries. As long as the development of
part-time work has not differed systematically between countries and sectors during the time period
under consideration, the inadequacies are negligible, however.
Another problem arises since Sweden does not report EMPE data but only data for total employment
(EMPN) which also includes the self-employed and unpaid family workers. However this can be
assumed as a proxy for EMPE. Denmark and Finland have been taken as a reference point to
calculate the share of EMPE/EMPN in each industry. This can be justified since labor markets
there and in Sweden can be assumed to be similar (“Scandinavian Model”; the case of Norway and
Iceland may be different due to their high reliance on oil and fish; see Andersen et al., 2007: 13 for
reference). It turned out that this ratio (combined for Denmark and Finland) in all manufacturing
sectors was above 0.84 for all sectors and years. This ratio was multiplied with Swedish EMPN data
to estimate Swedish EMPE:
(EMPEDKit + EMPE
FIN
it )
(EMPNDKit + EMPN
FIN
it )
· EMPNSWDit = ÊMPE
SWD
it
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EUreferencewage =
M∑
j=1
(wj · Xj∑M
j=1Xj
) ∀ i, t (5.2)
and where Xj are the exports of the CEEC to EU-15 country j = 1, 2, ...,M = 137
and wj is the wage in EU-15 country j. 8
Since Slovakia reports trade data beginning in 1997 only it becomes clear why the
general analysis of this thesis is limited to the period 1997-2005.
5.1.2 Nominal, Real and PPP Wages
The SST and FPE theorem are formulated in real rather than in nominal wages.9
Many studies consequently use real wages (while some others even use nominal wages,
cf. Berger/Westermann, 2001). However, using purchasing power parities (PPPs)
might be a meaningful alternative. PPPs “are currency conversion rates that both
convert to a common currency and equalise the purchasing power of different curren-
cies. In other words, they eliminate the differences in price levels between countries
in the process of conversion” (OECD website).
Let PPP be P
∗
P where P
∗ is the price of a representative basket of goods abroad
in foreign currency and P is the price of the same basket of goods at home in national
currency. This means that P
∗
P units of the foreign currency buy the same amount of
goods in foreign as one unit of national currency at home.
It should be noted that there exist PPPs for different aggregates. Instead of using
the PPP for GDP which is taken in many cases, I took PPP for private consumption
from the Eurostat website since this seems more appropriate to compare wages of
different countries since their purchasing power usually does not directly depend on
the level all prices in an economy but especially consumer prices.10
Hence, a possible way to compare wages across countries would be to use the
measure
unitywageA/B =
wa/PPPA
wB/PPPB
, (5.3)
where A refers to the CEEC and wB is the associated EU reference wage. Unfortu-
nately, the stationarity characteristics of this variable do not allow for using it in the
econometric analysis (see section 5.5) which is a loss since this measure has a number
of advantages. It can be seen immediately that it does not matter which country is
taken as reference for PPP in this case (cf. OECD, 2006: 125) and that the measure
compares the purchasing power of wage earners in country A relative to the purchas-
ing power of wage earners in country B (see Appendix A for a proof). Accordingly,
if the purchasing power of wage earners in both counties is equal, unitywageA/B = 1
must hold. This concept allows one to really compare “whether workers can afford
bundles of goods which ... could be regarded as equivalent” (Raffer, 1987: 193; see
7Usually we would expect M to be 15, however, have in mind that Ireland is not included, as
mentioned above. Furthermore the Bilateral Trade Database of the OECD treats Belgium and
Luxembourg together. Accordingly, they were treated as if they were one country in the analysis.
Therefore M = 13.
8Now it becomes clear, why the exclusion of Ireland would not make much difference: the CEECs’
exports to Ireland are so marginal that this would not significantly influence EU-15 reference wages.
9To be more precise, inflation does not play any role.
10Since Belgium and Luxembourg are treated as one country, their PPP (as well as their CPI
when real wages were considered) was calculated by their individual PPPs weighted by their shares
in added value in manufacturing in year t.
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193ff as well as Raffer, 2006 for a discussion).
Another advantage of this measure is, that it does not need to use exchange
rates to make wages comparable across countries, as can be seen from above. This
is a main advantage since exchange rates might be influenced by many aspects of
currency markets and thus rapid movements in the exchange rate might not reflect
changes in economic or living conditions, especially in the short run. This might
not matter much in the present analysis since I use yearly averages. However, note
that the CEEC-4 have applied different monetary policies (cf. Zuckersta¨dter, 2004)
leading to different long-run developments in their exchange rate.
Turning a blind eye to the conceptual general problems of “testing” for FPE or
the SST, there is a problem in using this measure in the HO framework. Thinking in
common currency and keeping price levels in A and B fixed where PA 6= PB, we might
observe unitywageA/B going to unity and thus an equalization of purchasing power
of workers in countries A and B but from a general perspective, factor prices are not
equalized. On the contrary in the context of trade liberalization, the HO framework
predicts equalization of good prices and through this equalization of good prices, also
factor prices equalize. However, it can be shown, that unitywage going to unity is a
necessary (though not sufficient) condition for FPE (see Appendix A). Therefore, to
start with testing for this proposition is quite accurate.11
5.1.3 Descriptive Wage Statistics
Table 5.2 gives an overview of the development of real wages and the unitywage in
the CEEC-4 and the EU-15 between 1997 and 2005.12 We can see that none of the
four CEECs had reached more than 56.6 % of the living standard (i.e. unitywage)
of their trading partners in the EU-15 in 1997. Poland, having the smallest gap in
1997, had the smallest increase throughout the following eight years (7.2 %) but still
came closest to the level of EU-15 trading partners in 2005. The Czech Republic (+
38.0 %) and Slovakia (+ 28.1 %) had the highest increases in living standards, with
Hungary (+ 21.5 %) not lagging far behind. In 2005 thus, every country reached at
least 48 % of the standard of their EU-15 trading partners.
When looking at the development of real wages (see table 5.2), we see a similar
picture:13 Especially the Czech Republic performed well with p.a. real wage increases
11If this proposition holds, the problem can be investigated in a supplementary way. In common
currency the problem is easy to address by looking if prices or absolute (real) wages also equalize.
Empirically, using price level indices (PLIs) is an appropriate way. PLIs are obtained by dividing
PPPs by the exchange rate E, which expresses the amount of foreign money that has to be paid in
order to obtain 1 unit of national money. PLI indicates the relation of the foreign price level to the
price level at home in common currency. Note, that according to the introduction of the Euro and
the fixed exchange rates PLI = PPP for Euro countries starting as of 1999.
12No exchange rate was needed to calculate real wage changes. For the EU-15 national real wage
changes were weighted by the number of employees. The unitywage of CEECs does not refer to the
EU-15 as a whole but is relative to trading partners in the EU-15 using the concept introduced above.
All wages are calculated as the average of wages in sectors i weighted by employment in sector i.
Thus due to the level of data aggregation, there might be differences to the manufacturing wages
officially provided by OECD STAN.
13This might not be surprising at a first thought. Have in mind, however, that the unitywage is
weighted by the exports to the corresponding trading partner. Thus, if trade reallocation towards
high-income EU-15 partners takes place between 1997 and 2005, high real wage changes might be
outperformed by this shift in trade patterns. The opposite seems to be true for Slovakia, which
had modest real wage changes but a high increase in the unitywage with respect to EU-15 trading
partners.
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CZ H PL SK EU
avg. real wage growth p.a. 3.81 % 2.92 % 1.42 % 1.63 % 0.55 %
avg. real wage growth p.a.
if employment structure fixed 3.49 % 2.39 % 1.22 % 1.77 % 0.21 %
1997 unitywage 0.409 0.450 0.566 0.374 1
2005 unitywage 0.565 0.547 0.606 0.480 1
Table 5.2: Development of manufacturing wages 1997-2005
Figure 5.1: development of manufacturing unitywages
of 3.81 % on average, followed by Hungary (+ 2.92 % p.a.) and Slovakia (+ 1.77 %
p.a.). Polands real wage increase was the lowest (+ 1.22 % p.a.) but was still twice
as large as in the EU-15 (+ 0.55 % p.a.).
The increase of real wages for all countries is a process that consists of two com-
ponents: First the level of wages in each sector may change. Secondly, there might
be labor mobility between these sectors and workers may move from low wage sectors
to higher wage sectors. Therefore it is of interest which of those two effects caused
the wage increase. To find out I re-calculated the 2005 real wage for all countries but
used the 1997 employment structure instead of the 2005 employment structure as
weight. The results can be seen in the middle row of table 5.2 and show that keeping
the employment structure fixed at 1997 level, the wage increases are still substantial
and therefore wages must have risen mainly due to wage increases within each in-
dustry. Slovakia is the only case where wages with fixed employment structure have
risen more than when compared to the actual employment structure, indicating that
a slight move of laborers towards lower wage sectors has taken place. On the other
hand, the difference in the development of wages with fixed employment structure
compared to the actual development was quite dramatic for the EU-15 countries,
indicating a redeployment of workers towards sectors with higher wages. From the
data analyzed so far, we do not know, why this happened. Note, however, that the
5.1. WAGES 41
Figure 5.2: development of real manufacturing wages, Index (1997 = 100)
HO framework predicts a higher labor demand in the high skill industries after trade
liberalization with a “less advanced” region/country.
Regarding the distribution of employees among industries (see table B.3 in Ap-
pendix B), many employees in CEECs are concentrated in the sectors: food products,
beverages and tobacco and basic metals and fabricated metal products. Electrical and
optical equipment is another important sector, though less for Poland. Machinery
and equipment, n.e.c. is important in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia, while the
low tech sector textiles, textile products, leather and footwear are important in all
countries with the exception of Czech Republic.
The situation in the EU-15 does not differ much from the CEECs in this regard
with basic metals, food, machinery and equipment, as well as electrical and optical
equipment being the most important sectors there.
The textile sector has dramatically lost importance in all countries. Electrical and
optical as well as transport equipment were sectors in the Czech Republic, where em-
ployment highly increased. Hungary experienced a real surge in electrical and optical
equipment employment which also grew in the Slovak Republic while employment
decreased strongly in machinery and equipment in the latter.
Real wage increases (see table B.2 in Appendix B) have been relatively modestly
distributed in the Czech Republic, where the sector coke, refined petroleum products
and nuclear fuel made most gains (+ 5.8 % p.a.) while the increase was the less
pronounced (but still quite high) in the sector of wood and products of wood cork (+
2.2 % p.a.). Also in Poland gains were relatively equally distributed with the chemicals
(+ 2.7 % p.a.) and textile (-0.5 % p.a.) sectors marking the extreme values. In
Hungary the increase in the machinery sector (+ 7.0 % p.a.) was exceptionally high,
whereas sectors coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel and manufacturing
n.e.c. suffered real wage losses of -1.0 % p.a. in average. In Slovakia the wage
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surge in sector coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel (+ 10.1 % p.a.) was
outstanding while real wages in the wood sector decreased by an average of -0.7 %
p.a..
5.2 Trade Data
Trade data is the second important set of data in the subsequent analysis. It has been
taken from the STAN Bilateral Trade Database (BTD) which breaks down bilateral
trade flows by OECD member (and some other) countries by economic activity.
Exports are measured in US-$. These were generally transformed to an export
share which I calculated by dividing the exports towards the EU-15 by gross output
transformed to US-$ with the corresponding exchange rate (taken from the OECD
website).
5.2.1 Descriptive Trade Statistics
When looking at this data, we can see first of all, that all countries have relatively
high export shares. In the case of Poland, which has the lowest share, manufactur-
ing exports were 24.8 % of manufacturing gross output in 1997 and 42.9 % in 2005.
Secondly, manufacturing exports increased significantly in all countries, the most in
Poland (+ 73.0 %), the least in Hungary (+ 34.7 %). The EU-15 has been by far
the most important trading partner for all four CEECs: Their exports to the EU-
15 accounted for at least 47.2 % and 57.8 % (Slovakia) of all exports in 1997 and
2005 respectively. The highest share of manufacturing exports towards the EU-15
was achieved by Hungary in 1997 (72.2 %) and by the Czech Republik in 2005 (66.4
%). Interestingly, there seems to be convergence among the CEECs concerning the
importance of exports towards the EU-15 in total exports: For the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland, the share of EU-15 exports to total exports did not differ more
than one percentage point from their mean of 65.5 % in 2005. In 1997 the mean
was 65.1 % and thus not very different, but extreme values did scatter much more
arround this value (Czech Republic: 59.8 %, Hungary: 72.2 %). For both years, only
the Slovak Republic lay well below (47.2 % and 57.8 % respectively). Relative to the
gross manufacturing production (cf. table 5.3), exports to the EU-15 have risen by
22.4 % in Hungary and by more than 60 % for the other countries and it seems that
this percentage has settled down at a certain level after 2003, or even before for Hun-
gary (1999). From 2004 to 2005 the percentage has even decreased for all four CEECs.
An interesting pattern of CEEC-4 exports towards the EU-15 is revealed by a look
at figure 5.4 which depicts the percentage change of manufacturing exports to the EU-
15 (as a percentage of manufacturing gross production) between 1997 and 2005 by
skill intensity (according to the classification given in table 5.1): While HO theory
would predict that low-skill intensive goods exports would increase as a result of trade
liberalization, we can see that in fact the relevance of high-skill and medium-high-
skill intensive exports has dramatically risen for all countries, especially the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, while the significance of less skill intensive exports remained
fairly unchanged (or even decreased in the case of Hungary).
The next important trading partners for the CEEC-4 are themselves. Here, Hun-
gary and Poland can be distinguished from the others: While the share of exports
towards CEEC-4 to total exports amounted to 9.0 % for the former countries in 2005,
it was remarkably higher in Czech Republic (16.1 %) and especially Slovakia (25.6 %).
Here old ties of the common country seem to prevail - the importance of intra-CEEC-
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Figure 5.3: CEECs’ manufacturing exports towards the EU-15 (as per-
centage of manufacturing output)
Figure 5.4: development of skill intensities in CEEC-4 exports towards
the EU-15, 1997-2005
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4 trade is decreasing in the latter, however, while it is dramatically increasing for
the former. Relative to gross manufacturing production, only Slovakia experienced a
slight decrease (- 0.7 %) of CEEC-4 exports.
Exports to the other eight NMS amounted to an average of 4.2 % of total exports
and 2.6 % of gross manufacturing production in 2005 but was increasing in relevance
for all countries, especially for Hungary and Poland. Decreasing, on the other hand,
was the importance of Russia as an export destination: for all countries even the per-
centage relative to gross manufacturing production decreased, especially for Hungary.
Russia is the most important for Poland: 4.6 % of all Polish manufacturing exports
went to Russia in 2005. For the other three countries this percentage was less than 2
%.
More than 11.3 % of exports of the CEEC-4 went to other countries in the world,
the share is highest for Poland (17.7 %) and its share develops differently across
countries (but is increasing in relation to gross manufacturing production for all
countries).
5.3 Other Variables
Following the considerations in subsection 4.2.1, there are other variables which will
be used in the subsequent analysis.
Unemployment rates have been taken from the OECD website where they are
provided as harmonized unemployment rate including persons above a specific age,
who were without work, currently available for work and seeking work, in relation to
the civilian labor force. Obviously, this measure is not sector specific.
The data divides the CEEC-4 into two parts (cf. table 5.5): Hungary and the Czech
Republic had a relatively low unemployment rate, being below the level in the Euro
area for most years. However, while the unemployment rate decreased from 9.0 % to
7.2 % in Hungary between 1997 and 2005, it increased dramatically from 4.8 % to 7.9
% in the Czech Republic. Poland and Slovakia on the other hand had unemployment
rates that were well above the Euro area average throughout all years under consid-
eration. In both countries the unemployment rate increased: from 10.9 % to 17.8 %
in Poland and from 11.9 % to 16.3 % in Slovakia.
Foreign competition, i.e. import penetration, is calculated as the proportion
of imports from the BTD relative to gross output plus net imports:
MPEN =
IMPO
PROD + IMPO − EXPO.
This measure is sector specific.
As mentioned in subsection 4.2.1, productivity changes might result from changed
trade patterns but also for other reasons. In reality, however, it is hard to distin-
guish the sources of any productivity gain. Thus, only including overall productivity
changes will result in a biased estimator for the effect of trade, if trade and productiv-
ity are correlated. Furthermore, usual productivity measures are not sector specific.
Egger and Stehrer (2003: 66) use lagged real goods production to account for sector
specific non-neutral technical progress. This, however, does not overcome the problem
of biasing the trade coefficient. Thus, I suggest using Research & Development
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Figure 5.5: Unemployment Rates 1995 - 2005
expenses of enterprises as an instrument for productivity since they might affect
productivity but are uncorrelated with trade. Another advantage is the fact, that R
& D expenses are provided at the industry level. On the other side, spillover effects
for R & D might occur, meaning that R & D expenses in one industry might also
affect the productivity of another industry. This problem (which is subject to current
research efforts in panel data econometrics, cf. Kapedanios et al., 2006 or Pesaran
et al., 2007 e.g.) is less severe in the present context since the consistency of the
estimator for the influence of R & D on wages is of little interest.
Data on foreign direct investments unfortunately was not available on a level
of industry aggregation compatible with my data.
5.4 Preliminary Analysis
So far, we have seen that wages have risen more substantially in the CEEC-4 than in
the EU-15 but we do not know what has driven these wage changes. Before providing
a more elaborate econometric framework I present some scatter graphs and simple
regressions concerning the overall development of the variables between 1997 and
2005. Figure 5.6 shows the development of unitywages between 1997 and 2005 on
one axis and the development of the export quote of the corresponding industry on
the other axis. Figure 5.7 does the same but uses real wage development rather than
unitywages.
In table 5.3 the results of a regression of the changes of the variables mentioned
above on changes of the export share are presented: yt = α + βxt + t, where yt
measures the overall change in either unitywage or real wage while xt measures the
overall change in the export share and t is an index for the industries.
Since the constant α captures a large fraction of the variation in the data, I
ran all regressions as a homogeneous model also (i.e. under the restriction α =
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Figure 5.6: development of unitywages and exports
0). Economically we would expect this restriction to hold if the change in wages
is exclusively due to the change in the export share which is a rather unrealistic
assumption.
Without forcing the regression line to go through the origin, Hungary is the only
country where the change in exports towards the EU-15 had a significant effect on
the development of (real) wages, and this relationship is positive. Interestingly, if
all countries are pooled, there is a positive relationship that is significant at the 5
% level for real wages, though not for the unitywage. Generally, real wages seem to
react more significantly to trade. In the homogenous regression, all coefficients are
statistically different from zero and > 0 on the 10 % level. On a first view thus, there
seems to be some evidence that there is a positive correlation between the change in
CEECs’ wages and the change in their exports to the EU-15.
It might also be interesting to check whether low wages increased more than
higher wages during the time period under consideration. If this would have been the
case this indicates a compression of the income distribution (unless it is outweighed
by changes in the employment structure). Therefore I ran a simple regression of
the (real) wage change between 1997 and 2005 on the level of real wages in 1997:
yt = α+βxt + t, where yt measures the overall change in the real wage and xt is the
1997 level of real wages (and t again is an index for the industries).
We can see from figure 5.8 that the relationship is not very strong. By running a
regression of the two variables (see table 5.4), however, we obtain significant positive
estimates (except for the case of Hungary and the pooled regression) indicating a
positive relationship between the level of the real wage in 1997 and its development
in the eight years thereafter. Since sectors with higher wages have experienced higher
growth rates, we would expect wage inequality to have risen. We can also observe
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Figure 5.7: development of real wages and exports
Figure 5.8: real wages in 1997 and their increase until 2005
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country α β β (if α = 0)
CZ 0.375*** -0.003 0.118***
unitywage (0.085) (0.032) (0.025)
CZ 0.338*** -0.003 0.106***
real wage (0.058) (0.021) (0.020)
H 0.001 0.093 0.093**
unitywage (0.117) (0.062) (0.030)
H -0.039 0.130** 0.112***
realwage (0.097) (0.051) (0.025)
PL 0.117 0.000 0.028*
unitywage (0.081) (0.023) (0.013)
PL 0.044 0.20 0.030***
realwage (0.040) (0.011) (0.006)
SK 0.265** 0.024 0.083***
unitywage (0.110) (0.029) (0.019)
SK -0.011 0.066 0.063***
realwage (0.149) (0.40) (0.020)
pooled 0.192*** 0.021 0.073***
unitywage (0.052) (0.017) (0.011)
pooled 0.113** 0.035** 0.065***
realwage (0.050) (0.016) (0.010)
Table 5.3: Simple regression between changes in wage and export share,
1997-2005
from the figure that there is an outlier, which represents the 1997 real wage of the
sector Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel in Hungary being equal to
52.940 Euro. Excluding this sector from the pooled regression does not change the
outcome significantly; only the constant in the equation becomes insignificant at the
10 % level, all of the other main results remain qualitatively the same. However these
results might be interpreted, it is important to stress that we do not know the impact
of trade in this relationship.
country α β β (if α = 0)
CZ -0.038 1.84e-06** 1.65e-06***
(0.148) (7.25e-07) (1.06e-07)
H 0.236** -2.66e-08 1.93e-08
(0.080) (2.28e-08) (2.14e-08)
PL -0.100 7.06e-06*** 3.83e-06***
(0.066) (2.22e-06) (6.29e-07)
SK -0.866** 5.12e-06*** 1.12e-06***
(0.301) (1.42e-06) (3.62e-07)
pooled 0.235*** -4.44e-06 0.0000131***
(1997 wage in Euro) (0.044) (4.39e-06) (3.60e-06)
Table 5.4: Simple regression between wage change and 1997 wage level
To hopefully obtain more meaningful results about the relationship between trade
and wages as well as their distribution I move on to a more elaborate econometric
analysis.
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5.5 Stationarity and Non-Stationarity
First, to avoid the spurious regression problem discussed in the previous chapter I
investigate the stationarity characteristics of the series.
Definition 1 A series yt = y1, y2, ..., yT is said to be (covariance or weakly)14 sta-
tionary if
E(yt) = 0,
V ar(yt = σ2,
and
Cov(yt, ys) = 0 ∀t 6= s
holds (cf. Greene, 2000: 528).
A stationary series thus is characterized by constant mean and variance.
To test for stationarity, different unit root tests in the time series context have
emerged. However, in a panel data setting, unit root tests have not been devel-
oped until the 1990s.15 Levin and Lin (1993, published as Levin et al., 2002, further
referred to as LLC) did pioneering work in this area and their contribution “con-
tained almost all the key elements which continue to preoccupy the later discussion
in the literature” (Banerjee, 1999: 614). Their null hypothesis states, that each
cross-sectional/individual time series is integrated while under the alternative none
of them have a unit root, i.e. all of them are stationary. While the null hypothesis of
the LCC test makes sense under some circumstances, the alternative is very strong
(see Maddala/Wu, 1999: 635). The test proposed by Im et al. (2003, further IPS)
therefore formulates a “heterogeneous alternative” that allows some (but not all) of
the individual series to have a unit root under the alternative. Thus, rejection of H0
does not necessarily imply that the unit root null is rejected for all i but that H0 is
rejected for N0 < N members of the group (Im et al., 2003: 73). The central statistic
of the test is the t˜-bar statistic which is computed as
t˜-barNT =
1
N
N∑
i=1
t˜iT , (5.4)
where t˜iT is a simplified version of the DF statistic for group i (cf. Im et al., 2003: 57).
The test therefore “is a way of combining the evidence on the unit root hypothesis
from the N unit root tests performed on the N cross-section units” (Maddala/Wu,
1999: 635).
Both the LLC and IPS test are based on the ADF test and therefore also suffer
from its lack of power in distinguishing the unit root from a borderline stationary
alternative even though this problem becomes less severe in a panel setting (cf. Bal-
tagi, 2002: 362 and Maddala/Wu, 1999: 631). Furthermore they require a balanced
panel, i.e. t = T ∀i.
Due to these limitations Maddala and Wu (1999) proposed a test based on a
classic book of Sir Ronald Aylmer Fisher from 193216 which is more powerful in
distinguishing the null and the alternative hypothesis (see Maddala/Wu, 1999: 645):
14The concept of strong stationarity assuming that the distribution is not changing over time is
neither needed nor meaningful in the present context.
15For example, Kao and Chiang (2000: 180) state that “not much attention has been paid to
testing the unit roots in panel data”. However, Banerjee (1999: 607) mentions that panel unit root
and cointegration have been a “fruitful area of study in recent years.”
16A similar test has been proposed by Choi (2001).
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Let pii denote the p-value of any unit root test17 for cross-section/individual i.
The test statistic then is
pi = −2
N∑
i=1
log(pii)
where pi is χ2 distributed with 2N d.o.f.18 The test needs no balanced panel and
can be used for different lag lengths in the individual regressions (Maddala/Wu, 1999:
636). The Fisher test is thus an exact test based on combining the significance levels
while the IPS test is an asymptotic test which combines the test statistics.
All three tests discussed are thus a combination of independent unit root tests
within the N cross-sections. Maddala/Wu (1999: 650) consider this generalization of
tests used in univariate data to panel data as a “major problem”. This independence
also implies that all three tests are based on the assumption that the error terms  in
the test equations are not cross-related among the sectors/individuals i.
Without cross-section correlation in the errors, IPS performs slightly better than
the Fisher and the LLC test but in the presence of this correlation Maddala/Wu
(1999: 644/5) found Monte Carlo evidence suggesting that the problem is less severe
with a Fisher test, especially when T is large and N relatively small. They therefore
conclude “that the Fisher test is better than the IPS and LL[C] test” (645, see also
650).
IPS (1995/2003) allows for a limited cross-section correlation through the inclusion
of common time effects (i.e. a term θt > 0 is added to the test equation and can
be eliminated by subtracting out the mean y from yit before performing the unit
root test; cf. also Breitung/Pesaran, 2005: 18f) but it is unlikely that cross-section
correlation takes on this simple form in real-world applications (see Maddala/Wu,
1999: 645). The IPS test, however, has been widely implemented in empirical research
(cf. Drine/Rault, 2006: 315).
Generally, the technique of demeaning cannot work when pair-wise cross-section
covariances of the error terms differ across the individual series (Pesaran, 2007: 265).
Different procedures (which were called “second generation” panel unit root tests
drawing a distinction to the “first generation” tests mentioned above) to solve for
this problem have been developed (see Breitung/Pesaran, 2008 for an overview).
Pesaran (2007) e.g. proposed a CADF test where the ADF is extended with the
cross-section averages of lagged levels and first differences of the individual series. In
formal notation, the problem and test structure is explained as follows: Suppose a
panel time series yit = yi0, ..., yiT of the cross sections i = 1, 2, ..., N is generated by
a stochastic, first order autoregressive (AR(1)) process
yit = (1− φi)µi + φiyi,t−1 + uit
for each i, where yi0 are given and uit has the single-factor structure uit = γift + it
with ft being the unobserved common effect that is serially uncorrelated with E(ft) =
0, E(f2t ) = σ
2
f < ∞ and E(f4t ) < ∞ and set to unity without loss of generality and
all it are i.i.d. across i and t with E(it) = 0, E(2it) = σ
2
i < ∞, E(4it) < ∞ and
finally it, ft, and γi are independently distributed ∀i. Taking the first difference
∆yit = yit − yi,t−1 leads
∆yit = (1− φi)µi + φiyi,t−1 − yi,t−1 + uit
= (1− φi)µi + (φi − 1)yi,t−1 + γift + it
= αi + βiyi,t−1 + γift + it (5.5)
17The test can even be performed for unit root tests where the null hypothesis is stationarity.
18Thus, the test is also called the inverse Chi-squared (or P-)test (cf. Pesaran, 2007: 266).
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with αi = (1− φi)µi and βi = (φi − 1).
Since if φi = 1, i.e. βi = 0, the series yit is said to have a unit root, the test
hypotheses of interest is
H0 : β1 = β2 = ... = βN = 0 (5.6)
with the heterogeneous alternative
H1 : β1 < 0, β2 < 0, ..., βN1 < 0;βN+1 = βN+2 = βN = 0 (5.7)
with N1/N = δ and 0 < δ ≤ N as N →∞.
If γ = N−1
∑N
j=1 γj with γ 6= 0, then ft can be proxied by the cross section mean
of yit, yt = N−1
∑N
j=1 yjt and its lagged value(s) yt−1, yt−2, ... for sufficiently large
N (see Pesaran (2006a) for explanation). We can thus estimate equation 5.5 in the
CADF form
∆yit = αi + βiyi,t−1 + ciyt−1 + di∆yt + eit (5.8)
by OLS to obtain a t-ratio (see Pesaran, 2007: 269ff) in a similar way as in equation
5.4, whose critical values are derived and tabulated by Pesaran (2007: 274ff). This
can be interpreted as t-bar statistic of the IPS test with mean deviations (see Pesaran,
2007: 276f).
The CADF is valid for panels where N and T are of the same orders of magnitudes
and has satisfactory power even for relatively small values of N and T but is based
on a one factor residual model, which is restrictive in some settings (Pesaran, 2007:
267). A truncated version of the test performs slightly better with small T, but its
power is still low for T < 50, especially if N < 20 (cf. Pesaran, 2007: 288). A fur-
ther problem is that since the CADF test removes common factors, it will eventually
indicate stationary series even where the series are actually non-stationary due to a
common stochastic trend (Breitung/Pesaran, 2005: 24). Interestingly, however, even
if the test was not designed for weak cross section dependence, it tends “to be the
most robust to spatial type dependence” (Breitung/Pesaran, 2005: 25).
To investigate the stationarity characteristics of the series, I decided to conduct
a CADF test using the STATA module written by Piotr Lewandowski19 and two
types of Fisher tests written by Scott Merryman20, one based on the DF statistic and
another one based on a test statistic proposed by Phillips and Perron (1988). The
results are presented in table 5.5 and show, that we are unable to clearly reject the
null hypothesis of a unit root for the unitywage, real wage, real wage gaps, and the
export share variables for levels as well as logarithms of the series. The logarithm
of the Slovak unitywage and the Hungarian real wage gap are the only wage series
that allow for a relative robust rejection of H0.21 Regarding the export share, the
Hungarian one is the only one where we can clearly reject the null (in levels and
logarithms).22
19Warsaw School of Economics, Institute for Structural Research, Poland
20Risk Management Agency, US Department of Agriculture
21This result holds if a deterministic trend is assumed for Slovakia and not assumed for Hungary.
22Since the time series is relatively short (T = 8) we run relatively short of d.o.f. This explains
why no second lag was used (since I reject H0, this will not change the outcome anyways) and why
no time trend was included in the CADF statistic. The conventional IPS statistic requires T > 5
and if a trend is included T > 6 (cf. Im et al., 2003: 59). CADF further decreases the d.o.f. since
supplementary lagged values of the cross-section means y and differences of their actual values are
used in the regression. Therefore it is no further surprising that the p-value of the CADF statistic
for wage variables is always 1 if a trend is included (and mostly 1 for the export quota, p-values
therefore have not been reported in the table).
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CADF (1lag) Fisher ADF (1 lag) Fisher PP (1lag)
series no trend no trend trend no trend trend
CZ unitywage 0.632 1.0 0.3027 1.0 0.0061
H unitywage 0.053 0.5405 0.9805 0.3885 0.8877
PL unitywage 0.974 0.0009 0.0707 0.0004 0.0008
SK unitywage 0.056 0.1540 0.0 0.9317 0.2423
log CZ unitywage 0.857 1.0 0.0699 1.0 0.0
log H unitywage 0.002 0.5535 0.9742 0.4421 0.9151
log PL unitywage 0.683 0.0002 0.0288 0.0001 0.0001
log SK unitywage 0.009 0.0350 0.0 0.7240 0.0915
CZ real wage 0.647 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
H real wage 0.012 0.7980 0.9903 0.7197 0.9713
PL real wage 1.0 0.0030 0.0 0.0 0.0227
SK real wage 0.528 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
log CZ real wage 0.196 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
log H real wage 0.306 0.7855 0.9799 0.7112 0.7112
log PL real wage 1.0 0.0007 0.0 0.0 0.0126
log SK real wage 0.174 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CZ real wage gap 0.992 0.0200 0.0 0.0312 0.0020
H real wage gap 0.042 0.0 0.5049 0.0 0.4166
PL real wage gap 0.929 0.0154 0.0115 0.1195 0.4359
SK real wage gap 0.956 0.0 0.0023 0.0206 0.9864
log CZ real wage gap 0.921 0.0180 0.0001 0.0178 0.0019
log H real wage gap 0.073 0.0 0.3301 0.0 0.0444
log PL real wage gap 0.505 0.0083 0.0093 0.0729 0.3783
log SK real wage gap 0.998 0.0 0.0027 0.0120 0.9790
CZ ExpQ 0.226 0.6530 0.9435 0.2015 0.2526
H ExpQ 0.001 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PL ExpQ 0.879 0.8315 0.0411 0.9964 0.9809
SK ExpQ 0.728 0.5366 0.0 0.4891 0.2174
log CZ ExpSh 0.385 0.0821 0.6414 0.0008 0.0745
log H ExpSh 0.004 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
log PL ExpSh 0.910 0.8213 0.8890 0.9379 0.9650
log SK ExpSh 0.802 0.0025 0.0 0.0010 0.2670
Note: Reported values are p-values. Tests conducted for the period 1997-2005.
Table 5.5: Unit Root Test
When turning to first differences (see table 5.6), we see that interestingly H0 can
still not be rejected for unitywage in the case of Hungary and also the CADF does
not allow rejecting the null for Slovakian unitywage.23 Also, the results for the first
difference of the real wage gap do not allow a clear rejection for all countries under
consideration. Following a conservative strategy, the use of the first difference of the
real wage is probably the only appropriate way for serious regression analysis: Any
test statistic applied allows rejection of H0 on the 10 % level at least (and on the 5
% level in the case of the CADF statistic).
23In the case of Slovakia note, that we further run short of d.o.f. since the first lag (for the period
1996-97) does not exist.
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CADF (1lag) Fisher ADF (1 lag) Fisher PP (1lag)
series no trend no trend trend no trend trend
d(CZ unitywage) 0.003 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
d(H unitywage) 0.305 0.4411 0.6930 0.0 0.0001
d(PL unitywage) 0.008 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
d(SK unitywage) 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0573
d(CZ real wage) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
d(H real wage) 0.011 0.0705 0.0 0.0 0.0
d(PL real wage) 0.0 0.0 0.0382 0.0 0.0
d(SK real wage) 0.019 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
d(CZ real wage gap) 0.081 0.0004 0.0006 0.0 0.0
d(H real wage gap) 0.250 0.6213 0.0 0.0 0.0
d(PL real wage gap) 0.271 0.0024 0.6711 0.0 0.0188
d(SK real wage gap) 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.3362 0.0144
d(CZ ExpSh) 0.125 0.0078 0.0 0.0 0.0
d(H ExpSh) 0.047 0.0 0.1226 0.0 0.0
d(PL ExpSh) 0.859 0.0019 0.1124 0.0 0.0
d(SK ExpSh) 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Note: Reported values are p-values. Tests conducted for the period 1997-2005.
Table 5.6: Unit Root Test for First Differences
54 CHAPTER 5. DATA DESCRIPTION AND STATISTICS
Chapter 6
The Influence of Trade on Wages
6.1 Cointegration Analysis
Considering real wages to be the only wage series being integrated of order one (I(1))
the next step is to check whether the variables that are assumed to influence real
wage are cointegrated with real wage. Generally, two I(1) series y and x are said to
be cointegrated if the error term  of the regression y = α+βx+  is stationary. This
can economically be interpreted as a stable relationship between the two variables.
More formally:
Definition 2 Consider the ni time series variables zit = (zi1t, zi2t, ..., zinit)
′ as being
different variables observed within the ith cross section unit in period t = 1, 2, ..., ni.
Let zijt I(1), j = 1, 2, ..., ni for each i. If there are linear combinations of zijt’s for
j = 1, 2, ..., ni that are I(0), i.e. if there exists an ni× ri matrix (ri ≥ 1) βi such that
β′i zit = ξit I(0)
ri × ni ni × 1 ri × 1
then zit is said to form one or more cointegrating relations (cf. Breitung/Pesaran,
2005: 25).
Compared to the normal time series case, in a panel context “the analysis of coin-
tegration is further complicated by heterogeneity, unbalanced panels, cross section de-
pendence, cross unit cointegration and the N and T asymptotics” (Breitung/Pesaran,
2005: 26). Again, the problem of cross section dependence arises but has been ig-
nored in the first wave of contributions to this topic. Recent contributions (cf. Pe-
saran (2006b) and Westerlund (2007) e.g.) have paid attention to this dependence
which could arise in presence of common stationary or non-stationary components
(see Breitung/Pesaran, 2005: 29ff for a survey).
A further difference to the time series context is that testing for the stationarity of
the residuals of the estimated structural equation can’t be applied if x is endogenous
(cf. Pedroni, 1999: 654) at least in the long run. In the present case this is quite likely
since wages in a sector are likely to be positively correlated with prices, which are
themselves negatively correlated with demand, i.e. exports. Under these conditions
the OLS estimator would be consistent but inefficient (cf. Breitung/Pesaran, 2005:
33) and other estimators such as FMOLS (put forward by Phillips and Hansen, 1990;
cf. Phillips, 1995: 1025) or the probably “more promising” (Kao/Chiang, 2000: 216)
DOLS estimator (suggested by Saikkonen, 1991) are more efficient to estimate the
cointegration relationship.
Before estimating the possible cointegration relationship one, however, has to test
whether cointegration is the case. Different test statistics have been developed, e.g.
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the ones by Kao (1999) or Pedroni (1999, 2004; generalized by Banerjee and Carrion-
i-Silvestre, 2004). Fairly recently, Westerlund (2007) proposed four test statistics of
the null hypothesis of no cointegration, of which two test for the alternative that the
panel is cointegrated as a whole, while the others test for at least one cointegrated
individual/cross-section as alternative. More precisely, they test “whether the error
correction term in a conditional error correction model is equal to zero. If the null
hypothesis of no error correction is rejected, then the null hypothesis of no cointe-
gration is also rejected” (Westerlund, 2007: 710). “Each test is able to accommo-
date individual-specific short-run dynamics, including serially correlated error terms,
non-strictly exogenous regressors, individual-specific intercept and trend terms, and
individual-specific slope parameters” (ibid.).
The setup is as follows: The series yit is modeled as having a deterministic term
(φ1i+φ2it) and a stochastic error (zit) and xit is a pure random walk. The basic idea
(cf. Westerlund, 2007: 711ff) is that in the conditional error correction model
αi(L)∆yit = δ1i + δ2it+ αi(yit−1 − β′ixit−1) + it,
where αi(L) = 1−
∑pi
j=1 αijL
j with L being the lag operator, all variables have to
be stable so that the whole model is stable. Then βi defines a long-run equilibrium
relationship between xit and yit. If the error correction parameter αi < 0, then there
is error correction implying that yit and xit are cointegrated. If αi = 0, there is no
error correction and hence no cointegration. Accordingly H0 : αi = 0 vs. H1 : αi < 0
is tested by a least square estimate of αi and test statistics are derived, where Gτ
and Gα are group mean statistics and Pτ and Pα are panel statistics.
series Gτ Gα Pτ Pα
CZ: ExpSh 0.860 0.997 0.661 0.781
H: ExpSh 0.887 0.994 0.662 0.743
PL: ExpSh 1.0 0.998 0.971 0.913
SK: ExpSh 1.0 0.999 0.994 0.942
Notes: Reported values are p-values.
Test conducted for one lag without constant
or deterministic trend for years after 1996.
Table 6.1: Westerlund’s cointegration test in levels
The results reported in table 6.1 (and derived through the STATA module by
Persyn/Westerlund, 2008) don’t allow to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration
on a reasonable level of significance. The same is true if logarithms of the series are
used instead of levels.1 Thus, the only cautious strategy modeling the influence of
trade on wages is using first differences of real wages as the dependent variable and to
accordingly use explanatory variables in first differences too. One should be aware,
however, that this only allows investigating the short run relationship and destroys
information contained in the series (cf. Granger, 1990, 247; Greene, 2000: 781).
1Again, in this testing procedure we run short of d.o.f. since T = 8 is a very short period of
observation. Accordingly we cannot even include a constant and trend in the testing equation. Tests
for the whole period 1995-2005 for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (in levels), which
increases the d.o.f. show that we can reject H0 for all three countries for the Gτ statistic on the 1
% level and for the Czech Republic for the Pτ statistic on the 5 % level if a trend and a constant
are included. Note that the α statistics are generally more appropriate than the τ statistics if T is
substantially larger than N (Westerlund, 2007: 722) which is not the case here.
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6.2 Modeling Strategy
In setting up the potential model, a central question of the analysis is not only, if
the data (or: the econometric model) fits an economic model, but also if it fits a
statistical model (cf. chapter 2). For example, consider the simple model
yit = β0 + β1xit + uit, (6.1)
where y stands for wages, x stands for exports and u is the error term. Leaving be-
sides any statistical considerations about the lag structure, fixed unobserved industry
effects and the spurious regression problem this estimable model can be seen as gener-
ally corresponding to the economic model of the HO-Samuelson framework. However,
as mentioned before, we will also have other variables heavily influencing wages and
omitting these will bias the OLS estimator even though trade indeed were a relevant
true explanatory variable and furthermore conventional inference procedures will be
incorrect since also the variance of the error term cannot be correctly estimated (cf.
Johnston, 1984: 260f). Thus the statistical model would be inappropriate.
Fortunately we do have other variables at hand and even though some of them might
be irrelevant for wages, their inclusion will lead to unbiased coefficient estimates of
the true parameters of the relevant variables in the X matrix and the residual vari-
ance will also be an unbiased estimate of σ2 (cf. Johnston, 1984: 261f). Nevertheless
adding (relevant or irrelevant) extra variables lowers the precision of estimation of
the relevant coefficient(s) (cf. Johnston, 1984: 245ff, 262f).
I thus consider every model Mr : M0 ⊆ Mr ⊆ Mall ∩ Mr  Mall, where M0
only includes the first lag of the EU-15 export variable (and a constant) as an ex-
planatory variable (i.e. this variable is protected) and Mall includes the full set of
variables (see Appendix C), as a potential candidate model. As a selection criterion
(cf. Leeb/Po¨tscher, 2008: Section 1.2.2 for an overview) for the preference order ,
two general approaches arise: a consistent or a conservative strategy. In the further
one the probabilities of over- and underparameterizing the model converge to zero
as the observations tend to infinity. The latter is given if the possibility of selecting
a model that does not nest the minimal true model tends to zero asymptotically.
Among the most commonly known selection criteria are Akaike’s AIC and Schwarz’
BIC, where BIC is a consistent selection criterion “punishing” supplementary ex-
planatory variables generally more than AIC which is a conservative criterion. By
choosing AIC I follow a conservative strategy that asymptotically selects only correct
models but possibly overparameterized ones (cf. Leeb/Po¨tscher, 2005: 23/46, Note
6, and 35ff). I use a backward selection approach, i.e. I start with the full model
and eliminate one variable respectively.2 Out of these eleven submodels anyone that
has a lower AIC is considered as a potential candidate model. Out of these, again
one variable is eliminated respectively and the procedure is repeated until no further
decrease in AIC is possible. From all remaining models the one with the lowest AIC
is chosen.
6.2.1 POLS vs. FE
In a very first step another decision has to be made, namely which estimator should
be used. If the original model in levels is
yi,t = $ + αt+ βxi,t + ui,t (6.2)
2If a lagged variable is excluded, any higher lag of the same variable is excluded too.
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with ui,t = vi+νi,t, i.e. vi is a sector specific unobserved effect and νi,t ∼ NID(0, σ2ν),
taking the first difference of equation 6.2 will eliminate this unobserved effect:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = $ + αt+ βxi,t + vi + νi,t −$ − αt− 1− βxi,t−1 − vi − νi,t−1
∆yi,t = α(t− [t− 1]) + β(xi,t − xi,t−1) + νi,t − νi,t−1
= α× 1 + β∆xi,t + νi,t − νi,t−1
= α+ β∆xi,t + i,t (6.3)
where i,t = νi,t− νi,t−1 ∼ NID(0, σ2 ). Furthermore, we lose N observations since we
now have T-1 time periods for each i and while the original intercept $ (as well as
all potential variables that are not time varying) vanishes, the original trend now be-
comes the intercept in the first difference model. First differencing a structural equa-
tion with unobserved effects produces asymptotically valid inference (Wooldridge,
2002: 281) and is a “powerful method” of policy analysis (Wooldridge, 2002: 283).
Under the above assumptions, application of OLS (called POLS) leads to a consistent
and (under the strict exogeneity assumption)3 unbiased “first difference” estimator
βˆFD(Wooldridge, 2002: 280). Generally, under the assumption E(νiν ′i|xi, vi) = σ2νIT ,
the FE estimator of the original series is more efficient than the FD estimator. But
we have seen that this assumption is not fulfilled since the variance of the error term
νi is not assumed to be stable over time. Instead for the FD POLS estimator we
assume E(i′i|xi1, ..., xiT , vi) = σ2 IT−1. νit being a random walk will thus lead to no
serial correlation in it (cf. Wooldridge, 2002: 281).
If one assumes that the time trend αt in equation 6.2 is sector specific, α in
equation 6.3 will become sector specific (and thus αi). The assumption of sector
specific time trends is not unlikely since (especially skill specific) wage differentials
were very low under CPEs and thus wages in industries with higher skill intensities
are expected to rise faster than others for example. Empirically, the normality of 
in 6.3 is an essential criterion to discriminate between the FD POLS and the FD FE
estimator. If the errors of POLS estimation are normally distributed, POLS will be
consistent and efficient. However, the results presented in table 6.2 indicate that this
is not the case. Using POLS and FE for the full model, a Jarque-Bera test shows that
we can easily reject the null hypothesis that the residuals are drawn from a normal
distribution for POLS on the 1 % level for all countries. On the other hand, when
using a FE estimator we cannot reject the null on a 10 % level for Hungary and
Poland, and on a 1 % level for the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Also both model
selection criteria AIC and BIC prefer FE over POLS in each case. Thus, any further
FD estimation is based on the FE assumption.
6.3 Model Estimation
As we can see from table 6.3, the full model does not lead to significant results for the
influence of exports towards the EU-15 on CEEC-4’s wages. Only for Hungary the
parameter estimate for the influence of exports on wages is significantly smaller than
zero on the 5 % level whereas the influence of the third lag is significantly positive
3This strict exogeneity assumption is a rather strong assumption in the present context. If the
correlation between exports to the EU-15 and CEEC wages is positive, as expected, there will be no
such problem but if it is negative, there might be severe endogeneity problems since wages are a key
determinant of goods prices on which demand (and thus also export) hinges. By lagging the trade
variable by one period this problem can be overcome. This also makes sense to a certain degree as
far as the model specification is concerned since we would not expect markets to immediately adopt
to the new conditions.
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POLS FE
Jarque-Bera AIC BIC Jarque-Bera AIC BIC
Czech Republic 0.0031 1713 1745 0.0349 1703 1734
Hungary 0.0000 2266 2298 0.6083 2247 2278
Poland 0.0082 843 868 0.1344 819 843
Slovakia 0.0000 1288 1315 0.0180 1280 1307
Note: Reported values of the Jarque-Bera normality test are p-values.
Sector 7 excluded from estimation.
Table 6.2: Criteria for selection of POLS vs. FE
(on the 10 % level). Generally, the results leave a lot to be desired since only few
variables are significant. Also in the best AIC models presented in table 6.4 hardly
any general statement about the influence of trade on wages can be drawn. The
qualitative apects of the estimates for Hungary remain as in the full model (even
though the third lag is now significant on the 5 % level) and the third lag of the ex-
port variable is now significantly positive at the 1 % level for Poland. Note, that all
parameter estimates for the export share towards the EU-15 (besides from the first
lag in Hungary) are positive, even though they are not statistically different from
zero on the 10 % level of significance in most cases. A further interesting aspect is
that besides from the Czech Republic all three lags of the export share remain in the
best AIC model. Unemployment remains in the model as an explanatory variable
only in the case of Czech Republic and the influence is significantly negative there, as
expected from economic theory. Interestingly, for all other countries than the Czech
Republic the influence of the real wage gap is significant at least on the 10 % level
in the best AIC model: If the real wage gap between these CEECs and its EU-15
trading partners was higher (i.e. the variable value lower, as discussed in section 4.1),
the subsequent increase in real wages tended to be stronger in the corresponding
industry. This is a slight evidence of convergence but is not necessarily related to
trade. No definitive statement can be made about import penetration but it does not
seem to be an appropriate variable explaining wages since it is eliminated in all best
AIC models except for Hunary where the first lag remains in the best AIC model
and is significantly positive on the 5 % level. This might be surprising since higher
import penetration might be interpreted as increased competition by foreign markets
(cf. Stockhammer/Onaran, 2006) which might entail downward pressures on wages.
But if the increased import penetration is due to intra-industrial trade, then it might
allow specialization and upgrading patterns that can result in wage increases.4 In the
Czech Republic, the lagged level of operating surplus remains in the best AIC model
and is significantly negative (on the 10 % level) which might be counterintuitive due
to economic theory. However, have in mind that restrictions to wage increases were
in profitable enterprises were implemented in transition economies (cf. p. 20 and
Nesporova, 1999: 23).
Besides from Slovakia all models produce a F-statistic that allows to reject the null
hypothesis that the complete set of explanatory variables have no significant influence
on wages on the 1 % significance level (cf. Johnston, 1984: 186f). Furthermore, the
Jarque-Bera statistics allows rejection of the normality assumption only for the Czech
Republic and Slovakia on the 5 % level (but not on the 1 % level).
4For example, deeper integration in the global division of labor might lead to a split-up of the
production processes (“global value chains”). If therefore a reallocation of labor from intermediate
goods to higher value-added final goods production takes place, wages might increase and since
required intermediate goods are imported, import penetration might raise too. However, the question
about the causes raising import penetration are beyond the scope of this thesis.
60 CHAPTER 6. THE INFLUENCE OF TRADE ON WAGES
dependent variable: d.(real wage)
CZ H PL SK all
d.expquot 7,829 -1,148,858** 3,489 -26,448 -1,650**
(1 lag) (39,128) (487,104) (18,645) (61,961) (719.8)
d.expquot 7,499 23,969 -13,220 -46,625 -712.2
(2 lags) (40,368) (337,318) (16,518) (79,421) (599.3)
d.expquot -9,322 568,228* 14,877 19,421 588.8
(3 lags) (16,305) (326,264) (13,776) (26,129) (573.8)
d.unempl -127,561 -545,245 54,461 132,753 -9,949***
(1 lag) (89,781) (4,495,944) (37,016) (142,947) (3,370)
real wage gap 0.5132 -63.1*** -0.8384** -3.34 -0.2593***
(1 lag) (0.9510) (23.0) (0.3783) (2.67) (0.0371)
d.mpen 1,305 36,728* -1,187.887 35,957 23.06
(1 lag) (40,032) (18,676) (17,502) (50,121) (33.22)
d.mpen -13,759 7,637 12,241 42,352 5.24
(2 lags) (41,752) (11,598.28) (13,906) (57,844) (29.73)
d.ops 3.34e-07 -0.000259 3.67e-08 -1.16e-07 7.12e-08
(1 lag) (8.98e-06) (0.000269) (1.78e-06) (0.0000306) (2.20e-06)
ops -0.0000149 0.0000575 2.68e-07 0.0000183 2.54e-06
(1 lag) (0.0000102) (0.0001673) (1.56e-06) (0.0000307) (1.86e-06)
d.R&D -2.20 -27.9 -0.1904943 -6.97 2.50
(1 lag) (4.32) (17.6) (7.497906) (21.82) (6.16)
d.R&D 3.26 -24.76 -16.1 19.6 -3.99
(2 lags) (3.30) (20.41) (11.12) (20.83) (6.98)
d.R&D -8.31** -4.84 -17.04 -3.93 -10.47*
(3 lags) (3.60) (19.32) (10.26) (16.20) (6.06)
constant 32,144 -1,818,200*** -26,065** -105,111 -7,613***
(29,986.65) (661,762.8) (11,422) (83,775) (1,120)
Prob F-stat 0.1225 0.0064 0.0655 0.7936 0.0
within R2 0.2400 0.3468 0.5057 0.1759 0.3582
AIC 1,703 2,247 819 1,280 3,990
Obs 84 84 48 60 264
1997-2005 (98 for SK), Sector 7 excluded. Standard Errors in parentheses
Significance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Table 6.3: FD FE estimation results (full model)
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dependent variable: d.(real wage)
CZ H PL SK all
d.expquot 7,492 -1,122,453** 8,485 16,330 -1,355***
(1 lag) (17,588) (454,739) (6,905) (21,129) (492.7)
d.expquot X 190,731 4,305 6,745 -737.0
(2 lags) X (212,489) (8,155) (25,167) (486.1)
d.expquot X 597,576** 31,651*** 25,586 573.2
(3 lags) X (242,615) (10,410) (22,135) (549.3)
d.unempl -145,691** X X X -11,007***
(1 lag) (72,563) X X X (3,310)
real wage gap X -67.67*** -0.3793* -3.97* -0.2649***
(1 lag) X (19.82) (0.1910) (2.12) (0.0363)
d.mpen X 35,481** X X X
(1 lag) X (17,326) X X X
d.ops X X 6.25e-07 X -2.59e-07
(1 lag) X X (1.00e-06) X (2.12e-06)
ops -0.000013** X X X 3.38e-06*
(1 lag) (5.64e-06) X X X (1.78e-06)
d.R&D -1.71 -17.78 X X X
(1 lag) (3.92) (13.72) X X X
d.R&D 3.49 X X X X
(2 lags) (3.01) X X X X
d.R&D -7.96** X X X X
(3 lags) (3.29) X X X X
constant 15,793*** -1,959,282*** -12,207** -121,745* -7,811***
(2,806) (587,919) (5,546) (66,310) (1,094)
Prob F-stat 0.0075 0.0003 0.0092 0.3637 0.0
within R2 0.2275 0.3148 0.3761 0.0917 0.3426
AIC 1,692 2,239 816.3 1,269 3,987
JB 0.0215 0.7430 0.7228 0.0304 0.0208
Obs 84 84 48 60 264
1997-2005 (1998-2005 for SK), Sector 7 excluded. Standard Errors in parentheses
Significance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Jarque-Bera reports p-values for normality test of residuals.
Table 6.4: FD FE estimation results (best AIC models)
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6.4 Distributional Effects
In a next step I examined whether the impact of trade on wages was statistically
different across sectors with different skill intensities.5 By statistically different I
mean that each parameter estimate for a subsample lies outside of the 90 % confidence
intervall of the other estimate. If we assume that CEECs are abundant in low-skilled
labor and that the demand for goods intensively using this factor of production will
increase due to trade liberalization, also demand for low-skilled labor will increase
and so will their wages. The full as well as the best AIC models are estimated with
the subsamples of different skill intensities. The results are presented in tables B.4 to
B.13 in Appendix B and summed up in table 6.5. As can be seen there, the results
are inconclusive and none of the results is statistically significant.
∆ low vs. med-high skill ∆ low-med vs. med-high skill
country full model best model full model best model
CZ - - + -
H + + + -
PL + - + -
SK + - - -
all + - - -
Notes: + indicates that the impact of the export share on real wages was more
positive (or less negative) for the less skilled industries; - indicates the opposite.
Table 6.5: distributional effects
6.5 Pooling All Countries
If all countries are pooled (and thus the number of observations is dramatically in-
creased), we obtain results that are somewhat more meaningful and significant (see
the rightmost columns of tables 6.3 and 6.4). Here, the first lag of the export share
has a significantly negative impact on wages (on the 5 % level in the full and on the
10 % level in the best AIC model). The second lag is also negative but not signifi-
cant (in both specifications) while the third lag turns positive but is also insignificant
(in both specifications). Note that despite being insignificant, conservative backward
model selection maintains all three lags of the export share in the best model. The
presented findings might indicate that trade liberalization has a strong negative effect
on real wages in the short-run whereas the long-run effect is rather insignificant but
tends to be positive. The only single-country finding that necessarily contradicts this
view is the Czech one, where all parameter estimates are insignificant but the first
lag is positive while the third one is negative.
Besides from the trade parameters, unemployment has a significant negative im-
pact on real wages in both specifications (on the 10 % level) as is expected from
economic theory. The same is true for the real wage gap, indicating a process of con-
vergence in real wages between the CEEC-4 and the EU-15 (cf. the statement about
the individual countries on p. 59). The effect of import penetration is positive but
statistically insignificant and is eliminated in the backward selection process for the
5The subsample of low-skilled industries comprises the food, textiles, wood, pulp and paper sectors
as well as recycling and manufacturing that is n.e.c. The low-med skill subsample supplementary
includes sectors rubber and plastic products, basic metals, and non-metallic mineral products. Finally
the med-high skill subsample consists of sectors machinery and equipment n.e.c., electrical and optical
equipment, transport equipment, and chemicals and chemical products. Cf. table 5.1 on p. 36.
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best AIC model. The influence of the lagged level of operating surplus is positive and
turns significant (at the 10 % level) in the best AIC model. This might indicate that
workers can acquire a certain share of last year’s profit in the bargaining process for
example. The overall F-test for both pooled models clearly indicates significance of
the complete regression, however, inference might be missleading since the hypothesis
that the residuals are drawn from a normal distribution is rejected on the 5 % level
(but not on the 1 % level) of significance.
6.5.1 Distributional Effects
Concerning the distributional effects of exports in the pooled model, we again observe
no statistically significant difference across subsamples. The results comparing low
and med-high skill intensive sectors are inconclusive since full and best (AIC) model
arrive at different conclusions. When looking at the different impact in low-med and
high-med skill intensive sectors, both models indicate that real wages in med-low
skill intensive sectors where more negatively affected by growing exports towards the
EU-15 than real wages in med-high skill intensive sectors which is contrary to the
expectations drawn from economic theory. In the best AIC model the sum of the
parameter estimates for all three lags of the export share of med-high skilled sectors
(-599) lies even above the summed upper borders of the 90 % confidence intervall for
the med-low sectors (-1,212); but on the other hand, the sum of parameter estimates
for med-low sectors (-4,739) is not below the lower bound of the 90 % confidence
intervall of the med-high skilled sectors (-5,730) so that the difference cannot be
classified as being statistically significant. As can be derived from tables B.12 and
B.13 in Appendix B, the more negative impact of exports on wages in med-low skill
intensive sectors comes particularly from the fact that after a negative first and second
lag, the impact turns positive in the third lag for med-high skill intensive sectors
while it remains negative for med-low skill intensive sectors. I suggest that this
pattern might arise from a higher mobility of higher-skilled workers which may be
able to adapt to changing foreign demand and domestic production structures more
quickly. This assumption is likely to be influenced by a geographical agglomeration
of skill-intensive industries in certain areas, while less skill-intensive industries are
geographically more scattered and concentrated as a legacy from the communist past
(cf. p. 19). However, the highly aggregated data used in this investigation does not
allow to check for strong empirical support of this hypothesis.
6.6 Estimating the Long-run Correlation
In a final step I took up the idea of Onaran/Stockhammer (2006, cf. p. 27 of this
thesis) to estimate a long-run relationship. Contrary to them, however, I do not use
averages of the variable but long-run differences. Thus, the dependent variable is the
percentage increase of either real or unitywages from 1998-2005. The explanatory
variables are the percentage change in the export share (towards the EU-15), in the
unemployment rate,6 and in import penetration. These changes are calculated over
the period 1997-2004 to allow for a lag structure of at least one year. The real
wage gap between the CEEC-4 and the EU-15 enters the equation in 1997 levels
since sectors where the wage was especially low in 1997 are expected to experience
higher wage increases within the following years. We can see from table 6.6 that
this expectation is fulfilled since the parameter estimate of this variable is < 0 (and
significant at the 10 % level at least for Poland, Slovakia and the combination of all
6The change in the unemployment rate is only included in the pool of all countries since it is not
sector-specific. Therefore it would simply act as a constant on the country level.
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countries). Also operating surpluses and R & D expenses enter the equation not in
long-run differences but in averages over the period 1997-2004 since they are assumed
to have a persistent influences on wages.
dependent variable: ∆98−05real wage
CZ H PL SK all
∆97−04 expquote -0.0137203 0.3047 0.0559114** -0.0265299 -0.0430825
(0.0487254) (0.2509) (0.013508) (0.0671819) (0.0535559)
∆97−04 unempl X X X X -0.0619558
X X X X (0.0600708)
real wage gap -2.28e-06 -0.0000154 -9.62e-06* -0.0000142** -7.80e-06*
(2.80e-06) (0.0000118) (4.01e-06) (4.83e-06) (4.57e-06)
∆97−04 MPEN -0.0129384 0.4924 -0.1095 0.2733 0.1345
(0.1157) (0.5100) (0.0494) (0.1916) (0.1611)
OPS
97−04
-0.0178824 -4.40* -0.7938* -0.8868 -0.9514
(% of gross prod.) (0.4178781) (2.01) (0.2810) (0.7545) (0.7007)
R&D
97−04
2.47 13.22 -2.51 -118,238 10.28*
(% of gross prod.) (3.35) (12.30) (14.13) (83,228) (5.65)
constant 0.2584** 0.1456 -0.1377 -0.2384 0.0703555
(0.0797) (0.3836) (0.0996) (0.1745) (0.1617761)
observations 12 12 9 12 45
R2 0.4973 0.7005 0.9657 0.6325 0.2872
prob F-stat 0.4137 0.1206 0.0209 0.2015 0.0356
AIC -41.5152 -4.412561 -39.19999 -21.67237 -31.12484
JB 0.0 0.0139 0.0461 0.0 0.0
OLS estimation, excluding sector 7
Significance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Table 6.6: long-run correlation (full models)
The results for the influence of the variables on the real wage in the full model is
presented in table 6.6. As can be seen there, the long-run influence of exports towards
the EU-15 are only significant in Poland (at the 5 % level and positive). Thus, in
Poland sectors that got more export-oriented towards the EU-15 during the period
1997-2004 had higher significantly higher increases in real wages between 1998 and
2005. A positive relationship is also suggested for Hungary but is not statistically
significant (at the 10 % level) there. Negative, but also insignificant, relationships
are suggested for the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
When turning to unitywages as the dependent variable (see table 6.7) we see that
the export share is now only significant (at the 10 % level) for Slovakia and switches
to a positive influence there while generally all other variables become insignificant.
In the case of Slovakia though we cannot conclude that exports towards the EU-15
led to a convergence of living standard with the EU-15. Rather, an adjustment of
export markets to domestic living standards took place since a shift of Slovakian EU-
15 exports towards countris with lower wage levels has occured which automatically
leads to an increase in unitywage (see footnoe 13 on page 39).
Backward model selection (cf. section 6.2) leads to the models presented in ta-
ble 6.8 when real wage change is the dependent variable. For Slovakia no submodel
obtained a better AIC and therefore the full model is equal to the best AIC model.
Again, we can see a positive relationship between exports towards the EU-15 and real
wages in Hungary and Poland that is only significant in Poland (at the 5 % level). In
the Czech Republic the relationship is negative but far from being significant. The
same is true if all countries are pooled together. In this specification the impact of
unemployment on real wages is significantly negative (at the 10 % level) and also
sectors of the CEEC-4 which lagged further behind the wage level of the EU-15 had
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dependent variable: ∆98−05unitywage
CZ H PL SK all
∆97−04 expquote -0.0751545 0.1373 0.1115 0.2077* -0.0117081
(0.2209716) (0.3433) (0.0964) (0.1061) (0.0747248)
∆97−04 unempl X X X X -0.021469
X X X X (0.0838149)
real wage gap -0.0000106 -0.0000187 -9.62e-06 -0.0000109 -8.83e-06
(0.0000127) (0.0000162) (0.0000286) (7.64e-06) (6.37e-06)
∆97−04 MPEN -0.1293 0.2003 0.3386 -0.0080716 0.1928
(0.5246) (0.6978) (0.3528) (0.3027563) (0.2248)
OPS
97−04
-0.6304 -3.75 1.82 1.34 0.4929
(% of gross prod.) (1.90) (2.75) (2.01) (1.19) (0.9777)
R&D
97−04
-29.53 4.08 -29.84 -243,544 -6.28
(% of gross prod.) (15.17) (16.83) (100.8) (131,499) (7.88)
constant 0.3431 0.085623 -0.6164 -0.2634 -0.0943162
(0.3615) (0.524859) (0.7109) (0.2757) (0.2257211)
observations 12 12 9 12 45
R2 0.4964 0.4456 0.5536 0.5819 0.0659
prob F-stat 0.4152 0.5055 0.6404 0.2742 0.8426
AIC -5.2312 3.112694 -3.824643 -10.69433 -1.146998
JB 0.8803 0.4727 0.7104 0.0 0.7539
OLS estimation, excluding sector 7
Significance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Table 6.7: long-run correlation (full models)
dependent variable: ∆98−05real wage
CZ H PL all all(2) all(3)
∆97−04 expquote -0.0124933 0.3890 0.0520576** -0.008981 X X
(0.025732) (0.2302) (0.0173286) (0.0463253) X X
∆97−04 unempl X X X -0.1069* X X
X X X (0.0573317) X X
real wage gap X -0.0000206* -9.07e-06*** -0.0000115*** -8.32e-06** -8.51e-06***
X (9.44e-06) (2.28e-06) (3.92e-06) (3.29e-06) (2.65e-06)
∆97−04 MPEN X X -0.1328* X 0.0757959 X
X X (0.0689) X (0.1149141) X
OPS
97−04
X -2.82* -0.6197 X -0.9742* -0.8250*
(% of gross prod.) X (1.50) (0.4075) X (0.4985) (0.4564)
R&D
97−04
4.34** X X X 1.34
(% of gross prod.) (1.66) X X X (4.31)
constant 0.3115*** -0.0262775 -0.1368 -0.0979964 -0.0438819 -0.0574905
(0.0159) (0.2510) (0.0930239) (0.1130082) (0.1313139) (0.1068122)
CZ X X X X 0.2627* 0.2660***
(dummy) X X X X (0.0704994) (0.0654068)
H X X X X 0.0905609 0.1028*
(dummy) X X X X (0.065151) (0.059471)
PL X X X X -0.0806327 -0.0581152
(dummy) X X X X (0.0769566) (0.0658328)
expshare X X X X -0.0942253 -0.0672449
(CZ) X X X X (0.0981182) (0.0883706)
expshare X X X X 0.4731218*** 0.4880513***
(H) X X X X (0.1445702) (0.1366209)
expshare X X X X 0.0349513 0.0315527
(PL) X X X X (0.0508951) (0.0446638)
expshare X X X X -0.0145322 0.0005896
(SK) X X X X (0.0659978) (0.0597317)
observations 12 12 12 48 45 48
R2 0.4369 0.6191 0.8284 0.2075 0.7030 0.7044
prob F-stat 0.0754 0.0431 0.0082 0.0158 0.0 0.0
AIC -46.15499 -5.528724 -41.26866 -35.4272 -60.5143 -70.77059
JB 0.0 0.0988 0.0199 0.1592 0.0 0.0
OLS estimation, excluding sector 7
Significance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Table 6.8: long-run correlation (best AIC models)
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significantly higer increases in real wages.
Since it might be a strong assumption that the constant (i.e. the linear time
trend of the wage variable that is not explained by the variables in the model) as
well as the parameter of the influence of the export share on real wages are equal
across all countries I included dummy variables for the countries in the full pooled
model (model ‘all(2)’ in table 6.8) and furthermore interacted them with the share
of exports towards the EU-15.7 The obtained results are similar to the results from
table 6.6: The share of exports towards the EU-15 has a negative impact on real
wages in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while the influence is positive in Hungary
and Poland. Now, Hungary is the only country where this influence is statistically
significant (at the 1 % level). Furthermore, the initial gap between the CEECs and
the EU-15 in real wage and operating surpluses have a significant influence on real
wages. When the best AIC submodel is selected (column ‘all(3)’ in table 6.8), the
impact of exports on real wages in the Slovak Republic turns positive but remains
highly insignificant. All other results remain qualitatively unchanged.
To sum up these results, no clear long-run relationship between the share of
exports towards the EU-15 and the development of real wages could be found in
the CEEC-4. However, the results suggest that this relationship may seriously vary
between countries.
7It should be clear that three country dummy variables account for all four countries and then also
the unemployment rate becomes obsolete as an explanatory variable. Since all four country dummies
are interacted with the export share also the overall export share is no longer needed.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Implications
Using the OECD database for structural analysis, I have illustrated that real wages
increased stronger in the CEEC-4 than in the EU-15 in the period 1997-2005. This
led to a convergence in living standards of workers but it is very weak: None of the
four countries obtained a living standard (unitywage) of more than 60.6 % of their
EU-15 trading partners by 2005 (subsection 5.1.3).
The role of trade in this process of weak convergence is not clearly determined.
Even though a major trade liberalization between the EU-15 and the CEEC-4 took
place (manufacturing exports of CEEC-4 towards the EU-15 as a percentage of manu-
facturing gross output have approximately doubled in the period under investigation,
see subsection 5.2.1), no clear implications of welfare effects can be derived from this
export surge.
The results obtained from a rather conservative econometric analysis indicate that
the increase in export shares towards the EU-15 and the increase of real wages do not
move in a stable long-run relationship (section 6.1). There is evidence that the import
of exports towards the EU-15 have a negative short-run impact but turn to a positive
impact in the long-run (sections 6.3, 6.5). The former does not necessarily contradict
the conclusions derived by Stolper and Samuelson (1941, 1948, 1949), since of course
nobody “ever denied that the workers employed in the particular industry which loses
a tariff could be hurt in the short-run, but according to the classical theory, in the
long-run there would be an increased demand for those commodities in which the
country had a comparative advantage” (Stolper/Samuelson, 1941: 59). Interestingly,
while CEEC-4 are expected to have this comparative advantage rather in low-skilled
industry; it seems that the impact of exports towards the EU-15 was more positive
(or less negative) in sectors that have a higher skill intensity. This might be due to
higher labor mobility in the latter sectors (sections 6.4, 6.5).
A further finding of interest is the fact that the major surge in exports of CEEC-
4 towards the EU-15 has taken place in the sectors with higher skill intensity (see
table 5.4 on p. 43). This clearly contradicts the expectations of the simple HO
model about the trade patterns and production adjustment entailed by a trade tran-
sition from an autarky to a free trade equilibrium. This therefore suggests that the
Stolper-Samuelson and the FPE frameworks are not adequately describing the forces
influencing factor prices of labor in the present context.
The results presented in section 6.6 suggest that the long-run impact of exports
towards the EU-15 differed systematically between countries: While the impact is
more likely to be positive in Hungary and Poland, the results are negative but highly
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insignificant for Czech Republic and Slovakia. Thus, it is possible that not trade lib-
eralization per se has an unambiguous effect on wages but that it especially matters in
which institutional environment trade liberalization takes place. To determine these
possible influences is beyond the scope of this thesis and requires more detailed data.
It should be noted though that the textbook distinction between the big bang and
a gradual approach to transition does not seem to be an accurate explanation since
Poland as well as the Czech Republic adopted a big bang strategy while Hungary is a
textbook example of a gradualist strategy (see subsection 3.1.3). But Czech Republic
and Slovakia undoubtedly share a joint past of policy in a common country shaped
by a rigid system of central economic planning after the reform ambitions in the late
1960s failed. On the other hand, decentralization and liberalization processes took
place in Hungary at that time and also Poland experienced certain market-oriented
reforms in 1981 (even though they were foiled by the introduction of martial law by
the government to some extent). These reforms might have strengthened the geo-
graphical agglomeration of manufacturing production which is highly concentrated in
the Polish Silesian Voivodeship, while the Eastern parts of Poland are rather domi-
nated by the primary sector and the West Pomeranian as well as the Western part of
the Masovian Voivodeship and the Eastern part of the Lower Silesian Voivodeship are
centers of tertiary economic activity. In Hungary, manufacturing production is also
highly concentrated, namely in Central and Western Transdanubia. This geograph-
ical concentration of manufacturing production might increase mobility of workers
across sectors (since workers do not have to move in order to change job) while the
regional dispersion of manufacturing production all over the country in Slovakia and
the Czech Republic might disable workers in stagnating and declining sectors to find
work in industries that are expanding due to increasing foreign demand.
Such a tendency would mean that the theoretical shift towards institutions and
economic geography in economic theory might be appropriate to account for the dif-
ferences of the impact of trade on wages in different regions of Central and Eastern
Europe. Furthermore, this suggests for lobbies and associations of workers, especially
trade unions, that their major issue of concern should not be whether or not a coun-
try liberalizes trade, but under which environment and which conditions. Measures
to increase the mobility of workers, such as infrastructure and a sufficient social pro-
tection (to allow for labor market transitions without a dramatic decrease in living
conditions during this transition period), seem especially adequate to allow workers
to reallocate if changing foreign demand leads to a change in production patterns.
How far aspects, such as labor mobility across sectors and institutional environ-
ment, can be made responsible for different impacts of trade on wages lies beyond the
scope of this thesis and requires more detailed data. Collection of more detailed data
in the last years, also as a result from the EU accession, might enable future research
to investigate the trade-income relationship more satisfactory. Since the major trade
liberalization took place already (see subsection 5.2.1) it is questionable to what ex-
tent this research will be fruitful.
Finally, one might argue that the CEECs are not good examples to investigate the
trade-income relationship due to the many different forces at work in the transition
context. This argument seems reliable to some extent, but especially the CEEC-4 were
relatively stabilized in the mid and late 1990s. On the contrary, one might argue that
there rarely has been such a good example of trade liberalization as the integration
of the NMS to the common European market. Another issue to keep in mind in this
process is the fact that this integration had not only narrow economic aspects but
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also was shaped by institutional directives from the EU-15 and regional as well as
structural subsidies for the NMS possibly influenced the trade-income relationship.
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Appendix A
Theorems and Proofs
Gauss-Markov theorem
The following assumptions hold: E(u) = 0
E(uu′) = σ2I
rank(X) = k and
X is non-random
when no a priori information about the true value of β is given, meaning that any
β ∈ Rk is a possible true value.
Then, the GMT shows proof that in the true model Yn×1 = Xn×kβk×1 + un×1
the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator β̂ = (X ′X)−1X ′Y is the “best” estimator
within the class of linear unbiased estimators (β̂ is BLUE) in the sense that V C(β˜) ≥
V C(β̂)∀β˜ : β˜ = DY for any non-stochastik Dk×n ∧ E(β˜) = β.
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unitywage measures purchasing power
Let P’ be the price level of any optional country of reference. Then:
Proof.
unitywageA/B =
wA/PPPA
wB/PPPB
=
wA
PA/P ′
wB
PB/P ′
=
wA×P ′
PA
wB×P ′
PB
=
wA × PB × P ′
wB × PA × P ′ =
wA × PB
wB × PA × 1
=
wA × PB × P ′
wB × PA × P ′ =
wA × PB
wB × PA
=
wA/PA
wB/PB
Thus, the price level of the reference country is eliminated, i.e. unitywage does
not depend on which country is chosen for reference. Furthermore, it can be seen
that unitywage compares the purchasing power of wage earners in two countries.
FPE implies unitywage = 1
Let E be the exchange rate between country A and B. For FPE then the following
must hold: Proof.
wA
E
= wB
wA
PPP
= wB
wA
PA/PB
= wB
wA × PB
PA
= wB
wA
PA
=
wB
PB
Since numerator and denumerator of the term unitywageA/B =
wA/PA
wB/PB
will then
be equal, it is implied that unitywageA/B = 1.
On the other hand in autarcy there might be an equilibrium, where prices between
both countries differ and wages differ in the same proportion such that wAPA =
wB
PB
but
FPE does not hold.
Appendix B
Tables
CZ H PL SK
1986 - 96.8 102.7 -
1987 - 100.7 104.5 98.3
1988 - 102.4 107.5 100.1
1989 - 102.4 106.7 101.9
1990 100 100 100 100
1991 88.3 89.4 98.2 82.7
1992 87.3 89.6 100.2 78.4
1993 88.1 94.6 104.0 75.7
1994 89.4 93.3 108.3 79.5
1995 92.7 94.5 115.2 82.9
1996 96.3 95.1 121.7 86.8
1997 96.6 99.1 129.4 89.8
1998 95.8 103.1 135.1 93.9
1999 97.9 107.3 140.8 96.4
2000 100.9 112.8 146.0 97.9
2001 103.4 118.5 148.0 100.9
2002 105.1 124.1 150.4 105.8
2003 108.5 129.0 156.3 110.5
2004 111.9 135.2 164.6 114.4
Source: own calculations based on
Heston/Summers/Aten (2006); constant prices
calculated using Laspeyres Price Index
Table B.1: Real GDP p.c., Index (1990 = 100)
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sector 1997 2005 growth p.a.
Czech Republic
Food Products, Beverages & Tobacco 189,291 235,601 2.8 %
Textiles, Textile products, leather & footwear 134,419 178,058 3.6 %
Wood and products of wood & cork 162,825 193,131 2.2 %
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing & publishing 231,984 297,077 3.1 %
Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 251,388 395,205 5.8 %
Chemicals & chemical products 235,051 326,069 4.2 %
Rubber & plastics products 213,245 273,987 3.2 %
Other non-metallic mineral products 202,828 282,477 4.2 %
Basic metals & fabricated metal products 206,213 262,144 3.0 %
Machinery & equipment, n.e.c. 207,444 282,193 3.9 %
Electrical & optical equipment 202,074 267,406 3.6 %
Transport equipment 223,606 318,796 4.5 %
Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 166,109 210,789 3.0 %
Hungary
Food Products, Beverages & Tobacco 1,451,822 1,759,399 2.4 %
Textiles, Textile products, leather & footwear 899,654 1,005,317 1.4 %
Wood and products of wood & cork 1,092,036 1,107,051 0.2 %
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing & publishing 2,402,105 2,688,554 1.4 %
Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 11,200,000 10,300,000 -1.0 %
Chemicals & chemical products 2,067,280 2,522,259 2.5 %
Rubber & plastics products 1,729,617 2,318,809 3.7 %
Other non-metallic mineral products 2,201,804 2,242,078 0.2 %
Basic metals & fabricated metal products 1,754,745 1,853,540 0.7 %
Machinery & equipment, n.e.c. 1,570,701 2,698,824 7.0 %
Electrical & optical equipment 1,598,518 2,063,368 3.2 %
Transport equipment 2,006,815 2,603,808 3.3 %
Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 1,234,179 1,135,289 -1.0 %
Poland
Food Products, Beverages & Tobacco 24,389 26,213 0.9 %
Textiles, Textile products, leather & footwear 16,835 16,215 -0.5 %
Wood and products of wood & cork 20,261 19,546 -0.4 %
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing & publishing 35,926 39,144 1.1 %
Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 48,475 57,272 2.1 %
Chemicals & chemical products 36,787 45,375 2.7 %
Rubber & plastics products 26,839 28,609 0.8 %
Other non-metallic mineral products 26,942 30,366 1.5 %
Basic metals & fabricated metal products 27,818 31,514 1.6 %
Machinery & equipment, n.e.c. 28,612 33,834 2.1 %
Electrical & optical equipment 31,460 33,474 0.8 %
Transport equipment 29,374 35,422 2.4 %
Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 19,479 20,403 0.6 %
Slovakia
Food Products, Beverages & Tobacco 182,835 200,626 1.2 %
Textiles, Textile products, leather & footwear 133,156 136,056 0.3 %
Wood and products of wood & cork 165,935 157,156 -0.7 %
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing & publishing 230,770 253,785 1.2 %
Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 312,689 674,869 10.1 %
Chemicals & chemical products 234,633 267,356 1.6 %
Rubber & plastics products 235,185 233,590 -0.1 %
Other non-metallic mineral products 205,935 231,193 1.5 %
Basic metals & fabricated metal products 230,901 274,347 2.2 %
Machinery & equipment, n.e.c. 194,231 241,135 2.7 %
Electrical & optical equipment 194,559 199,288 0.3 %
Transport equipment 215,254 293,070 3.9 %
Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 165,484 194,457 2.0 %
EU-15
Food Products, Beverages & Tobacco 27,978 29,251 1.2 %
Textiles, Textile products, leather & footwear 20,126 21,174 0.3 %
Wood and products of wood & cork 24,121 24,936 -0.7 %
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing & publishing 33,790 34,495 1.2 %
Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 60,085 70,670 10.1 %
Chemicals & chemical products 48,204 54,326 1.6 %
Rubber & plastics products 31,472 33,127 -0.1 %
Other non-metallic mineral products 31,580 32,785 1.5 %
Basic metals & fabricated metal products 32,401 33,860 2.2 %
Machinery & equipment, n.e.c. 36,566 39,531 2.7 %
Electrical & optical equipment 37,375 41,861 0.3 %
Transport equipment 41,567 45,491 3.9 %
Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 24,502 24,994 2.0 %
All amounts in national currencies, Euro for the EU-15.
Table B.2: Development of Real Wages
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sector 1997 2005 growth p.a.
Czech Republic
Food Products, Beverages & Tobacco 167,464 135,506 -2.6 %
Textiles, Textile products, leather & footwear 167,825 90,116 -7.5 %
Wood and products of wood & cork 52,899 47,022 -1.5 %
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing & publishing 59,092 56,478 -0.6 %
Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 5,923 3,209 -7.4 %
Chemicals & chemical products 49,943 42,660 -2.0 %
Rubber & plastics products 51,289 71,471 4.2 %
Other non-metallic mineral products 88,249 72,467 -2.4 %
Basic metals & fabricated metal products 243,956 200,443 -2.4 %
Machinery & equipment, n.e.c. 178,520 148,284 -2.3 %
Electrical & optical equipment 136,706 166,832 2.5 %
Transport equipment 97,972 125,022 3.1 %
Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 80,604 65,702 -2.5 %
Hungary
Food Products, Beverages & Tobacco 146,130 131,683 -1.3 %
Textiles, Textile products, leather & footwear 146,297 89,641 -5.9 %
Wood and products of wood & cork 30,496 32,054 0.6 %
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing & publishing 34,942 40,628 1.9 %
Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 4,781 5,366 1.5 %
Chemicals & chemical products 52,289 46,256 -1.5 %
Rubber & plastics products 29,217 36,660 2.9 %
Other non-metallic mineral products 26,046 28,171 1.0 %
Basic metals & fabricated metal products 79,479 94,559 2.2 %
Machinery & equipment, n.e.c. 68,600 53,004 -3.2 %
Electrical & optical equipment 89,357 154,758 7.1 %
Transport equipment 35,142 57,807 6.4 %
Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 24,941 36,304 4.8 %
Poland
Food Products, Beverages & Tobacco 531,309 443,900 -2.2 %
Textiles, Textile products, leather & footwear 516,395 274,600 -7.6 %
Wood and products of wood & cork 120,946 118,600 -0.2 %
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing & publishing 119,356 123,900 0.5 %
Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 22,510 15,700 -4.4 %
Chemicals & chemical products 137,866 100,500 -3.9 %
Rubber & plastics products 105,858 131,400 2.7 %
Other non-metallic mineral products 169,500 126,700 -3.6 %
Basic metals & fabricated metal products 339,658 281,700 -2.3 %
Machinery & equipment, n.e.c. 284,332 181,600 -5.5 %
Electrical & optical equipment 188,875 165,600 -1.6 %
Transport equipment 209,722 174,000 -2.3 %
Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 184,573 194,200 0.6 %
Slovakia
Food Products, Beverages & Tobacco 69,741 46,727 -4.9 %
Textiles, Textile products, leather & footwear 90,091 67,934 -3.5 %
Wood and products of wood & cork 26,707 26,093 -0.3 %
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing & publishing 31,161 20,967 -4.8 %
Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 6,106 3,583 -6.4 %
Chemicals & chemical products 28,370 12,838 -9.4 %
Rubber & plastics products 16,798 20,730 2.7 %
Other non-metallic mineral products 30,070 24,182 -2.7 %
Basic metals & fabricated metal products 81,059 70,802 -1.7 %
Machinery & equipment, n.e.c. 77,846 46,712 -6.2 %
Electrical & optical equipment 52,588 71,852 4.0 %
Transport equipment 26,635 31,706 2.2 %
Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 24,924 23,121 -0.9 %
EU-15
Food Products, Beverages & Tobacco 3,263,448 3,262,961 0.0 %
Textiles, Textile products, leather & footwear 2,676,811 1,847,406 -4.5 %
Wood and products of wood & cork 771,262 722,411 -0.8 %
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing & publishing 2,409,475 2,134,046 -1.5 %
Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 151,815 131,049 -1.8 %
Chemicals & chemical products 1,575,509 1,451,884 -1.0 %
Rubber & plastics products 1,304,224 1,308,686 0.0 %
Other non-metallic mineral products 1,257,417 1,186,411 -0.7 %
Basic metals & fabricated metal products 3,839,024 3,817,672 -0.1 %
Machinery & equipment, n.e.c. 2,949,302 2,910,509 -0.2 %
Electrical & optical equipment 3,026,978 2,690,276 -1.5 %
Transport equipment 2,503,429 2,555,164 0.3 %
Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 1,532,817 1,451,224 -0.7 %
Table B.3: Development of Employees
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low skill med-high skill med-low skill
dependent variable: d.real wage
esti- 90 % esti- 90 % esti- 90 %
mator intervall mator intervall mator intervall
d.ExpSh 4,302 (-159,557; 16,445 (-106,765; 35,294 (-69,484;
(1 lag) (94,494) 168,161) (69,130) 139,656) (62,061) 140,072)
d.ExpSh 41,233 (-115,934; 9,014 (-141,736; 71,200 (-29,019;
(2 lags) (90,635) 198,400) (84,582) 159,763) (59,361) 171,418)
d.ExpSh -8,078 (-60,002; 40,094 (-23,639; -17,844 (-52,665;
(3 lags) (29,943) 43,845) (35,759) 103,827) ( 20,625) 16,976)
d.unempl -139,864 -162,536 -212,598*
(1 lag) (188,352) (225,444) (118,648)
real wage gap -0.3404 5.87* 0.7270
(1 lag) (1.6481) (2.97) (1.31)
d.MPEN 20,386 (-137,466; 3,879 (-127,500; -27,481 (-133,936;
(1 lag) (91,030) 178,238) (73,714) 135,258) (63,055) 78,976)
d.MPEN -40,999 (-186,057; -14,036 (-170,298; -58,130 (-156,737;
(2 lags) (83,652) 104,059) (87,675) 142,225) (58,406) 40,476)
d.OPS 0.000017 -0.0000476* 0.0000118
(1 lag) (0.0000144) (0.0000239) (0.0000106)
OPS -0.0000185 0.0000575 -0.0000262
(1 lag) (0.0000159) (0.0000341) (0.0000116)
d.R&D 15.38 1.61 7.16
(1 lag) (33.03) (6.75) (8.59)
d.R&D -12.57 9.64 14.52501
(2 lags) (34.19) (5.401635) (9.842607)
d.R&D -9.62 -2.92 -13.19
(3 lags) (25.69) (5.55) (8.44)
constant 6,739 208,813* 38,525
(41,136) (106,310) (36,116)
FE FD estimation, 1997-2005. Standard Errors in parentheses.
Significance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Table B.4: distributional effects Czech Republic (full model)
low skill med-high skill med-low skill
dependent variable: d.real wage
esti- 90 % esti- 90 % esti- 90 %
mator intervall mator intervall mator intervall
d.ExpSh 581.8 (-50,634; 19,436 (-33,630; -2,653.513 (-43,261;
(1 lag) (29,935) 51,797) (30,602) 72,502) (24,143) 37,954)
d.unempl -54,520 -188,211 -138,754
(1 lag) (111,398) (161,624) (88,799)
OPS -8.40e-06 -0.0000128* -0.0000138
(1 lag) (0.0000106) (0.0000114) (6.93e-06)
d.R&D 4.57 -2.67 4.43
(1 lag) (24.53) (6.25) (7.32)
d.R&D -24.79 2.59 10.70
(2 lags) (23.64 ) (4.34 ) (8.83)
d.R&D -13.17 -7.19 -11.67
(3 lags) (22.50) (5.2) (7.78)
constant 11,118** 18,778** 14,585***
(4,580) (6,701) (3,201)
FE FD estimation, 1997-2005. Standard Errors in parentheses.
Significance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Table B.5: distributional effects Czech Republic (best AIC model)
77
low skill med-high skill med-low skill
dependent variable: d.real wage
esti- 90 % esti- 90 % esti- 90 %
mator intervall mator intervall mator intervall
d.ExpSh -660,110 (-1,662,048; 82,626 (-4,229,214; -366,606 (-1,419,396;
(1 lag) (577,798) 341,828) (2,419,273) 4,394,466) (623,581) 686,184)
d.ExpSh -103,414 (-1,184,070; -2,796,517 (-6,738,382; -374,241 (-1,466,404;
(2 lags) (623,193) 977,242) (2,211,688) 1,145,348) (646,902) 717,922)
d.ExpSh 307,448 (-1,262,075; 2,789 (-1,113,462; -285,704 (-1,877,754;
(3 lags) (905,113) 1,876,971) (626,303) 1,119,039) (942,991) 1,306,346)
d.unempl -1,929,296 -1.22e+07 -2,323,855
(1 lag) (6,060,027) (1.31e+07) (5,557,185)
real wage gap -65.39** 6.18 -80.03***
(1 lag) (30.67) (65.43) (26.43)
d.MPEN 17,349 (-26,451; -857,691 (-4,683,512; 1,726 (-42,453;
(1 lag) (25,258) 61,148) (2,146,579) 2,968,130) (26,168) 45,905)
d.MPEN 6,784 (-24,510; 3,695,247 (-1,686,332; -701.7 (-35,474;
(2 lags) (18,046) 38,077) (3,019,478) 9,076,826) (20,596) 34,070)
d.OPS -0.0001549 -0.0000237 -0.0003813
(1 lag) (0.0003369) (0.000702) (0.0003552)
OPS 0.0002801 0.000221 0.0005468*
(1 lag) (0.0003037) (0.0004112) (0.0003028)
d.R&D -115.2 2.47 -37.02
(1 lag) (364.6) (35.05) (88.18)
d.R&D -605.0 -18.86 -55.56
(2 lags) (498.9) (32.12) (99.47)
d.R&D -42.83 16.02 -96.39
(3 lags) (346.3) (31.53) (124.9)
constant -1,600,680** 146,163 -2,144,940***
(724,630) (2,330,899) (655,515)
FE FD estimation, 1997-2005. Standard Errors in parentheses.
Significance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Table B.6: distributional effects Hungary (full model)
low skill med-high skill med-low skill
dependent variable: d.real wage
esti- 90 % esti- 90 % esti- 90 %
mator intervall mator intervall mator intervall
d.ExpSh -562,815 (-1,493,493; -1,473,514 (-3,955,513; -279,961 (-1,296,688;
(1 lag) (543,976) 367,864) (1,431,319) 1,008,485) (604,493) 736,767)
d.ExpSh -99,547 (-831,665; 171,269 (-480,648; -461,531 (-1,197,938;
(2 lags) (427,918) 632,570) (375,947) 823,185) (437,829) 274,877)
d.ExpSh 145,079 (-844,581; 761,905* (104,583; -374,337 (-1,366,552;
(3 lags) (578,450) 1,134,739) (379,064) 1,419,226) (589,918) 617,878)
real wage gap -71.26** -59.65 -79.26***
(1 lag) (27.24) (39.25) (23.70)
d.MPEN 11,575 (-27,267; -159,356 (-2,524,660; -2,460 (-43,712;
(1 lag) (22,703) 50,418) (1,364,024) 2,205,949) (24,526) 38,791)
d.R&D 241.3 -17.56 -8.93
(1 lag) (198.0) (18.35) (72.71)
constant -1,670,236** -2,160,539 -1,968,918***
(644,423) (1,501,979) (599,141)
FE FD estimation, 1997-2005. Standard Errors in parentheses.
Significance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Table B.7: distributional effects Hungary (best AIC model)
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low skill med-high skill med-low skill
dependent variable: d.real wage
esti- 90 % esti- 90 % esti- 90 %
mator intervall mator intervall mator intervall
d.ExpSh 11,642 (-28,807; -25,917 (-66,026; 25,855 (-4,474;
(1 lag) (23,452) 52,090) (22,772) 14,192) (17,989) 56,184)
d.ExpSh -17,494 (-54,526; -16,124 (-46,377; -22,020 (-49,484;
(2 lags) (21,472) 19,539) (17,176) 14,128) (16,290) 5,444)
d.ExpSh -19,046 (-47,404; 11,559 (-5,953; -10,033 (-30,712;
(3 lags) (16,442) 9,312) (9,942) 29,071) (12,265) 1,0645)
d.unempl -39,058 70,181* -23,474
(1 lag) (23,848) (34,313) (16,977)
real wage gap 0.2759 -0.6560** 0.0171
(1 lag) (0.4867) (0.2822) (0.3470)
d.MPEN 865.3 (-42,195; 24,374 (-12,350; -14,578 (-45,696;
(1 lag) (24,966) 43,925) (20,851) 61,099) (18,457) 16,540)
d.MPEN 17,478 (-24,917; 22,018 (-6,428; 14,248 (-17,058;
(2 lags) (24,581) 59,873) (16,151) 50,465) (18,569) 45,554)
d.R&D -4.73 9.28 -2.88
(1 lag) (22.46) (7.62) (15.18)
d.R&D 25.64 7.30 15.74
(2 lags) (26.68) (6.53) (16.03)
d.R&D 17.46 3.72 10.26
(3 lags) (24.12) (7.12) (14.91)
constant 7,085 -24,640** 773.7
(11,760) (10,428) (8,929)
FE FD estimation, 1997-2005. Standard Errors in parentheses.
Significance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
OPS had to be excluded since it was not available for all years
and thus estimation of med-high subsample was not possible.
Table B.8: distributional effects Poland (full model)
low skill med-high skill med-low skill
dependent variable: d.real wage
esti- 90 % esti- 90 % esti- 90 %
mator intervall mator intervall mator intervall
d.ExpSh 14,068 (-4,395; 5,813 (-20,616; 15,446* (615.8;
(1 lag) (10,186) 32,530) (13,950) 32,243) (8,577) 30,276)
d.ExpSh 2,287 (-21,273; 11,846 (-18,044; 2,862 (-14,670;
(2 lags) (12,999) 25,846) (15,777) 41,736) (10,139) 20,394)
d.ExpSh -5,090 (-34,444; 37,535* (106.3; -7,775 (-30,178;
(3 lags) (16,196) 24,264) (19,755) 74,963) (12,956) 14,627)
real wage gap -0.2861 -0.2586 -0.2149
(1 lag) (0.3162) (0.3265) (0.2384)
d.OPS 2.98e-07 3.61e-06 -4.23e-07
(1 lag) (1.60e-06) (3.30e-06) (7.77e-07)
constant -7,265 -12,154 -5,661
(7,640) (11,716) (6,118)
FE FD estimation, 1997-2005. Standard Errors in parentheses.
Significance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Table B.9: distributional effects Poland (best AIC model)
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low skill med-high skill med-low skill
dependent variable: d.real wage
esti- 90 % esti- 90 % esti- 90 %
mator intervall mator intervall mator intervall
d.ExpSh 4,486 (-304,305; 125,392 (-273,883; -89,837 (-265,087;
(1 lag) (166,057) 313,277) (187,291) 524,667) (101,611) 85,414)
d.ExpSh -83,008 (-630,464; -117,689 (-505,333; -114,850 (-365,894;
(2 lags) (294,403) 464,448) (181,835) 269,954) (145,557) 136,195)
d.ExpSh 1,966 (-114,523; -87,500 (-24,3843; 9,834 (-55,716;
(3 lags) (62,644) 118,455) (73,337) 68,843) (38,006) 75,384)
d.unempl 391,957 304,599 17,0895
(1 lag) (578,356) (389,007) (234,119)
real wage gap 4.87 -1.97 -7.22
(1 lag) (25.83) (5.26) (6.03)
d.MPEN -45,048 (-355,235; -56,174 (-248,601; 74,228 (-79,244;
(1 lag) (166,808) 265,139) (90,264) 136,254) (88,984) 227,700)
d.MPEN 44,112 (-419,351; 19,161 (-205,440; 84,579 (-117,242;
(2 lags) (249,234) 507,575) (105,355) 243,761) (117,017) 286,400)
d.OPS 0.0000971 2.55e-06 0.000013
(1 lag) (0.0001614) (0.0000735) (0.0000438)
OPS 0.0000156 -0.0001007 9.56e-06
(1 lag) (0.0001918) (0.0001405) (0.0000405)
d.R&D -1,758 -7.05 36.03
(1 lag) (2,936) (37.49) (57.09)
d.R&D 740.0 14.97 62.68
(2 lags) (5,175) (28.86) (61.13)
d.R&D 1,965 -21.90 28.15
(3 lags) (4,658) (24.69) (37.41)
constant 121,659 -56,090 -19,4235
(660,398) (205,730) (161,238)
FE FD estimation, 1997-2005. Standard Errors in parentheses.
Significance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Table B.10: distributional effects Slovakia (full model)
low skill med-high skill med-low skill
dependent variable: d.real wage
esti- 90 % esti- 90 % esti- 90 %
mator intervall mator intervall mator intervall
d.ExpSh -11,261 (-79,189; 76,803* (7,755; -1,530 (-55,152;
(1 lag) (38,908) 56,667) (38,741) 145,852) (31,521) 52,093)
d.ExpSh 1,528 (-82,485; -1,505 (-57,274; -1,556 (-66,922;
(2 lags) (48,120) 85,540) (31,291) 54,264) (38,426) 63,811)
d.ExpSh 22,137 (-45,513; -14,674 (-86,460; 19,780 (-33,930;
(3 lags) (38,748) 89,788) (40,278) 57,112) (31,573) 73,489)
real wage gap -5.126684 -2.656307 -6.51
(1 lag) (7.462152) (2.176272) (4.92366)
constant -126,833 -102,117 -172,723
(186,392) (87,712) (131,794)
FE FD estimation, 1997-2005. Standard Errors in parentheses.
Significance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Table B.11: distributional effects Slovakia (best AIC model)
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low skill med-high skill med-low skill
dependent variable: d.real wage
esti- 90 % esti- 90 % esti- 90 %
mator intervall mator intervall mator intervall
d.ExpSh -1,726** (-3,068; -3,300 (-8,115; -1,917** (-3,336;
(1 lag) (805.8) -384.9) (2,882) 1,514) (856.2) -499.2)
d.ExpSh -1,286 (-2,777; -2,794 (-5,787; -1,700* (-3,218;
(2 lags) (895.9) 205.4) (1,792) 200.2) (916.4) -181.7)
d.ExpSh -691.9 (-2,132; 1,591* (156.9; -1,285 (-2,782;
(3 lags) (865.1) 748.1) (858.7) 3,026) (903.6) 211.3)
d.unempl -7,889* -9,264 -9,888**
(1 lag) (4,273) (7,283) (3,778)
real wage gap -0.2134*** -0.2321*** -0.2902***
(1 lag) (0.0606) (0.0632) (0.0499)
d.MPEN 10.98 (-41.0; 1,770 (-1,987; 11.10 (-45.69;
(1 lag) (31.23) 62.96) (2,249) 5,527 (34.29) 67.89)
d.MPEN -5.72 (-58.59; 3,160 (-62.51; -4.30 (-61.46;
(2 lags) (31.76) 47.1) (1,929) 6,382) (34.51) 52.87)
d.OPS 9.58e-06*** -4.72e-06 1.50e-06
(1 lag) (2.96e-06) (6.23e-06) (2.36e-06)
OPS -9.45e-06** 6.74e-06 8.19e-07
(1 lag) (3.84e-06) (4.56e-06) (1.98e-06)
d.R&D 15.56 1.71 10.92
(1 lag) (20.25) (8.23) (17.23)
d.R&D 0.7902 -5.79 13.69
(2 lags) (23.37) (9.81) (17.88)
d.R&D -6.09 -7.32 -5.77
(3 lags) (22.76) (8.11) (16.04)
constant -4,619*** -8,771*** -7,287***
(1,495) (2,449) (1,287)
FE FD estimation, 1997-2005. Standard Errors in parentheses.
Significance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Table B.12: distributional effects all countries (full model)
low skill med-high skill med-low skill
dependent variable: d.real wage
esti- 90 % esti- 90 % esti- 90 %
mator intervall mator intervall mator intervall
d.ExpSh -1,473*** (-2,324; -2,037 (-4,390; -1,707*** (-2,636;
(1 lag) (511.5) -622.1) (1,410) 315.5) (560.5) -779.3)
d.ExpSh -1,359** (-2,456; -165.6 (-1,571; -1,802** (-2,960;
(2 lags) (659.9) -260.9) (842.3) 1,240) (699.4) -643.7)
d.ExpSh -576.7 (-1,949; 1,604* (231.1; -1,230 (-2,671;
(3 lags) (824.7) 795.1) (823.0) 2,978) (870.4) 211.4)
d.unempl -8,292** -12,360* -9,684***
(1 lag) (3,963) (6,954) ) (3,631)
real wage gap -0.2169*** -0.2569*** -0.2866***
(1 lag) (0.0578) (0.0598) (0.0486)
d.OPS 9.52e-06*** -3.19e-06 1.50e-06
(1 lag) (2.62e-06) (5.32e-06) (2.22e-06)
OPS -8.74e-06** 7.06e-06* 1.08e-06
(1 lag) (3.65e-06) (4.02e-06) (1.94e-06)
constant -4,730*** -9,741*** -7,205***
(1,428) (2,314) ) (1,253)
FE FD estimation, 1997-2005. Standard Errors in parentheses.
Significance: * = 0.1 level, ** = 0.05 level, *** = 0.01 level
Table B.13: distributional effects all countries (best AIC model)
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Zusammenfassung
Ich verwende die STAN-Datenbank der OECD sowie verschiedene
o¨konometrische Verfahren, um in dieser Diplomarbeit die Auswirkungen der
Exporte in die La¨nder der EU-15 auf Lo¨hne in den Visegra´d Staaten (Polen,
Slowakei, Tschechien und Ungarn) zu untersuchen.
Die Ergebnisse lassen keine klaren Schlussfolgerungen u¨ber diesen Zusam-
menhang zu. Wa¨hrend letzterer u¨ber einen kurzen Zeitraum durchaus negativ
sein kann, scheint er zumindest in Polen und Ungarn langfristig positiv zu sein.
Klar ersichtlich ist hingegen, dass die Entwicklung der Exporte der un-
tersuchten zentral- und osteuropa¨ischen Staaten nicht den Vorhersagen des
Heckscher-Ohlin Modells folgt und somit die darauf aufbauenden Theoreme
von Stolper und Samuelson (1941) und bezu¨glich des internationalen Ausgle-
ichs von Faktorpreisen die zugrundeliegenden Faktoren des Einflusses von Han-
del auf Faktorpreise nicht hinla¨nglich beschreiben.
Schlagwo¨rter: Paneldaten, EU-Erweiterung, Handel, Lo¨hne, Faktorpreise,
Einkommensverteilung, Zentral- und Osteuropa, Visegra´d Staaten
JEL Klassifikation: C23, F14, F15, F16
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Abstract
For this thesis, I used the STAN database of the OECD and different econo-
metric methods to investigate the effects of exports towards the EU-15 on wages
in the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia).
The results do not allow to draw any definite statements about this effect.
While the impact of exports towards the EU-15 on wages in the countries in-
vestigated is likely to be negative in the short run, it seems to be positive in
the long run, at least for Hungary and Poland.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the pattern of CEEC-4 exports towards the
EU-15 does not correspond with the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
Therefore, also the theorems of Stolper and Samuelson (1941) and concerning
the equalization of factor prices, which are based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model,
do not seem accurate to describe the underlying forces linking trade with factor
prices.
Keywords: panel data, EU enlargement, trade, wages, factor prices, in-
come distribution, Central and Eastern Europe, Visegrad Countries
JEL Classification: C23, F14, F15, F16
